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



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


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Three Types
of Practical Ethical Movements
of the Past Half Century



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Three Types of Practical Ethical Movements of the Past Half Century

BY

LEO JACOBS

New York

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TO
THOMAS DAVIDSON
my revered teacher, exemplar, and guide,
I dedicate this humble effort of
mine towards the construction
of a better world.

PREFATORY NOTE

Practical as distinguished from theoretic ethics is a by-product of the industrial revolution, and one of the new sciences of the second half of the nineteenth century. Like every new science, it stands in need of a terminology of its own. The old terms applicable to theoretic ethics no longer satisfy. Such words as "social," "organic," "solidarity," and even "religious," "good," and "true," require a reinterpretation, if not an altogether new conceptual setting. The development of this new terminology is slow. Meanwhile a word of caution must be sounded by an author who undertakes to work in a new field with tools originally fashioned for a different soil.

By the term "Religious Ethical Movement," I mean an ethical movement which rests on a theological dogma. The Christian Socialist Movement which is described in the first chapter is but a part of the "Religious Ethical Movement." The Jewish Community Centers which are springing up about us are another part of the same movement, resting, however, on a somewhat different theological basis. I use the term "Religious Ethical Movement" rather than "Christian Socialist Movement" as a chapter-title, because the former is more inclusive; and the results which follow from an analysis of its principles would therefore hold true not only of Christian Socialism but also of Jewish Religious Movements. This title must not, however, be taken to imply that the other practical movements are irreligious. This is a point I wish to stress; for most of us

are all too prone to take the usual contrary of a given term for granted.

This applies to the implication of the term "pure" in the title "Pure Ethical Movement." It is not intended to mean that "The Religious Ethical Movement" and "The Social Ethical Movement" are impure in the ordinary sense of the word. Surely those who join the Ethical Culture Societies do not regard themselves as alone saintly and all others as less so. In speaking of the Ethical Culture Movement as "The Pure Ethical Movement," I use the word "pure" in its technical sense with no implication that the movement claims a monopoly of the highest virtue. The terminology of practical ethical science is, as was said, in the process of formulation, and the terms used meanwhile are therefore provisional. The word "pure" in the chapter on "The Pure Ethical Movement" is descriptive of an ethical movement which rests on no theological dogma whatever.

It must also be understood that what is here set forth about each of the three practical movements commits no one but myself. Their founders and followers may, perhaps, disagree with my interpretations. I offer them as my own.

A word of appreciation of those who assisted me in the task of sending this work forth to the world must not be omitted. The deepest appreciation is felt by the author for the labor bestowed by Dr. Henry Neumann and Mr. James Gutmann in reading the proof-sheets, and for their invaluable suggestions. Lastly I acknowledge with warm gratitude the efforts of my wife, without whose initiative this work would still be resting as manuscript in the drawer of my desk.

BROOKLYN, N. Y.

January, 1922.

LEO JACOBS.

INTRODUCTION

AMONG English-speaking peoples there have been in progress during the past fifty years three types of ethical reform movements. These aimed at practical and not at merely theoretical ethics. They aimed at conduct and not at theories of conduct. Each of these types has had a free run for at least a generation, and during this period each has developed and perfected its scheme and method, setting forth its ground plan and its propaganda. Time has now come to examine the aim and scope of these reform movements, with a view towards determining the chances of success which each type inherently carries by virtue of the principles on which it makes its appeal for a more ethical conduct. A practical ethical movement resembles in this one respect a political movement. Both make an appeal for a certain line of conduct. But the manner of estimating their success in obtaining their object is ascertainable in the one by a resort to the suffrage of the people, a purely *a posteriori* process; in the other by an indirect *a priori* process; for there is no direct way of determining the efficiency of a contemporary ethical movement.

The three types of practical ethical movements must therefore be subjected to an internal criticism, if their efficiency as practical movements is to be determined. This is all the more necessary because in the absence of any other test, the protagonists of each type claim, for one reason or another, the superiority of the one

avored by them over those favored by others. There are at present hosts of workers in the Religious Ethical Movement, who have certain interests to maintain. Now it is as easy to become a bigot in an ethical as in any other movement, and those who are attached to certain interests often become willing bigots to maintain them. And by most people the glowing accounts these give of their successful achievements in practical ethical reform, can neither be proved nor disproved in any direct way. To a few only is direct observation possible, and these few are offset by the many who have an interest to maintain. Where it is thus hard to maintain the truth by an appeal to objective facts, resort must be had to subjective principles. A thorough analysis of these will reveal the strength and weakness of the types to which they belong and thus also forecast the likelihood of their efficiency in practical affairs.

Each of the three types of the practical ethical reform movements rests on a different basic principle, from which it derives the greater part of its strength and no small share of its weakness. To set these forth by an analysis of the movements both in their historic developments and in their principles is the object of this work. Whatever positive contribution to practical ethics is to be found herein, has been set forth not as a separate and altogether new thesis—for in a treatment of practical ethical reform movements, this would involve, nay necessitate, the formation of a different and entirely new movement which is not at all necessary—but has been embodied in the negative criticisms of the Religious Ethical Movement in Chapter I and of the Social Ethical Movement in Chapter II; but more directly in the positive and favorable criticism of the Pure Ethical Movement treated in Chapter III.

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Three Types
of Practical Ethical Movements
of the Past Half Century

THREE TYPES OF PRACTICAL ETHICAL MOVEMENTS OF THE PAST HALF CENTURY

CHAPTER I

THE RELIGIOUS ETHICAL MOVEMENT

(I) *The Christian Socialism of Maurice*

THE second and third decades of the 19th century were characterized by tremendous social unrest. They represent a period of transition, political, industrial and economic, which was ushered in with the subsiding of the Napoleonic cyclone. The unrest was universal. To the sighs of the lowest classes of society, centuries old, was added a general unrest that permeated the social mass and threatened to burst the fetters that bound it.

Though the shackles were everywhere under new strain, these strains were not of the same kind in all places. In England and in America, they were industrial and economic; in Italy, in Spain, in Austria, and in Poland they were political. The calm has by no means arrived yet, though the storm has somewhat changed in character. As a result of this unrest some progress was made. In America, slavery was abolished; and much has been accomplished in England and in

Italy, countries which were fortunate in the possession of high-minded leaders.

Despite these achievements there still remains enormous social and industrial unrest to-day. Yet there is a difference between the unrest of to-day and that of the middle of the century. The working class of 1848 felt itself in possession of little power, and that for three reasons: 1. It had as yet little experience in organization and therefore was unable to bring united pressure to bear upon the weakest point of the opposition. 2. It looked upon the opposition party with somewhat of the awe with which the serf looked upon his master. 3. The dignity of labor had not yet been sufficiently established and therefore the working-class did not find itself bold enough to face the employing class as equal faces equal. The unrest expressed itself therefore intermittently, breaking out here and there, often with volcanic intensity.

The unrest of to-day is characterized by just the opposite marks. To-day the working class is in possession of the consciousness of a tremendous power—a power secured by effective and experienced organization, and it no longer feels any of that reverence toward the upper class which used to serve as a deterrent principle in its opposing attitudes to the employing group. In addition, the increased comforts with which modern inventions have blessed even the very poor, have filled up somewhat the gap between the two classes and helped to raise the contestants to a nearly similar level. The battles between the industrial classes to-day are therefore more masterful. The parties are always on the qui vive, and are ever preparing in times of industrial peace for the trying times of industrial war. The clashes therefore when they do come are like those which occur when Greek meets Greek.

It was, however, only slowly and gradually that the inequality in the fighting equipment of the two classes was removed. In the history of the removal of this inequality, the Religious Ethical Movement plays a great part. It has helped to match the combatants, and has also tried to parry their blows; and like the Red Cross Societies on the battlefield, it has endeavored to assuage the wounds after they were once made. To trace the history of its activity we must go back to the Reform Bill of 1832.

The Reform Bill of 1832 enfranchised the middle class inhabiting the newly arisen manufacturing cities. But the workers in the factories and the sweaters in the shops still remained in a condition of subserviency. They were subject to the aristocracy of wealth which is even more distasteful than subjection to a feudal aristocracy of birth. The feudal lord was at least solicitous of the condition of his underlings, and a sense of undefined duty moved him to take under his protection his lowly tenants. Not so was it with the new aristocracy. The moneyed aristocrat owing his wealth to the exploitation of laborers to whom he was bound by no feudal ties was more ruthless than the feudal lord. He was more self-centered, more self-flattering, more boastful of his energy and resources.

This attitude of the captain of industry was bound to bring about a spirit whose philosophy of life was expressed in the saying, "Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost." This extreme individualism felt no duties towards others, nor scruples about means. It rested, in short, on a lower moral plane than did the feudalism which it supplanted. No wonder that men like Carlyle and Ruskin detested it to the utmost and with prophet-like vehemence called for a return of the old feudal order. The new was

evidently worse than the old. Human emotions seemed to have dried up during the transition from the one to the other. The moneyed aristocrat had neither pity nor love; neither the fatherly anxiety of the feudal lord, nor the prudent selfishness which characterized the southern slave owner.

Carlyle, apostle of paternalism, abhorred strongly this type and blamed the individualistic system for giving it birth. Not knowing how to turn the new individualism back to the humane channels from which it sprang, he came to hate individualism which was responsible for the new order. Tennyson had not yet written the lines:

"The old order changeth yielding place to new, . . .
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world,"

and Darwin had not yet propounded the new truth. Carlyle therefore could see no way out of the difficulty except by going back to the old. He lived in an age of transition and not being able to go with the current, he undertook to buffet it. His work is an apotheosis of Feudalism. He says, "Let the merely commercial contract between man and man be dissolved, and let the old, feudal, domestic, yea even if it were serf-like relation be restored." Carlyle had no other plan of redemption.

Carlyle was the prophet of the Ideal Order. He stood for the German notion of law, a rather abstract concept which he borrowed from German Philosophy. The concrete seemed to his idealistic temperament somewhat polluted and corrupt, and to stand much in the relation which the concrete particulars of Plato stood in with regard to the Ideas. Carlyle thus despised the concrete. He could not tolerate any aberration from the ideal even in the social sphere. Now

the sphere of social economics is the most concrete of all the spheres of life, and the application of the ideal order of Law for which Carlyle stood to this sphere seemed at that time perhaps as incongruous as does at present the application of Christian Science to a person suffering from physical ills on his sick bed. But to Carlyle this was the only way of redemption from the social and industrial ills of the times. He abhorred any other plan; for he believed in no other.

The redemption which Carlyle failed to see was, however, perceived in a quarter which Carlyle was, to be sure, acquainted with, but which he utterly despised. That quarter was the Church. Now the Church has ever been the institution in which the ideal is made concrete and in which it is particularized. In it, the Great Unknown is clothed with a particular personality and made perceptible to the senses; and even the Great Beyond is particularized into Heaven and Hell. It was this institution, so adept in the art of particularization, that now stepped into the arena and applied its methods to the social and industrial difficulties of the time. In this institution the concrete affairs of the world are given a place in the grand mosaic of life, and the new conditions which Carlyle's ideal order could not arrange in that mosaic, were embodied in it by a churchman, Frederick Denison Maurice, a contemporary of Carlyle. It was Maurice who first applied to the new concrete industrial problems the religious machinery which was by nature so well adapted for dealing with the concrete. Maurice was persuaded that in Christianity alone lay social salvation.

Carlyle and Maurice represent two different types. To contrast the one with the other, is to contrast the abstract German Philosophy of Reason with the concrete practical English Philosophy of sense which loved

to deal with particulars. It is with concrete particular social endeavors that we find Maurice connected at all times.

In 1848 the condition of the laboring classes was deplorable. Strangely enough, it was the class most recently enfranchised, the industrial merchants who had been enfranchised in 1832, that now were the oppressors of the laboring classes and opposed their enfranchisement. Kingsley's "Yeast" and "Alton Locke" give by no means exaggerated pictures of the conditions. The sweaters in the shops, the workers in the mines and factories were no better off after 1832 than before it. They were literally enslaved bodily and mentally. The laboring classes looked back to 1832 when Parliamentary legislation removed the political disability of the middle class; and copying the political program of that class they likewise sought by legislative enactment to better their own circumstances. They put their trust in a freer charter, and for a long time after 1832 Chartist agitation was the propaganda of the working class. For many years occasional riots and conflagrations in various localities in England were part of their policy.

By 1848 the laboring classes, who for years had seen their hope in Chartism, began to lean towards Socialism; and Socialism had by that time assumed a political aspect. The social and political movements had coalesced, and the agitation for new reforms became thereby more threatening. This threat took a definite, though a veiled form in April, 1848, when the monster petition of the Chartists estimated to contain a million signatures, was presented to the Parliament. It was generally supposed that the implied threat would be carried out with riot and revolution in case Parliament failed to comply. England was really frightened; but the lethargic clergy did not move.

Those who looked upon the times impartially, and not from the viewpoint of a class, felt alike the wrongs of the laborers and the inadequacy of their demands for a Parliamentary reform. They were desirous to avoid bloodshed and felt that something ought to be done. Chief among this group was Maurice, the son of a Unitarian minister who shared with his father and sisters the community-work which circumstances called forth during the period of his youth. The experience he had gained then helped him now, in his manhood, to tackle more confidently the problems which gave rise to Chartism. He was ably seconded by Kingsley and Ludlow. This group of three set about to mend matters in a way that seemed to them most likely to succeed. Their efforts were heroic and their indefatigable zeal resembled that of Mazzini in his efforts for Italian unity. These high-minded men knew the futility of the Chartist proposal to bring about economic reform by mere Parliamentary fiat, and urged strongly against it; but not by forceful measures did they manifest their objection to Chartism.

Theirs was an educational propaganda carried on through a periodical called *Politics for the People*, which Maurice and Kingsley had established and to which the latter was the chief contributor under the nom de plume of Parson Lot. The aim of this periodical was to bring about a better feeling between the upper class and the working class. *Politics for the People* combated successfully the Chartist's fallacy of relying on an act of Parliament to bring about a moral reform and to stem greed and selfishness by a legislative fiat. They taught that only by Christian practices can human relations be amicably established. The articles written in *Politics for the People* stirred up vehement opposition from those who were bene-

fited by the status quo, but they had, nevertheless, the effect of bringing about a better feeling between the upper class and the working men, some of whom became closely attached to Maurice and to his conciliatory policy. This was exactly the object for which Maurice's movement was started, namely, the removal of the barrier which existed between laborers and employers. As early as 1840 he writes: "What education can avail best to put down Chartism? By confuting its unrighteous pretensions, by satisfying its righteous demands. This is the education which the people of England want." For about two years this education was spread by *Politics for the People*. At the end of this period, the more sensible men at least began through his efforts to fraternize with workmen in education, in amusement and in organization. Opposition to Maurice's propaganda soon manifested itself. He was accused of being a Socialist; and the accusation came not only from his lay brethren but from his fellow-clergymen as well. The term Socialism at that time implied also atheism and a disregard for moral laws and consequently violence and bloodshed. The English clergy, while not organized as solidly as the continental Neo-catholic clergy in opposition to Socialism, were none the less as strongly opposed to it, and mostly through ignorance of what Socialism stood for.

The clergy were infected with an aristocratic aloofness from the laboring classes of whose economic circumstances, which were by far more pressing than their spiritual needs, they knew nothing. They lived in that careless indifference to the actual worldly condition of their flocks which made their mission as pastors a mockery. The estrangement between that Christian life of the clergy and the economic life of the laboring

classes meant, in short, that the life of the latter was unchristian, and that of the former unpractical. No one appreciated this more fully than Maurice who had been brought up amidst his father's practical schemes of social reform. Even before the ripening of the Chartist petition he writes: "The necessity of an English theological reformation as the means of averting an English political revolution, has been more and more pressing my mind."

To win the support of the clergy to his view he began a new periodical called the *Christian Socialist*. It was intended to bring about a better understanding between the clergy and the laboring classes, just as *Politics for the People* was designed to bring about a better understanding between the upper class and the working people. Its whole tenor is a protest against "unsocial Christians and against unchristian Socialists." All the misery of life is attributed to the unchristian relation between man and man. "Every successful strike," he writes in 1850, "tends to give the workmen a very undue and dangerous sense of their own power and a very alarming contempt for their employer, and every unsuccessful strike drives them to desperate and wild courses." The only open path which leads to a proper relation between man and man in all their dealings, public, private, economic and industrial, is that which leads to the constitution of society on a family basis. "I may talk," he says, "about the Church as a family forever; if I do not try to show that it can ever under any circumstances fulfill some of the obligations of one, my preaching is a poor thing."

The central theme of Maurice's social philosophy, the basic principle that underlies all his thoughts is the Fatherhood of God. By tenaciously holding to the Fatherhood idea, he felt that he could inculcate in all

men the Brotherhood idea, and in this way root out the selfish greed from men's hearts which was responsible for the inhumanity manifested in the new industrial order. Accordingly he emphasizes it to such an extent that the theological consideration becomes to him the most embracing phase of human life. From it are derived all human institutions; state institutions, educational institutions and family institutions. In his conception of the State he does not start from the radical or popular ground. "I begin," he says, "in the acknowledgment of the divine sovereignty; thence I come to the idea of kings reigning by the grace of God; This I hold to be the first of political truths historically and the first fundamentally." The same principle he sets forth in regard to the educational question that was troubling Parliament at the time. When the Educational Bill was before Parliament, the question debated was whether the State or the Church was more fitted to undertake national education. Maurice moved by his metaphysical, theological ground-principle presses the view that theology rightly understood as the study of existing facts, was best fitted for the purpose of binding all other studies which form the curriculum of a national system of education. Theology was to serve as the "*scientia scientiarum*," the science whose business it is to assign to all other sciences their proper place. Sociology and economics thus became the mere handmaids of theology.

The close acquaintance and association with workingmen which the publication of the two successive periodicals had fostered, led directly to a practical setting forth of a new policy in economic reform. Fixed by the theologic notion of God's fatherhood which cannot be squared at all well with an individualistic system, the Christian Socialists ceased mere literary propaganda

and conceived the plan of workingmen's coöperative associations. They pushed the scheme by touring the country and by lecturing. They also changed the name of their periodical to *Journal of Co-operative Associations*.

The political economists of the Ricardian school at once felt their field invaded and took swift measures to repel the invaders who, as they thought, came from a foreign province with Christian principles as weapons. What business had theologians with economic problems? Maurice, whose voice was the "*ipse dixit*" of the group, launched forth with the theory that "Political Economy is not the foundation of morals and politics, but must have them (the Christian Principles) for its foundation or be worth nothing. Competition," he says, "is put forth as the law of the universe. That is a lie. The time is come for us to decree it is a lie by word and deed. I see no way but association for work instead of for strikes. I do not say that the relation of employer and employed is not a true relation. I do not determine that wages may not be a righteous mode of expressing that relation. But at present it is clear that this relation is destroyed, that the payment of wages is nothing but deception."

Unmindful of the attacks of the economists, the Christian Socialists established workingmen's associations all over England. A group of promoters was formed at first to advise and then to finance these associations. Of these associations many prospered, but many also failed, much to the delight of the Ricardians. The failures were due mostly to the mistrust which sprang up among the workers.

Education, especially moral education, must be supplied if workingmen's associations were not to go down in failure. Maurice and his friends at once came for-

ward to supply the need. He established a workingmen's college where instruction was given in the evenings. The faculty numbered men of prominence, and all gave their instruction gratis. The college was a great success, and was the last of the practical schemes of social reform conceived by the early Christian Socialists. They had devoted the best part of their lives to social reform and had become old in the service. At the time of Maurice's death all classes of men, his staunchest opponents among them, acknowledged the greatness of his work. Indeed the comparative calm that settled over the land was acknowledged to be due in the words of Brentano "to the Christian spirit and personal efforts of Maurice and his friends."

It has sometimes been said that the great social reformer must be possessed not so much of a great truth as of a great enthusiasm for that which he believes to be the truth. In this sense Maurice was a great reformer. For the truth which he enunciated, the Fatherhood idea as applied to industrial relations, is but a half-truth at best. Yet from belief in this truth he never for a moment wavered. On occasions, the singleness of the truth which he believed in made him blind to other truth. While listening for instance to a lecture by Carlyle, he restrained himself with difficulty from jumping from his seat. "I felt throughout" (the lecture), he says, "how much more kind and tolerant towards the truth in all forms of faith and opinion, he can be and should be, who does in his heart believe Jesus Christ to be the son of God and that all systems are feeling after Him, in the common center of the world, than Carlyle can ever be while he regards the world as without a center, and the doctrines of Christ's Incarnation, Passion and Resurrection as only one of the mythical vestures in which certain actions, which

without such a vesture, he secretly knows and confesses to be good-for-nothing abstractions, have wrapt themselves up." Maurice sought and found a metaphysical basis. "I cannot find," he writes again, "that Carlyle leads us directly to a center; but I do find that he makes us despair for want of one, and that he expresses the indistinct wailings of men in search of it better than all the other writers of our day. Just as far as I have been able to grasp this belief in a Head of Humanity, just so far the greatest problems of Ethics seem to me to find a solution. . . . This was the rock upon which I felt I could rest. It was a foundation for a universal human society. . . . If Christ be really the head of every man, and if he really had taken human flesh, there is ground for a universal fellowship among men, a fellowship that is itself the foundation of those particular fellowships of the nation and the family which I also consider sacred. It is the business of the Church to assert this ground of universal fellowship; that it ought to make men understand and feel how possible it is for men as men to fraternize in Christ; how impossible it is to fraternize except in Him." Maurice was influenced not by the force of intellect but of faith. He found the key of all his problems, not in an infallible reason but in faith in the everlasting love of God.

Such then is the solution of the economic problems which the new industrialism called into existence. How much better is this than Carlyle's solution? The want of a center, which Maurice deplored in Carlyle, he believed he made good. Christ was the center and only in Him was it possible to fraternize. What was the result? Those outside of Him could not come into brotherly relations. Maurice not only taught but acted upon this exclusive principle, as for instance, when he refused to work with other Christian sects on

the ground of our common Christianity "because to fraternize upon the common elements in sects is an avowal that you fraternize on some other ground than that of our union in Christ." In other words, you must accept the metaphysical basis of Maurice's ethics or he will not enter into ethical relations with you. You must be able to say with him, "Our father who art in Heaven," or you will not be able to coöperate ethically with him in earthly labors.

This is the conclusion to which a half-truth such as is that of the Fatherhood idea drives. The best indication that the Fatherhood idea as a basis of brotherhood is only a half-truth lies in the fact that it is self-contradictory. It seeks brotherhood at the start, but at the end it repels it. "He that is not for us is against us" is the conclusion to which every religious ethical movement has come, the moment it digs down to metaphysical rock for its foundation. Only those who are like each other can fraternize.

An ethics so grounded must become exclusive. Such was the case with the Jewish Ethical System founded on a patriarchal origin. By it, all relations with the gentile who stood without the communion were restricted. The wine he touched became impure; and even the dishes he ate from needed purification. The inherent weakness of the Religious Ethical Movement is its exclusiveness—an exclusiveness which manifests itself chiefly in seeking a basis for ethical conduct, and in not being satisfied with conduct alone.

Carlyle was not altogether wrong when he called the Christian Socialists mystics. They insisted on a metaphysical foundation for ethical fellowship, instead of giving indefeasible value to ethical conduct regardless of its foundation. The hair-splitting disputant has ever been the most intolerant bigot. It may be rightly

charged that the thinking man, the philosopher who looks for final causes, finds it much harder to live in ethical fellowship than the ordinary unsophisticated man who, when satisfied with his fellow's conduct, does not probe to learn its credentials.

Maurice starts his practical work in offsetting Chartism by appealing to the Fatherhood idea. He next tries to put brotherhood into practice through the formation of coöperative associations and finally finding it necessary to prepare men for brotherhood, he establishes a workingmen's college. This was the scope of Maurice's activity. The scheme was a noble one. In the whole-hearted enthusiasm with which it was entered upon, it has rarely been equaled. The ground, however, upon which the scheme was based was insufficient to buoy up this enthusiasm and with the death of its leaders, the movement for a time slumbered. When Christian Socialism was revived it was in a somewhat new setting.

(II) *The New Christian Socialists*

The activity of Maurice and Kingsley in behalf of industrial reform along the lines laid down by Christian Ethics ended in the establishment of a "Workingmen's College"—an acknowledgment that by education alone were men to be equipped for industrial coöperation. This was evidently the conviction of the early Christian Socialists—a conviction to which they arrived in consequence of the failure of many of the coöperative associations. But failure was proof to them not that the principle of coöperation had failed, but that the men who entered into it had failings which must first be done away with through education, before the principle could be applied successfully.

Here Maurice and his associates left off. It was not from this point, however, that the new Christian Socialists took up the work, after the temporary lull which the Crimean War had put upon all social activity. Not long after Maurice's death, Christian Socialism shook off its slumber and there began a second period of Christian Socialist activity. In every religious movement, we find, first, a period which is given over to the setting forth of principles; second, a period of disputation which brings out the essence and the contradiction of the principles set forth in the first period. In accordance with this historic truth, the second period of Christian Socialism is a period of disputation, during the course of which, the essence and the difficulties of the principles enunciated by Maurice are strongly contrasted. It thus manifests two opposing views set forth by two opposing parties. Broadly speaking, these two opposing parties are represented by two organizations, the Guild of St. Matthew and the Christian Social Union.

Both these organizations have in common with each other and with the Christian Socialism of Maurice, the protest against the inhumanity and against the selfishness of the times. They have in common also the belief that Christian teaching alone is the lever by which the social degradation of the times can be rolled away. But they fail to grasp the significance of the educational movement in which Maurice's work ended, and they entirely neglected it.

The Guild of St. Matthew and the Christian Social Union fall into differences over the practical significance of God's Fatherhood as taught by Christ, and over the meaning and emphasis which Christ put upon his doctrines.

(a) The Guild of St. Matthew

The Guild, which was founded in 1877 by the Rev. Steward D. Headlam, a pupil of Maurice, identifies Christ's teachings with the teachings of Socialism. He claims that Christ's Kingdom of God is an earthly kingdom and that his reforms were such as are those which Socialism promises to inaugurate: the doing away with diseases and untimely deaths that are the direct outcome of social and economic conditions. Excluding the views of some Socialists upon religion and marriage, the program of the Guild is identical with those of the economic Socialists. They point out that "The works of Christ were all distinctly secular, socialistic works—works for health against disease, works restoring beauty and harmony and pleasure where there had been ugliness and discord and misery—works taking care to see that the people were properly fed, works subduing nature to human good, works showing that mirth and joy have a true place in our life here, works also showing that premature death has no place here."¹

The Guild of St. Matthew allied itself as far as possible with the Fabian Society which Thomas Davidson founded in London in 1883 but which he abandoned when its program became socialistic. The Guild of St. Matthew and the Fabian Society wage a common war upon society as it is constituted to-day. As allies, the Guild offers its platform to the Socialistic orators and speakers of the Fabian Society, and the Fabian Society opens its Fabian Tracts to the pen of the Guild. Never was the insight of Maurice into human needs more clearly revealed when he chose the name Christian Socialism for his movement, than it was by this union of a Christian organization with a purely Social-

¹ S. D. Headlam—*Christian Socialism*.

istic organization. For this union proves that there was something intrinsically valuable in the life of Christ by which both Socialists and Christians were alike attracted, no matter what their separate beliefs may have been in regard to the church doctrines that were built upon that simple life.

There are certain human relations that are unhesitatingly approved or condemned by all parties, so that even a child is judge of them and discerns the right and wrong. These are the ordinary dealings between man and man, which conscience in each case approves or disapproves. In the humblest walks of life, in the simple unsophisticated cobbler, we often find the purest forms of moral life. And we find pure forms of moral life among the lowly, assuredly not because nature has made it easy for them to live the moral life—for she has not provided abundantly for them and has not made unnecessary the fierce struggle for existence which has turned almost everywhere men into brutes. The sweat of the simple man's toil and his long hours of labor are indications that competition and hardships are not absent. But purity is here a sort of natural product—as natural a concomitant of life as the blossom is of the plant's growth. Such was the life of Christ in every particular. We hear of no academic debates between Christian and Socialist questioning and defending the value of Christ's acts. And the acts which Christ performed and which every simple man daily performs in the course of his life, in his vocation and amidst his pleasures, in his family and in his communal life, are the acts that comprise by far the greatest portion of every man's human life.

Such acts have unquestioned value. The philosopher's stone alone causes the ripple in the calm waters of life where these acts abound; and the confused reflec-

tions, that come from the surface thus rippled, do not enable us to recognize the good from the bad. It seems as if it requires intellectual greatness to discern human littleness. Indeed, Mephistophelian intellectual acumen is often guilty of stirring up drowsy human brutishness. In the sphere of conduct it is more true than elsewhere that Thought sunders and that Life unites.

Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the consequences flowing from the life of Christ as compared with those flowing from his supposed metaphysical thoughts. The life of Christ has united millions and passed muster for two thousand years through the test of various ethical systems, while the supposed thoughts of Christ, belabored with metaphysical formulæ accumulating for centuries, have separated millions and have never received the sanction of other ethical systems. The advent of the Church with its dogma and rules has heaped confusion upon confusion. Christian and Socialist are never more united than in their approval of life; never more at variance than on questions of dogma.

How blind we must be to fail to see that the approval which everybody's conscience, Socialists' as well as Christians', gives to the life of Christ, is an approval of his mere "Good Will towards Man"; and that whenever universal conscience approves the simple life of the simple man, the element in that life that calls forth approval is the good-will that it manifests.

Metaphysical analysis that seeks the ground and basis of the good will is the stone that confuses the calm waters, and cleaves their unbroken surface into lashing and warring parts. In the ethical movement which we are studying we have a further illustration of this historic truth. "Christian Socialists are agreed in their antagonism to individual greed and injustice;

in personal and sympathetic devotion to the welfare of the people; the parting of the ways is as to the real basis on which modern industry shall organize itself."¹ When thought seeks for bases upon which to ground pure simple good will, it acts its metaphysical rôle and accomplishes nothing. This is particularly true of the work of the Guild in metaphysical regions. The Guild of St. Matthew, seeking a basis for its ethics, finds that the real basis on which to organize is to be found in the Church Catechism and the Prayer Book. The Guild purposes: 1. "To get rid of the existing prejudice against the Church, her sacraments and doctrines, and to endeavor to justify God to the people. 2. To promote frequent and reverent worship in the Holy Communion and a better observance of the teaching of the Church of England. 3. To promote the study of social and political questions in the light of the Incarnation."

In putting forth such a program, the Guild delving into metaphysical speculation, reaped the inevitable consequences. A program such as this, divides. It does not unite. It seems to have an ax of its own to grind instead of a desire to grind the common axe. The basis on which it sets out to establish the brotherhood principle of Hillel and the good-will of Christ is far too narrow to support such principle. It ends naturally in intolerance of all systems that endeavor to establish the same principle on another basis. "Christian Socialists," says the manifesto issued by the Guild of St. Matthew, "know no outlying spheres or districts. . . . Every thought of individualism and isolation is spiritual treason."

Such intolerance destroys the very principle of good-will which it seeks to establish. It strives to whip men

¹ Rev. J. Clifford—in *Fabian Socialist Series* No. 1, p. 31.

into line not for the living out together of the good-will principle but only for the acceptance of its own dogmas. It tries to establish altruism by an example of egoism. For as George Santayana says, "Intolerance itself is also a form of egoism, and to condemn egoism intolerantly is to share it." Such action may be excusable in Socialism which makes no claim to be primarily an ethical movement, but in Christian Socialism, which stands primarily for ethical life, intolerance can find no excuse; and yet the writings of the Guild members show abundant evidence of it, particularly with regard to economic questions. "We Christian Socialists," writes the founder of the Guild, "maintain that the reform calling for access to the land in the country (and taking away of the land from their present owners and distributing it among the workers) is demanded by justice and we maintain not only that it can be carried out in consistence with the highest morality but that morality is impossible without it."

This is exactly the Socialistic cry—the cry that the landowner is a robber. The Christian Socialists of the Guild of St. Matthew, like the economic socialists of the Fabian Society, classify society into beggars, robbers and workers. "If you want a rough description of the object of the Christian Socialists," writes Rev. Steward D. Headlam of the Society, "I should say that it was to bring about the time when all shall work and when the robbers shall be utterly abolished. A follower of Christ is to be an out-and-out fighter against poverty."

How different this species of Christian Socialism which the Guild teaches, is from that of the Christian Socialism of Maurice! The Christian Socialism of Maurice not even in its most ardent moments stooped to the calling of names; while the Guild of St. Matthew resorts to this practice without the least suspicion of

being itself guilty of unchristian conduct. And yet, the Guild of St. Matthew, whose founder, the Rev. S. D. Headlam, was a pupil of Maurice, insists that the Guild "came into being to develop the teachings of Maurice and other English theologians of 1848, convinced that their faith was to be found in the Church Catechism and the Prayer Book."¹

This is no great departure from the doctrine of Maurice. It is, as Noel says, a development of the metaphysical principle of Maurice who was the philosopher of Christian Socialism. It is the logical outcome of Maurice's position that the Church "ought to make men understand and feel how impossible it is to fraternize except in Christ and that the only true basis of human brotherhood is the acceptance of a common Father and a common Savior." This means, that the good-will of Christ, exhibited in life, is not possible except upon a metaphysical basis, upon which it is supposed to rest—namely, upon the basis of God's Fatherhood, of Christ's Incarnation, Passion and Resurrection. From this it follows naturally, as Headlam says, that every baptized person is bound by the catechism to treat every other baptized person absolutely as a brother.

But every unbaptized brother is not included in the community. This has been the verdict of history in regard to all ethical systems that sought a ground for brotherhood and found it in the principle of likeness. "He that is not of us is against us," is the unvaried outcome of such a system. Its corollary is intolerance. If you cannot accept our catechism, we cannot include you in our fellowship, even though you accept our Bible.

The founder of the Guild and the avowed successor

¹ Conrad Noel—in *Guild of St. Matthew*.

of Maurice complains bitterly that every horrible Calvinistic doctrine can be taught now in our Board Schools. "It is certainly not for those who value true manly religion," he writes, "to allow a compromise which includes the Bible and excludes the Catechism." Simple good-will is forgotten in the all-absorbing interest of finding a basis for it.

The social principle inherent in the good-will is negated by the platform upon which men sought to rest it. The vestment is considered more valuable than the principle which it clothes; and thus finally we lose sight of the essence and fraternize not on the simple principle but on some metaphysical basis for it. That Catholic priest, who replied to the accusation of harboring one that was guilty of all human vices, by saying, "Shall I make her an infidel also?" acted consistently along this line.

The Guild of St. Matthew thus fails where Maurice's school failed, and for the same reason. It has not exerted an influence like to that of Maurice and the earlier Christian Socialists; but this difference in influence shows itself not because their doctrines were unlike each other; on the contrary, their bases were nearly identical. The difference in results is due to the fact that the degree of influence is proportional to the life one leads, and not to the thought one preaches. The life of Maurice, not his thought, was responsible for his influence. The lives of the Guild members, good lives though they were, did not measure up to the grandeur of the earlier Christian Socialists and their corresponding influence was thus less visible.

(b) *The Christian Social Union*

The Christian Social Union which represents the other phase of the revised Christian Socialism was

founded in 1889 by Bishop Westcott who had also been a pupil of Maurice at Cambridge. It numbers among its members the dominant portion of the English clergy, and exerts therefore considerable influence. It has established a considerable number of branches throughout England, chief of which are the Oxford and the London branches. The former, through its organ the *Economic Review* is its most effective mouthpiece.

The objects for which the Christian Social Union was organized are set forth as follows:

1. To claim for Christian Law, the ultimate authority to rule social practice.
2. To study in common how to apply the moral truths and principles of Christianity to the social and economic difficulties of the times.
3. To present Christ in practical life as the living Master and King, the Enemy of wrong and selfishness, the Power of righteousness and love.

The principles by which the Christian Social Union expects to attain these ends are set forth thus:

1. In Jesus Christ, God is the father of all men, and all men are brothers.
2. God is the sole possessor of the earth and its fullness; men are the stewards of God's bounties.
3. Labor, being the exercise of body, mind and spirit, in the broadening and elevating of human life, it is the duty of every man to labor diligently.
4. Labor, as thus defined should be the standard of social worth.
5. When the divinely intended opportunity to labor is given to all men, one great cause of the present widespread suffering and destitution will be removed.

More briefly stated, the guiding principles, the basic supports of the moral good which it is the object of the

Union to attain, are the Fatherhood of God, the stewardship of man and the dignity of labor—principles first definitely enunciated by Maurice.

The Union is conservative in regard to Socialism, and manifests a tendency against its economic teaching. It takes, however, no definite stand; but wavers and oscillates to find a middle path between Individualism and Socialism. "The truth of individual hedonism—the truth that each single individual claims by an ineradicable instinct his own self-realization, his own happiness, Christianity recognizes; each man is to come into possession of his own life; he is to 'save his life.' The truth again of the older Utilitarianism—that each man counts one and no man more than one, is at the heart of Christianity."¹

In the practical field the Christian Social Union returned to Maurice's favorite scheme of coöperative associations among workingmen. These now are very considerable in number throughout the land, doing millions of dollars worth of business yearly. Coöperation is the watchword of the positive practical program of the Christian Social Union. "The Church," we are told by Bishop Gore, "must be spiritually and physically a profit-sharing company. This means a stern discouragement of the accumulation of wealth except as held consciously in trust for the common good; a strenuous opposition to the development of luxury; a practical realization of the temper of contentment with sufficient and wholesome food and lodgment, air and clothing, work and leisure, and of the greater blessing of giving as compared with receiving."

The Christian Social Union seeks voluntary instead of forced coöperation, and is sure that only by the reli-

¹ The Social Doctrine of the Sermon on the Mount, p. 154, *Economic Review*, 1892.

gious can such association be entered into. J. H. Noyes puts the case in this way: "The non-religious party has tried association under the lead of Owen and failed; the semi-religious party has tried it under the lead of Fourier and failed; the thoroughly religious party has not tried it." Not till Maurice began his activities did the thoroughly religious party as much as think that its work lay along this line, and this thought has not even yet quite prevailed among the clergy.

But while it is easy for all Christian sects to accept the general doctrine of coöperation, it is not so easy to determine the extent to which coöperative association is to go. This is far from being agreed upon. Two alternatives present themselves: the voluntary associations of which Maurice was the exponent and for which his times were not quite ripe, is one; and the coercive associations which Socialism proposes and which would be all embracing in their scope, is the other. The Christian Social Union stands for the former; the Guild of St. Matthew, for the latter. This point of difference is the source of much disputation. Each seeks to justify its stand by appealing to the Bible for confirmation of its position. Biblical passages are sought out, making for the abolition of private property and are brandished in the face of those who stand for it; and these in their turn bring other biblical passages to bear witness to their point of view.

The main point of contention is the status of private property according to Jesus. The passages chiefly quoted for private property are:

"Who made me a ruler or divider over you?"

"Take heed and keep yourselves from all covetousness, for man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth."

The opponents of private property bring forward:

"Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth."

"Sell all thou hast and follow me."

"If any shall not work, neither shall he eat."

"Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not the fruit thereof; or who feedeth a flock and eateth not the milk of the flock?"

This debate leads nowhere and fails to clarify the situation; for it proves neither alternative by the very fact that it proves both. The good-will principle on which Christ lived his life is not confined by any preconceived theories on private property or on other-worldliness. The life principle is essentially an active principle, not a hesitating, weighing, doubting activity. Life lives; thought tarries. The searching behind this living principle for its prop has ever been a disappointing search. The metaphysics to which it has given rise has ever failed to stand on its own feet and so it has always been seeking a prop for itself; and this prop has in turn sought another. Each in its turn has served as a hindrance to the very principle which it endeavored to support.

The Christian Social Union, of all the phases of the Christian Social Movement, has been least guilty of this inefficacious search for a ground of morality. Its statements on the social problems of the times and their ethical settings are correspondingly less objectionable. These statements command for this very reason universal approval just as the good-will principle commands it, simply because the ideas set forth in regard to the care for public health and safety, the relation of employer and employee, superior and inferior, buyer and seller, public official and citizenship are expansions and illustrations of that principle and not preconceived

theories in back of it. This thought is thus expressed by Ramsden Balmforth.¹ "The moral progress of the individual depends not on the adoption of any special theological or metaphysical belief, but on that natural expansion and development of the faculties which gradually freeing the mind from error, gives clearer vision and deeper insight into the difficulties which burden our human life."

It has always been found that whenever we remove our attention from life and direct it to the search of its cause we actually see more dimly the very life we seek to illumine, and the dimness is proportional to the intensity of our groping in its preconceived substratum. Even the Christian Social Union, when it touches this hidden field loses the luster which its doctrines elsewhere possess. Note, for instance, the narrow view of life's activity into which Bishop Gore drops from the broad vista described above, the moment the social reformer becomes the theologian. He desires to see, he says, "a body of celibate men living without any other life-vows than those of their baptism" and these "would surely be calculated to make men see how holy and happy a thing is Christian life when it can free itself from entanglements."

The point of importance lies right here. Once free from the entanglements that tie down the good-will, and that do not give it free scope by burdening it with preconceptions, and your morality will shine by its own true light. Celibacy, in so far as it rests on preconceptions, is itself an entanglement that hinders because it narrows life's impulse; and as for baptism, how often in past times was failure to have been baptized a hindrance to social fellowship and a limit beyond which

¹ See *The New Reformation and its Relation to Moral and Social Problems*, p. 69.

the good-will in civic life could not extend! At this very day are not all sorts of discrimination practiced even in high circles merely on the strength of the preconceived metaphysical and logical implications of baptism, and are not preferences shown in these implications? Theology even implicates God in this weakness; for its conception of a limbo makes God himself share this human feeling.

A still more striking example of the result of burdening the good-will with theological grounds and of resting coöperation on religious bases is found in the fact that the very exercise of the good-will is often not valued unless it be exercised by those who are included in the fellowship. A prominent minister of the Church of England writes, "The danger of the age is that of following where He points the way without faith in Him. Men are willing to accept His teaching if they may treat Him as they do Socrates or Hillel. We must not fall into this snare."¹ See how the metaphysical presumption is of more value than is the living out of the good-will!

This weakness of Christian Socialism comes out again in its attitude towards education. From Maurice down, the Churchman has invariably taken a stand against the State's direction of education; for he fears that if the State undertakes it, "cherished convictions will be trampled upon." If the Church is assigned to take charge of it, the money will be well spent, whereas if the State does it, "the money will be taken to support a sect." Therefore we are advised to "let government which is a machine working with as little humanity as possible, stay in its own province and teach secular education, while the Christian Church consecrates its strength and grace to perfect and crown all instructions

¹ John Clifford—*Jesus Christ and Modern Social Life*.

by bringing the Children to Christ that He may bless them."¹

True it is that Christian Socialism endeavors to reform from within, and yet despite the fact that reform comes from within and through fellowship, the Christian finds it hard to do the reforming, even though it is claimed that he has an immense advantage over other social reformers in the clear knowledge of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. This is only apparently an advantage; actually it is a disadvantage; for Christianity allows into its reform movement—a movement which works from within and through fraternization—only those who enter from behind—for only those who accept the background upon which its morality rests are included in the reform and to those alone does fellowship extend.

(III) *The Present Status of Christian Socialism*

(a) *The Christian Socialist Fellowship*

We have so far discussed the Religious Ethical Movement by considering its aspect as presented by Christian Socialism. We have seen the weak spot of that movement, and we have attributed this weakness to the failure of the original Christian Socialist Movement under Maurice and of its two offshoots, the Guild of St. Matthew and the Christian Social Union, to accept the good-will as in itself sufficient to ground an ethics on. The attempt of Maurice had for its object to christianize Socialism and to socialize Christianity. We may safely say that he succeeded in great measure in socializing Christianity. The church, after his work

¹ John Clifford—*Jesus Christ and Modern Social Life*.

was done, no longer presented such sights as the hunting parson who was dead to the economic needs of his starving factory parishioners. Gradually through his efforts, churchmen as a third estate standing aloof from the lowest social class, disappeared. He failed, however, to make much headway in christianizing Socialism.

More and more as the economic conditions became acuter, economic Socialism and not Christianity became the resort of the working people. We hear it said now that "Socialism is Christianity's most formidable rival."¹ To come to terms with this rival was the aim of the Guild of St. Matthew; to ward it off, was in the main the aim of the Christian Social Union.

Success depended largely upon the power of the contending forces to draw the common people to their teaching; and the form which the contest took was a rivalry between the Church and the Socialist Meeting Hall to get and hold an audience. The Church and the Socialist Meeting both made a bid for a large attendance, and, judging by results, the Church lost.

The next move was an aggressive campaign by the victors to capture the Church. This campaign is conducted at present by an organization that has adopted the name "Christian Socialist Fellowship." What a strange reversal Christian Socialism has suffered during the half century since its foundation! In 1848 the Church started to capture Socialism; in 1903 we find an organized attempt of Socialism to capture the Church.

This movement is mainly an American movement, extending chiefly throughout New England. Under the name of "The Christian Socialist Fellowship," the movement proposes "To permeate churches, denominations and other religious institutions with the social

¹ T. C. Hall.

message of Jesus." This seems an open affront to the Church. The very depository of the doctrines of Jesus is by this statement of the Christian Socialist Fellowship declared, as it were, by "innuendo," to be empty of them.

The Christian Socialist Fellowship is indeed only a counter move of Socialists to capture the Church for Socialism. To accomplish this it ignores the basic theological conception of Christianity and like the Guild of St. Matthew takes a stand upon those biblical passages in which Jesus expresses Socialistic doctrines. Unlike the English organization, it puts no emphasis upon ceremonials or rituals and offers fellowship to all who are ready to join with it in bringing about the Socialistic régime.

The constitution of the Fellowship goes on to state that the object of the movement is: "To show that Socialism is the necessary economic expression of the Christian life; to end the class struggle by establishing industrial democracy and to hasten the reign of justice and brotherhood upon earth." "We believe," says the manifesto issued in 1908, "that the present social system, based as it is on the sin of covetousness, makes the ethical life as inculcated by religion impracticable, and should give way to a social system founded on the Golden Rule and the Royal Law of the Kingdom of God, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' which, realized under the coöperative commonwealth of Socialism, will create an environment favorable to the practice of religious life."

If the Christian Socialist Movement is decreasing in efficiency and is being replaced by a Socialism often making claim to be a religion, may not its disappearance as an active force be due just to the fact that its underlying basis, its search for "a centre" as Maurice put

it, which would afford a "ground for men to stand upon" has proven too narrow a plank to hold all men? It is of necessity constrained to give way to a movement, which, without regard to any metaphysical background, does afford such foothold to all.

We may not agree with those who proclaim Socialism a religion, but we must agree with the spirit of it which, forsaking a limited centre and a short radius, invites all to coöperate in behalf of an end, no matter how they differ in regard to a beginning.

The point which the Fellowship has in common with the original Christian Socialism, is its stand that the Christian life as lived by Jesus is the only way to solve the present social difficulties. By quoting the words of Christ in favor of Socialism, the Christian Social Fellowship hopes to win the Church to Socialism. The point of difference between the Christian Socialism of Maurice and that of the Fellowship is that the former hoped to win Socialism to Christian life and thus to solve the economic and industrial problems, whereas the latter hoped to win Christianity to Socialism and in this way to solve these same problems.

In this one respect Socialism is stronger than the religious movement. It is more inclusive than the latter. "If uniting into one great movement all the strange elements of humanity, subduing all racial and religious hatred and distrust were the only achievement of the Socialist movement, I should confidently assert its claim to be counted among the greatest spiritual forces of the world,"¹ says John Spargo. "The spirit of Socialism," says he, "cries out:

'I am Religion and the church I build,
Stands on the sacred flesh with passion packed;

¹ J. Spargo—*The Spiritual Significance of Modern Socialism*, p. 30.

In me, the ancient gospels are fulfilled—
In me the symbol rises into fact.'"¹

If brotherhood and solidarity are the bases of social life, we must indeed confess that Socialism has more inner potency toward it than religion; for it gives greater promise of solidarity than religion at present gives. But solidarity and brotherhood are only partial and, therefore, defective tests of social life. The very effort and partial success of Socialism in the guise of the Christian Socialist Fellowship to capture the church, is evidence of its greater inclusiveness. That it makes the attempt to do so, is again evidence that it is free from the exclusiveness which is so prominent in the Church. "The Christian Socialist Fellowship," says John Spargo, "is, in fact, not a Christian Socialist organization at all. For there are Jews among its membership and even agnostics and atheists."²

Because it is not hampered by the short radius that incloses in its circumference of fellowship only men of certain beliefs, it is more likely to win in the long run, the adherence which seems so futile and elusive a task to Christian Socialism. "God's view, strange to say," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "must be more akin to that of the plain man than to that of the philosopher or statistician."

(b) *Christian Socialism from the University Chair*

It is, indeed, an encouraging sign, and one that promises to do much toward settling the social and industrial problems, to hear the voice of theologians raised in sympathetic note with the movements for general improvement. While few venture to identify the church activi-

¹ John Spargo—*The Spiritual Significance of Modern Socialism*, p. 26.
² *Amer. Journal Sociology*, vol. 15.

ties with municipal problems such as improved housing, or sewers, or recreation centers, and breathing spaces for the poor; or with industrial problems, such as problems of the living wage, employer's liability and state-insurance; or with the economic problems, such as the price of the necessities of life and the cost of transportation, the greater number of churchmen view these movements with hearty approval, even though on the ground that the Church is a spiritual organization they do not commit it to supporting them.

While the church has not enlisted in these positive reforms because they are outside of its sphere of activity, it takes, however, a very decided stand against a social order which is nothing more than a "competitive commercial industrialism, with profits as incentive to action, and private possession of the productive tools and opportunity as its goal."¹ The cry against this social order is quite loud, and it is fittingly the cry of the church; for the church claims dominion over the spirit, and it is the grasping spirit that prompts and maintains this condition. In antagonism to greed, in sympathetic devotion to the welfare of people the church is to-day doing valuable service. All this, as a modern church program, dates from Maurice.

What specific form this program of social reform is to take is the bone of contention and a difficult task no less for the churchmen who occupy university chairs than for statesmen. Some, when confronted with the immensity of the problem, say that the church is committed to no specific program, that the establishment of the Kingdom of God is the only church program, that "there is disappointment in store for the man who looks to Jesus for specific teachings as to reforms,"² that

¹ Hall—*Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics*, p. 47.
² Shailer Matthews—*The Social Teaching of Jesus*.

"sociology and political economy were just as far outside of his range of thought as organic chemistry or the geography of America."¹

And yet we cannot merely proclaim an ideal in order to advance it. We must have a specific program to act as a lever that will lift society even a short way toward the ideal. Indeed our remoteness from the Kingdom is due largely to uncertainty over the next step that leads towards it. Can we positively say that Socialism is that next step? If we could, we would by this time have realized it just as we have realized the abolition of slavery. Socialism has surely been agitated for as long a time as was abolition.

Indeed, a program viewed merely as an end, is neither good nor bad. For a program is a path or a method by which an end is arrived at, and is good or bad not in itself, but relatively to that end alone. This is implied in the statement of Jesus: "Why callest thou me good—none is good save the Father that sent me." The meaning of this can be grasped significantly only as applying to the distinction between an end and the spirit that manifests itself in achieving that end. Any program as an end is neither good nor bad. To the spirit that realizes and achieves the program, and to it alone, properly belong the terms good and bad. The spirit and the end which it realizes, are one and the same reality.

Likewise it is with any social and political program. Our municipalities are now debating the commission plan of government. Are we sure that its adoption will evoke nobility of spirit? Is it not just as likely to evoke more subtle craftiness in evading restrictions to selfish greed, which the commission form of government is intended to abolish? Are we so sure that a small Board

¹ W. Rauschenbusch—*Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 47.

of Education will be better than the present large one, or that the recall of judges will benefit the masses? The agitation for a change is not prompted by the certainty that the new form will be better. Rather it is prompted by the knowledge that the present is bad and by the hope that the trial of the new will lead to a better.

Experience is experiment. Experiment even in physical science never indicates beforehand the nature of the result; much less can it indicate in social science the reflex effect that the result will have upon the spirit that prompts the experiment. To watch and wait for this effect is a costly and often a dangerous procedure. National solidarity is not easily set into motion to remedy a wrong step once taken; and those of us who are so absorbed in the social solidarity that we refuse to put our foot forward unless our neighbors put their feet forward at the same time, find the approaching march toward the Kingdom slower than the snail's pace.¹

It is along the line of a detached spontaneity of life, now and then reaching a high level in the field of ethics, that contemporary discussions of social problems from the religious point of view proceed. These discussions come mainly from the Theological Chairs of our universities, and would that the voices that are engaged in

¹ One of the great men of this age, Thomas Davidson, whom I had the good fortune to know, fully convinced of the sloth that lies in solidarity, however it may be with its strength, refused to be hampered by the cumbersomeness of social solidarity and lived his own life of the spirit. So free, so humane, so social, yet so spontaneous was his life that, like the life of Jesus, it did not submit to classification. Some called him an individualist; others, a socialist; others, a single taxer; still others, an anarchist. To all these his answer was, "I am too much of an individualist to be a socialist, and too much of a socialist to be an anarchist." He lived the life of the spirit. He did not wait for mass movement to put into motion any program. "As a follower of Jesus," he "stood committed to neither Socialism nor individualism"; he was neither for nor against trades unions, neither the foe of the rich man nor of the poor man as such. He simply lived; and his life was the revelation of Spirit. His life was one illustration of the good-will and he readily joined with others who likewise lived it.

them were as clear in the delivery of their message as they are in genuine sympathy and in enthusiastic readiness to guide the public in its effort to solve the long standing social problems! The trend of these discussions is towards a better grasp of the meaning of social life and to a fuller elucidation of its concept.

What the concept social involves, the university men maintain, is best taught by Jesus. This is the burden of the ethics of the chair. The prevailing opinion is that it does not imply economic socialism. But the negation of economic socialism does not mean the exclusion of a social attitude and the reign of selfish individualism. The concepts social and individual are commonly considered mutually exclusive. It is an error to consider them so. Socialists most frequently fall into this error, an error due no doubt to the all-absorbing importance which the economic life has for them. Because the vocational life uses up so much of our time, the pursuit of a livelihood dominates all other pursuits and seems to them unsocial if it is not conducted in the manner of the old time hunting expeditions, fitted out with dogs, horses, tally-ho, etc., and if the products are not similarly shared in common. The concept individual is thus confounded with selfishness, and the concept social with altruism.

The object of the Christian Socialism of the University Theological Chairs is to show the fallacy of such suppositions. It shows that the life of Jesus did not admit of any classification. It aims at harmonizing socialism and individualism. To understand the solution of the problem as offered by the University Theologians we must analyze the philosophy of Maurice's ethics, from which they all take their start. The Christian Socialism of Maurice implied that the individualism of Jesus is necessarily social; that individualism

is an inner natural necessity which is exhibited in the endeavor of each to preserve and to conserve his being. Yet this inner necessity is supplemented by an outer metaphysical social fact—the descent from a common Father.

Maurice and all his followers seek to harmonize these two elemental and primal facts, one psychologic and internal, the other objective and physical. His method of harmonizing is to give emphasis and great importance to the objective factor. He thinks that by pressing forward the Fatherhood idea with its consequent brotherhood of man, the subjective *conatus in suo esse perseverare* will become reflective and through the sub-conscious family tie, brotherhood will possibly prevail upon the inner principle to give up the pursuit of the extreme individualism which that principle implies.

For the selfishness of individualism is nothing else than the extreme to which the fear of destruction prompts the inner nature of the individual to go. "An economy with a surplus tends to make us social; an economy of deficit arouses conflict and gives a dominance to pain reactions. The problem of Social advance is thus on its material side to keep out conditions of deficit and to get within the realm of surplus. On its psychic side, however, the problem is to keep our social nature dominant and to suppress the fear reactions that nature has implanted."¹

The objective external factor, the Fatherhood idea, physically understood, is intended to suppress and dominate the subjective and internal factor. This is the underlying idea of the whole Religious Ethical Movement. But the logic of this position is not clear until we are shown the *modus operandi* whereby the domination of the one over the other will take place.

¹Patten—*The Social Basis of Religion*, p. 219.

In exhibiting the working out of this process of domination we have the history of Religion, and of Christianity as the evolved Religion. Originally domination was to be effected through fear instilled by the physical superiority of the external factor. This proved too weak for any lasting domination and the compelling force in the Fatherhood idea was changed from fear to love. Love was to stop the inner endeavor after security from going to the ultimate limits that alone insure absolute security of continued existence. Love was to shear the innate individualism of its selfishness. Upon this is built the conception of the Christian Religion. We have thus far the ontological fact of Fatherhood which is mystically conceived as the Logos; but its compelling force having failed, there was superadded another compelling force, that of the power of love.

There is yet nothing necessarily social in a world constituted of individuals, who, through the dominating conceptions of Fatherhood and Love, are to strip themselves of the selfishness which the full development of their inner nature as *conatus in suo esse perseverare* would imply. For the concept love is not necessarily a concept of the social relation. The social relation involves reciprocal love; whereas the concept love may be unreciprocal, and thus fall short of the concept social. Love from the Father towards the individual may well exist together with an unrequited love from the individual towards the Father and vice versa as was the case with Aristotle's God.

The love relation is, in other words, not necessarily a social relation until it operates reciprocally. Unrequited love is not only not a social relation, but is often the very spring from which rise up the most unsocial acts. This is evidenced not only by persons afflicted with jealousy, but also by the Lord Yahveh who in his

wrath threatens all manner of punishment upon those who shall be guilty of setting up idols and graven images. The jealousy thus aroused in Yahveh gives vent to numerous bursts of threats against the people who chance to prefer another. (See Leviticus, Chap. 26.) The most unsocial acts are here hurled by the Lord against his chosen people for his unreciprocated love. The idea here presented is not merely a conceptualistic idea having no corresponding relation in the facts of life but is most vitally and most actually a relation of facts of life.

The metaphysicians of the Church perceived this well enough and mended the concept love, which in itself falls short of the concept social, by the conception of an all-embracing atmosphere of love, mystically conceived as the Holy Ghost, and by the conception of the forgiven life, again mystically conceived as the Christ. Thus the social structure of the religious idea is completed. For making life social and for the conquest of selfishness which individualism logically implies when it is interpreted Spinozistically as a *conatus in suo esse perseverare*, there is needed first, the authority of an external principle, that of Fatherhood; second, there is needed an all-embracing principle, that of Spirit; and thirdly, there is needed a mediating or reciprocal principle, that of the Christ.

"The most difficult of all religious concepts to socialize is that of God."¹ Fatherhood by itself dominates through fear and is in so far unsocial. The Holy Spirit is therefore invoked to reduce the external Fatherhood and the internal individualistic principle to a common denominator, and the reciprocal principle, Love, is to mediate between them.

The forgiven life is the most important social element

¹ Patten—*The Social Basis of Religion*, p. 234.

of the entire religious conception. When therefore the Christian Socialist of the Chair says, "The basis for a Christian ethics is the forgiven life, working itself out in a transformation of all ideals,"¹ he puts his finger on that element of the religious conception which is the essence of the social life. This conception is the essential one in any social scheme. It must lie in back of all acts of the individual to be truly social according to Christianity. That the Christian Church has failed to see it more often than not, is being fearlessly pointed out by the contemporary Christian Socialists. To apply to our industrial and economic problems the concept of the forgiven life and reciprocal love as the most essential principle in Christian Ethics is the solution offered by the most learned theologians of today.

The Professors of Christian Ethics declaim against emphasizing any other factor in religious life, and yet they themselves fail to see clearly, that the other factor which stands for an unsocial tendency is precisely that authoritative external conception of Fatherhood which in itself, as Patten well says, is the most difficult concept to socialize and which they refuse to abandon as a ground principle. All conceptions of the social life that involve as a presupposition and as an offset to individualism the conception of Fatherhood are, in so far, confused. Maurice who laid so much stress upon it in his social work failed to differentiate clearly from it the conception and function of Jesus as the reciprocal Love, which alone renders life social. The result was that he often confounded the essential with the unessential, and that he made himself necessarily sectarian and unsocial in the very effort to be social and to teach the social spirit. That this confounding was the undoing

¹ Hall—*History of Ethics within Organized Christianity*, p. 6.

of his hopes may fairly be judged by the shifting of his best efforts from one to another phase of social work, as if blindly and merely instinctively feeling his way towards the true conception of the social life.

His immediate successors, in common with him, saw the necessity of finding a basis for social life, but no more clearly than he, did they see its location. Perhaps they felt their bearings a little better; for they, especially the Christian Social Union proved somewhat nearer right. But this nearer approach to the social essence was due not to any clear sight of it, nor to any firm grasp of it in consequence of this clear vision. Rather was it due to the negative virtue of failing to emphasize what they nevertheless presupposed in common with Maurice, namely the fatherhood conception with the resulting theological superstructure.

Not even now is the distinction between Fatherhood and brotherhood clearly indicated by Religious Ethical writers. We hear much said about the Fatherhood of God and the consequent brotherhood of men, as if we were to imply that all men are necessarily social (brothers) because of their common Father. This lays emphasis upon the unsocial element in order to point out and develop the social life. Perhaps to say, "I and my Father are not one," will more truly serve a social purpose than to say, "I and my Father are one." Jesus, when he became philosophic, proved his Jewish descent. No Greek with his philosophic acumen would have identified an ontological external entity, with a principle that serves as the reciprocal relating activity between it and other entities.

This confusion of principles which originally can be thus traced to Jesus has come down the ages and was repeated again and again. At the present time we are

just beginning to untangle the knot and to allay the confusion. It is this genuine effort on the part of Christian men to straighten out doctrines long confounded, that is producing to-day such seething unrest in the Church. Men speak of the present as a crisis in religion, and attribute it rightly to the free discussion all around of principles and doctrines long taken for granted in the religious world. "The present crisis of the Christian religion is due to the fact that what Jesus took for granted, and what he taught, and what he was—all three of these primal Christian forces, have been attacked with a vigor, a skill, and an effectiveness never before known in the history of Christianity."¹ Not until we distinguish clearly between what Jesus took for granted and what he taught; and not until we eliminate what he took for granted from his times, and from what he taught, that which he actually was—reciprocal love, will we make progress in social ethics. Little progress in social ethics can be expected from the religious teachers until they stress and reverence the principle of reciprocal love which is the very essence of the life of Jesus.

At present we are struck and amazed by the hopeless doubt of writers and preachers on Christian ethics as to whether Jesus taught socialism or individualism, as to whether his was an economic program or an ethical program, as to whether his kingdom was of this world or of another. His very doctrines are unknown and must be discovered anew.

As members of a religion we accept in our changed environment what he accepted from his totally different environment; as scientists we reject the very things which as churchmen we accept. As parishioners we listen with our heart's approval to his ethical teaching

¹ Ambrose W. Vernon—*Hibbert Journal*, vol. 9, p. 58.

and as business men we violate them on the slender excuse that Jesus taught under a different economic and industrial system from ours and therefore we cannot apply his teachings to our business. *What he actually was* apart from what he accepted from his environment and apart from his deeds, we scarcely can claim clearly to know.

Religious ethics is thus fettered at the outset with an unsocial element because it looks for brotherhood in the conception of Fatherhood. But can men be brothers without a common Father? The answer is they must be brothers regardless of Fatherhood. This is the main thesis that has so far been negatively implied in the analysis of Christian Socialism. Upon what positive basis this thesis rests must be deferred for a later chapter.

In adopting as the social formula the idea of the brotherhood of men, because of the Fatherhood of God, Christian Socialism strikes an analogy from biologic life, and forgets that biologic brotherhood does not mean social brotherhood, though we should very much like it to mean that. It forgets that brotherhood used in the social discussions means merely, reciprocal love or good-will.

To seek an answer to the question why men should be social and why they should trim off the edges of selfishness which their natural tendency towards absolute self-preservation unfolds, is no doubt a bit of philosophical curiosity that minds rightly indulge in. Very often, however, not curiosity but intellectual pride prompts the search *ad infinitum* of a why for every what. Many theological formulae and concepts were confessedly so conceived. They were devised to answer the pagan questions and the pagan objections to the Christian world order.

Likewise the modern religious ethical movements both Jewish and Christian face the present industrial and social crisis not with the calmness that the philosophical curiosity which alone leads to knowledge would require, but with the suddenness that the heat of battle evokes and intellectual pride dictates. Why should not men pursue their own ends? you ask. Because men are social animals. Why should they be social and not pursue their own ends? Because they are brothers, being children of one God. This is the answer which the Religious Ethical Movement gives. It is an answer that rests on certain metaphysical conceptions. Little wonder that it is thus impossible to be moral unless your metaphysics is straight.

But to have a metaphysics of any sort is a personal predilection. Therefore to establish brotherhood the predilection of some must be taken away, and forcibly too, if not peaceably. History bears evidence of this at every step. Once force enters, good-will passes out by the opposite door; and with its departure, the door to social life is closed.

Kant's conception of a moral life, both social and individual, upon no preconceived notions, is the soundest bit of social philosophy so far spoken. Instead of being the ground of social life, the Kingdom of God is the consequence of it. "Yes," says the Socialist, "that is just what we say. Introduce the Socialist state and the Kingdom of God will follow upon it." But the Socialist is no more consistent in his attitude towards private property by coercively entering upon its possession, than is the stand taken by the theologian in making certain prerequisites the ground for social fellowship. The one makes the Kingdom the source of the social order; the other makes it the end. "One God will come with the economic system. The unifying forces are

delayed by argument and controversy."¹ Such are the alternatives which have confronted men.

But the Kingdom is neither beginning nor end. It is just where Jesus had often put it. It is more analogous to a means, yet not identical with it. It is the active energy of the good-will and reciprocal love. Beginning and end are static conditions. The social order is active energy. It asks no "whys" or "wherefores"; it simply manifests itself. This is the life of the true Jesus, the true social reformer.

The objective practical ideal of the Christian Socialist is the manifestation of this life in coöperation. How fine! When we ask him why coöperation is the ideal of the practical life, intellectual pride compels him to answer: Because we are children of one Father. "The Social movement," says Shailer Matthews, "is irreligious. . . . It eliminates a personal God from morals and the Jesus whom it honors is but a companion of Socrates."

It is evident that by such attitude theologians are bound to draw a circle about those who are to be considered brothers, and to exclude all outside of it. The religious ethics cannot therefore be a solution of the social problems. It cannot be true that "Society is by nature Christian," unless by Christian is meant the ethical Jesus, the Jesus minus what he had accepted from his environment, and minus his eschatological and metaphysical doctrines. "For it was not his sayings but Himself that Jesus wanted men to follow."

The ideas of Jesus were not metaphysical ones that were gotten up by intellectual pride to support his ethics; they were expressions of human sympathy; and his fight against the systems of his day was entered into just because they beclouded these expressions of

¹ Patten—*The Social Basis of Religion*, p. 234.

it. "The main quarrel Jesus had with the religious life of his day, was with the pharisaic conception of God as law-giver, and of the religious life as obedience to an outward legislation and of the Kingdom of God as the success of a selfish temporal and ecclesiastical organization."¹

If you accept this Jesus as the only true Jesus, then it is no longer necessary to use the word Christian as a characterization of society, for the adjective implies and makes a distinction; it narrows the social circumference; and by creating the distinction, it destroys the very conception of universal brotherhood which it is its ideal to found.

Christian Socialism in each of its several stages falls short just here. It introduces *all* the conceptions that are implied by the adjective Christian and, in so far as it does this, it falls short of the heights attained by the ethical Jesus. The metaphysical Jesus comes nowhere up to him.

The misfortune is that since the Christian era it has been the metaphysical and not the ethical Jesus that has been busy establishing the Kingdom. It is from the metaphysical Jesus that Christianity takes its rise. All Christian ethics bears the stamp of this origin. All its efforts at social and economic reform are tinged with it. All denominational institutions such as sectarian orphan asylums, and denominational social settlements and Y. M. C. A.'s are affected by it. In short we may truly say with T. C. Hall, "Out of Christian experience we may expect a body of conduct distinctly bearing the marks of the origin. No speculative system of ethics can therefore satisfy the Christian heart and conscience, when (note these words) it takes no account

¹ Hall—*History of Ethics*, p. 177.

of what to the Christian believer is the supreme reality of his experience."¹

The Christian Socialism of the Chair no less than its predecessors bears the marks of its origin. True, it is more ready to give up all ceremonial forms and rites as non-essentials of Christian ethics, but it clings tenaciously to the presuppositions—to the Fatherhood idea, as a basis of social ethics. For the Catholic formula "*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," religious ethics substitutes "*extra paternitatem nulla salus*."

Social conduct refuses to be hedged in either by the authority of the Church or of the Father. The Ethics of the Chair strikes the true note when it emphasizes the loving spirit of the ethical Jesus. But when it digresses to the metaphysical Jesus it falls into the error of former Christian Socialists, and leads to confusion. Contemporary Christian Socialism therefore needs clearer vision.

Is it any wonder, when the learned are confounded and perplexed by the social concept, that the ignorant manifest the perplexity by the manner of their lives? Is it any wonder that the Christian business men do not live socially in business, when, although well convinced of the existence of Church and God, the terror that these once struck no longer frightens; and when the loving God who replaced the God of terror is confusedly conceived in a trinity whose limits are not clearly defined, but whose essence embraces both social and unsocial elements? Is it any wonder that under this confused state of the social concept the business man in his natural dread of perishing, somewhat further insures his existence by artificially raising the prices of food-stuffs and by turning such innovations as storage houses

¹ Hall—*History of Ethics*, p. 6.

(whose advent was hailed as an omen of the dawn of a lower cost of living through the preservation of perishable foodstuffs) into a means of raising prices through cornering markets and through doling out the product with as slow a hand as will insure the large return which an apparent scarcity forces from the needy? Is it any wonder that the collective bargaining of trades unionism which some years ago was a mighty factor for good in combating the evils of the capitalistic trusts, has turned, the moment it has become conscious of its solidarity, into a system as exacting as the one combated?

The one is no more social than the other. The solidarity of large organizations of employees, working together for certain ends, is not necessarily any more social than is the similar solidarity of capitalistic magnates who work together for their own ends. Solidarity is mistaken for sociality. If the sugar trust artificially limits the output of sugar to get larger returns for itself, we condemn its solidarity; if the labor trust artificially limits the supply of labor in order to force upon the employer, let us not say higher wages or shorter hours, but an unworthy laborer, one who is abusive and vile in the shop, are we to hesitate to condemn its solidarity as unsocial simply because it comprises a larger group? Solidarity does not mean social life any more than does selfish individualism. We wrongly identify solidarity with social life, because we fail to discriminate the distinctive factors of social ethics.

We sing the praises of utilitarian ethics, with its greatest good to the greatest number on the one hand; and on the other, we shout loudly for the rights of the minority. Some time ago we identified brotherhood with the social concept. The tendency to-day is to identify the social concept with solidarity. "The first postulate of the Christian Socialist—the ethical basis of

modern social movements—is the solidarity of the race."¹

But here we confront the same old problem as to what constitutes a race. It is a conventional term of undefined boundaries, and these we often define to suit our selfish ends. As Royce says: "The earliest Social problem of humanity is also the most recent problem. This is the problem of dealing with the men who seem to us somehow very widely different from ourselves in physical constitution, in temperament, in all their deeper nature, so that we are tempted to think of them as natural strangers to our souls."²

The temptation to think of differences as aversions is the ingrained fault of all systems that base ethics upon solidarity or likeness of one kind or another. It is bound to end in unsociability and in a spirit of persecution. High types of men of all stations of life fall into it. It seems unavoidable, for it is due to their starting point. Perhaps there is no higher type of men than those who occupy the theological chairs of our universities. Yet, they unavoidably become unsocial in their doctrines.

This cannot be accidental. It must be germane to their attitude towards life. When a teacher who in one place nobly says: "A Christianity that prefers plans of salvation to salvation itself, that raises definitions of the 'natures' of Jesus above moral surrender to the joy-giving Savior, has always bred the spirit of persecution,"³ says in another place that "The unity of believers, is the new social order,"⁴ and that "Worth does not lie in the mere fact that a man is a man,"⁵ we have a bias that is traceable to some fountain-

¹ P. Monroe—*English and American Christian Socialism*.

² Royce—*Race Questions and Other American Problems*, p. 5.

³ Shailer Matthews—*The Gospel and the Modern Man*.

⁴ Shailer Matthews—*The Church and the Changing Order*, p. 86.

⁵ Shailer Matthews—*The Social Gospel*.

head. When from the man who says: "In loyalty to the gospel lies the hope of the church," we also hear: "I cannot see in ethical teaching pure and simple, whether it be in ethical culture societies or in evangelical pulpits, any greater hope than in a hopelessly outgrown literalism and anti-scientific conservatism,"¹ we are up against a fundamental stumbling block.

The man who starts with a doctrine that all men are brothers because they come from the same Father, soon makes a distinction between the brothers. "We have to distinguish sharply," says Shailer Matthews, "between two possible conceptions of the divine sonship. On the one hand there is the conception according to which all men are the sons of God in that they were created by him, possess moral attributes and are capable of rising to nobility in self-sacrifice and devotion—in a word, in that they possess simply by virtue of their humanity an ineradicable likeness to God . . . On the other hand, there is the more intensive conception of sonship . . . which uses the word to express the more intimate and responsive relation with God actually enjoyed by those who are seeking noble ends, who are consciously seeking moral strength from prayer, who in a personal sense, love God while seeking to keep his commandments and who through this personal contact with God, gain a new character which, while possessed of the same powers as before, is yet fuller of the divine likeness . . . The second and more restricted use of sonship was the one adopted by Jesus. Jesus reserved this term to the relations of those persons who were members of the Kingdom of God—who, to use the Johannine expression, have been born anew. To extend the use of these terms of Jesus to all mankind, is to confound what was in his mind a possible condition

¹ Shailer Matthews—*The Church and the Changing Order*, p. 89.

with that which was real only in the case of far too small a number . . . Promises made to those who in this deeper sense pray to their Father are not to be transferred to those who will not so pray."¹

This brings out clearly the point insisted upon so often. No matter how moral you may be, if you are not of my church you shall not get the preferment. This is the philosophy of likeness. It rates ethical conduct below religious conformity, and the performance of duty below the saying of prayers.² These ideas proceed from the University Theological Chairs. It is needless to say that they represent the highest thought of the Religious Ethical Movement. They are full of excellent thought in regard to their attitude to the social problems of the day, but when they seek to ground their morals in religion they fall far below their ethical utterances. The problem which we have to solve, the problem of clipping the selfish wings of individualism, and of making the social dominate it, can not be met by churchmen, no matter how well-meaning they may be.

¹ Shailer Matthews—*The Social Teachings of Jesus*, pp. 63-67.

² Shailer Matthews—*The Gospel and the Modern Man*, p. 287.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL ETHICAL MOVEMENT

(I) *The History of the Movement*

(a) *Its Inspirers and Pioneers*

THE Religious Ethical Movement which began in England in 1848, had for its immediate purpose the establishment of a better understanding between the clergy and the people. It battled against the attitude of indifference which the former maintained toward the latter upon all matters that were most vital in this world's life, the attitude to their vocation, to their health, to their economic and social needs. The movement from this point of view was a grand success, for it did bring about a change in this attitude. By 1875 the clergy had been brought together with the laboring classes and this mainly through the efforts of the Christian Socialists. The social horizon had been thereby widened and the economic and industrial conditions were perhaps somewhat better than they had been before. But in its most ultimate purpose of changing by an appeal to brotherhood in God, the misery, the poverty, the unsanitary and dangerous habitations to which the new industrial conditions had given rise, Christian Socialism had utterly failed.

The home life and its surroundings, the needs for leisure and recreation of the great masses of working people, were yet a sealed book to the educated and upper

classes. The failure of Christian Socialism in this sphere was due, as we have seen, partly to the narrow limits which the Religious Ethical Movements placed upon a brotherhood that necessarily drew its solidarity from the acknowledgment of the Fatherhood of God, and partly to the inadequacy of the knowledge which the middle and upper classes of society had concerning the home life and the social loneliness of the industrial classes, thrown together though these were in the same big cities and intertwined as their lives were in the same industrial system.

True, Kingsley in "Cheap Clothes and Nasty" and in "Alton Locke" had done much to spread knowledge of the life of the working classes, but people generally made allowances for the play of his poetic imagination as they always do in fiction, and therefore they largely discounted the force of his works. "The schemes of Christian Socialism, their co-operative enterprises were wrecked on the shallows of spiritual defect, their own ignorance and the want of moral and intellectual preparation of the working classes."¹ What was needed was concrete cold statistical facts about the social conditions of the masses from actual touch with them. There was need of something like Booth's "In Darkest England" to give vital force to a reform movement, and that Christian Socialism was unable to produce.

Whoever succeeded in revealing the social conditions and read them aright would be most likely to ascertain the causes of the social evil, of crime and of poverty. To be sure, Socialism was at that very time engaged in opening up the problem of poverty by attacking the generally accepted doctrine of the Manchester School of Economists, that poverty is an unavoidable factor in municipal life, and that therefore it must be

¹ C. R. Henderson.

patiently borne. The Socialists brought home to the world the fact that if it is true that poverty is unavoidable then the consequences that follow upon the heels of poverty—hardships, disease and crimes—must likewise be tolerated, since poverty is a prime cause of the greater percentage of these.

The Socialists, especially the Christian Socialists of the Guild of St. Matthew, who were closely affiliated with Fabian Socialism, thereupon tried to give a new meaning to the Biblical passage, "The poor ye have always with you." They endeavored to show that Jesus meant this to be taken as a state due entirely to human injustice and not as an everlasting accompaniment of life.

The Manchester School on the other hand looked upon poverty as an eternal fact. Even Professor Giddings held that "At all times a portion of mankind must be relatively useless to the community and for that reason relatively poor and their greatest possible utilization and compensation depend upon their being held for the while in practical subjection to other individuals or to the commonwealth."¹

With such view of poverty, remedies are useless. The best that could be done with poverty was to state its case coldly: and with such cold statement the economic theory of Ricardo was satisfied. Its redemptive word was *laissez faire*. It follows naturally from this view that each social class occupied a certain fixed position in society. To belong to a certain class, thus implied of necessity, to be honored and respected or to be scorned and detested. This is the natural conclusion drawn from the Ricardian view of society.

In offsetting this view and in doing away with the scorn and coldness of class against class and in mitigat-

¹ Giddings—*Philanthropy and Social Progress*.

ing the feeling of the class ostracism which accompanied poverty, the Christian Socialists were partly successful, but the method they employed was inadequate to the requirement of post-Darwinian times. Their method was purely a priori. They lacked a detailed acquaintance with the condition of the poor which accurate investigation alone could afford. They were not scientific. They employed deductive reasoning on the social evils even after Darwin's theory of evolution had been firmly grasped, and therefore they fell into errors.

Nor were the upper and educated classes equipped with better methods.

Though the submerged tenth had been shunned by the educated and upper classes, these latter had nevertheless been laboriously theorizing and constructing theoretical legislation on the problem of poverty and on the economic and industrial phenomena which they were looking at only from the surface. The real phenomena were veiled from their view by their social aloofness from the very masses whose conditions were either a very great puzzle to them or else a thing taken for granted as natural, in accordance with the Biblical teaching in regard to the poor.

During the latter part of the 19th century, a movement arose which was free from the defects that crippled the efficiency of the ethical movement of the middle of the century. It threw off the limits which the Religious Ethical Movement put upon fellowship, and got into close touch with the working classes, by living as nearly as possible their life. This movement is the Social Ethical Movement. It was scientific and yet not possessed of the laboratory coldness. It started like its predecessor, in England; and owed its initial impetus to the teaching of such men as Thomas Hill Green, J. R. Green, and J. Ruskin. It was a university movement

rather than a church movement, although churchmen were its pioneers.

Inspired by John Richard Green, Edward Denison in 1867, a truly heroic type of man began to assail the hydra of ignorance, filth and vice of the crowded section of East London. He hired small quarters in the densest place and patiently studied the conditions of his chosen surroundings. Wherever he could, he helped. Where the state functions were not enforced owing to the inactivity of officials, he prodded the lax inspectors and forced results from them by the sheer weight of his personality. But like a pioneer, he stood alone, and fighting without the added strength which the social force of even a decrepit institution affords, he succumbed to an early death.

He was followed in 1875 by Arnold Toynbee, a pupil of Ruskin at Oxford. Toynbee, it has been said, would have founded a Church Order had he lived in the Middle Ages, for his was an inspiring personality, the warmth of which radiated through those who touched it and passed on to others beyond them. He entered wholeheartedly into whatever he undertook; whether it was building a road under Ruskin's direction or teaching history to those who were destined for the Indian Service, earnest application marked his efforts. In 1875 he spent the summer vacation in Whitechapel, one of the most thickly settled and one of the most miserable districts of London. Whitechapel was in the parsonage of S. A. Barnett, and to him Toynbee turned for assistance and information. He made a strong impression upon Canon Barnett whose help and encouragement he secured. His influence was soon felt throughout the district. He became the friend of his neighbors, perceived their condition, and turned his attention to the

industrial and economic theories of the day, with a view of correcting from first hand knowledge theories whose foundations were not laid upon actual experience with the laboring classes.

Toynbee introduced a new formulation into plans for social amelioration, which differed from that of the Christian Socialists. The latter strove to turn industrial civilization to a recognition of the fact that the central pivots of that civilization were God and man, and that all else, profits, prices, rents, hours of labor, were secondary and dependent upon the theory of the relation of man to God. Maurice and Kingsley, the founders of Christian Socialism, were of the *a priori* type of reformers. They applied to the problems which arose from the industrial revolution, a theory which had its origin in the Bible and not in the phenomena of the life of the workers, whose struggles they little knew. Maurice, for instance, summed up the evils of the times in the word "Competition" and the remedy in the word "Association"—a remedy which he drew from his religious belief in the Fatherhood of God.

Denison and Toynbee, the founders of the Social Ethical Movement, were, on the other hand, of the *a posteriori* type of reformers. Imbued with the scientific spirit of investigation, they took up their residence close to the subjects of investigation, in the poorest quarters of the City, and in this way got into first hand acquaintance with the facts of the social problems. As a result of his investigations Toynbee thus summed up the social situation: "The welfare of the producer was as much a matter of interest to the consumer as the price of the product."

This is a new way of stating the case, and it rested on sound investigation of industrial affairs. Again and

again has this open avowal of the social interrelations been corroborated through sad experiences. The infectious diseases of the sweatshop garment maker have been carried to the homes of the ladies of fashion who, though somewhat concerned over the prices of their garments, had not been very much disturbed over the welfare of the worker. Social solidarity of rich and poor has been brought home to the millionaire's palace by the diseases that are the result of social conditions; and this solidarity was stated not in terms of the relation between man and God, but in terms of man to man.

The Social Ethical Movement sets forth the relation of man to man in the industrial order as essentially a reciprocal relation, which it is futile and even suicidal for wealth and education to ignore. The intensive study of social phenomena which the new movement made possible, has revealed much more strongly than it had hitherto been possible to reveal, how vitally connected all men, regardless of rank or station, really are.

The Religious Ethical Movement and the Social Ethical Movement have no doubt the same ultimate goal, but their methods are different. Nor must it be supposed that the Social Ethical Movement, because its method is scientific, therefore looks coldly upon the facts and rests with merely stating them. The pioneers of the Social Ethical Movement, Denison and Toynbee, were like Maurice and Kingsley, ardently bent upon doing away with the evils about them; they directed all the energy of their lives towards changing the conditions and diverting the causes that are responsible for human misery. It is this latter attitude, rather than their intensive a posteriori investigations, that makes their movement an ethical movement. The new Social Ethical Movement is at once an ethical movement and a scientific movement.

Historically it traces its descent back to the Workingmen's College founded by Maurice after the failure of his co-operative scheme. From the idea of a Workingmen's College, sprang the idea of University Extension, and from the idea of University Extension, it was but a short step to University Settlements.

(b) *Its Institutionalization*

The initial stage of a reform movement is marked by the personal enthusiasm of its prime movers. What such movement lacks at its incipency in clear formulation of its doctrines, it more than makes good in the whole-hearted devotion of its adherents to the cause and supplies energy enough for a time to enthuse their successors.

With such devotion were the foundations of the Social Ethical Movement laid out by Edward Denison in 1867, and by Arnold Toynbee in 1875, that their individual efforts among the poor during the summer vacations quickly inspired others to follow. "Toynbee's share of the movement," we are told by Mrs. Barnett, "was at Oxford, where with a subtle force of personality, he attracted original or earnest minds of all degrees, and turned their thoughts or faces towards the East End and its problems."

Denison and Toynbee fought out single-handed their convictions in regard to social reforms, and the work was too much for them. Even though their sojourn in Whitechapel was but for a few weeks during the vacation, their strength was sapped and they succumbed after a brief period of activity.

Their individual efforts were, however, supplanted by concerted efforts. With the commencement of concerted efforts at reform we may date the period of the

institutionalization of the Social Ethical Movement. And in this institutionalization, the Social Ethical Movement simply followed the trend of the times.

This is an age of combination and centralization. Capital and labor have both centralized and organized their activities. Philanthropists have followed the line pursued by the capitalists and the laborers. They have pooled their resources. The Settlement with its head workers and residents is simply a manifestation of the same tendency carried over to the purposes of ethical propaganda. It is a collective attempt to improve life by improving its conditions.

The term Settlement is a significant name for the Social Ethical Movement. Historically, the term is applied to a group of men who leave their home and take up their abode away out on the frontiers of civilization, and live a life quite different from that to which they were accustomed. It is exactly in this sense that the term is used in the Social Ethical Movement. It designates a group of men who migrate from the comforts of their homes, situated on clean streets amidst a cultured neighborhood, and who take up their new homes amidst dirty streets and uncultured neighbors, because they are impelled "to eliminate by disregarding them, the unreal and artificial barriers of class and station and to work together for mutual good as one community on the basis that the real good of the individual and of society must be one."¹

The chief organizers and formulators of the Settlement movement in England have been Canon and Mrs. S. A. Barnett, the founders of Toynbee Hall, the first Settlement. In America, Stanton Coit and Jane Addams stand out most prominently.

¹ E. G. Starr—*Settlements and the Church's Duty*, p. 4.

How the individual efforts of Denison and Toynbee were converted into collective efforts and how their brief duration through the vacation season became a permanent vocational pursuit is thus told by Mrs. Barnett: "In June 1883, we were told that some men at Cambridge were wishful to do something for the poor. Mr. Barnett was asked to suggest some way. He wrote a letter suggesting that men might hire a house, where they could come for short or long periods, and, living in an industrial quarter, learn to 'sup sorrow with the poor.' That letter founded Toynbee Hall."¹

Canon Barnett suggested a concerted plan of attack upon social conditions in Whitechapel, of which parish he was vicar, and it was taken up. Ever since 1872, he had been enlisting young Oxford men in practical research along the lines of social problems. Funds were procured, a building was erected and the first social institution whose object was ethical reform became a fact by the end of 1884. In honor of Toynbee, whose death occurred in 1883, it was named Toynbee Hall.

Toynbee Hall was an association of educated, well meaning men who migrated from wealthy families and healthy surroundings and took up their abode amidst the poverty-stricken, unsanitary and socially diseased communities of the East End of London with the object of mitigating or of removing the causes that are responsible for such communities.

Toynbee Hall, according to one of its reports, is "an association of persons, with different opinions, and different tastes; its unity is that of variety; its methods are spiritual rather than material; it aims at permeation, rather than at conversion; and its trust is in friends linked to friends rather than in organization." This

¹ Barnett—*Towards Social Reform*, p. 246-247.

is the first institution of its kind; an association of people based on their differences, and having for its object the recognition and appreciation of differences in others.

Toynbee Hall has become the pattern of Social Settlements throughout Europe and America. Its idea is that the solidarity of human kind is manifested by the reciprocal functioning of its parts; that the settlers gain from their neighborhood as much as their neighborhood gains from them. The Settlement stands for fellowship despite the differences that exist among men in regard to nationality, religion and race. "It must be grounded in a philosophy whose foundation is the solidarity of the human race, a philosophy which will not waver, when the race happens to be represented by a drunken woman or an idiot boy."¹

In the application of this philosophy, a knowledge of the causes that produce social ills must necessarily be sought out, and these social ills must be shown to be the natural consequence brought upon society by society's neglect of its members. Investigation of social conditions became the first move of the Settlement.

This specific attitude as applied to social phenomena spread with wonderful rapidity. Within two years after the opening of Toynbee Hall, the movement was transplanted to America, where, with the founding by Stanton Coit of the Neighborhood Guild in 1887 in Forsyth Street, and of the Hull House in 1889, by Jane Addams, there began a career of Settlement planting that promises to fulfill the wish of Stanton Coit for a Settlement to each 10,000 of the population. We seem now to be approaching Ruskin's idea of having an overseer or bishop over every hundred families of the State who shall have care of their interest and conduct. Settlements have not been confined to cities alone. Socially

¹ Jane Addams.

isolated mountainous communities have had their needs for social centers satisfied. Hundreds of Settlements now exist in England and in the United States, whose studies have resulted in bringing to light facts which furnish the material for a new social science, and for more intelligent legislation upon the problems of congestion, lighting, sanitation and the social evil.

The Settlements have moreover assumed and in part tried to fulfill the social needs for recreation, association and education of the impoverished community wherein they are located, and thereby applied either a harmless vent for, or an effective check to the forces causing the social evils of our time. This work was so highly appreciated, that the city authorities have taken over much of it, and now the public purse pays for a great deal of social work that was formerly paid for by private individuals. A city now acknowledges as its own the function of providing recreation for its inhabitants. With recreation piers on the water fronts, with playgrounds in the parks, with game rooms, club rooms, literary clubs, athletic associations, libraries and penny banks in our schools, the function of the privately maintained Settlements have nearly all been shouldered by the State. If the system of the resident workers as a peculiar feature of the Settlements is yet impracticable in the schools, at least an approach to it is recommended in the form of visiting teachers, who will perform in large measure the function of resident and visiting nurses. Recreation centers on the roofs of tenement houses are now strongly urged upon the community. The need for association and adult education is likewise being supplied by the city through clubs, evening schools and lecture centers. All these functions now assumed by the public, trace their origin to Toynbee Hall.

The Settlement has, with the handing over to the

city of a great part of its function, almost made itself a useless institution, which it promises soon to become. But this is the surest indication that it was founded on the soundest human needs, and has met them in the safest manner.

There are two classes of people who feel the need of Settlements: those who establish them, and those for whom they are intended. The need that is felt on the part of those who found them is splendidly analyzed by Jane Addams of Hull House, the most philosophic exponent of the Social Ethical Movement, in her article on the Subjective Needs of Settlements. She groups them under three heads: "The first contains the desire to make the entire social organism democratic, to extend democracy beyond its political expression; the second is the impulse to share the race life and to bring as much as possible of social energy and the accumulation of civilization to those portions of the race which have little; the third springs from a certain renaissance of Christianity, a movement towards its early humanitarian aspects." These are the impulses which drive a Barnett or a Stanton Coit or a Jane Addams to found a Settlement.

On the other hand, those for whom they are intended, the dwellers in neighborhoods that lack the opportunities which the full development of life requires, feel a strong need for something which to them is undefined, perhaps because their uncultivated powers are unable to define it; but the need is nevertheless there and is felt. Briefly, this need which the poverty-stricken dwellers of the congested neighborhoods feel, may be summed up in this sentence: they feel the need for social justice, without which their development is stunted. They feel their desire for the beautiful stunted by the ugly sights about them; their longing for education

suppressed by the long hours of toil that leave no energy for intellectual labor; their social instinct is checked by their loneliness in the very midst of a seething throng of human beings. All these needs, which are expressions of the pent-up energy of their inmost nature seeking for self-expansion, are choked by the social injustice of the times. Their subjective necessity for the Social Settlement is the feeling that there is a larger and more desirable life from which they are shut out. The Settlement supplies that larger and more desirable life which the lowest in the slum feel a longing for.

We thus see there is a need for Settlements, felt both by the Settlement worker and by the dweller in neighborhoods which are unfavorable for his development; and that need is reciprocal. The slum-dweller on the one hand feels that his life is but a fraction of what life might be and mean. The settlement worker, on the other hand, feels, as Jane Addams says, the social injustice involved in refusing to share social life with the people whose political life we put on a level with our own, and desires to set matters right on this score. He also feels that niggardly nature has been less kind to the slum-dweller than to him, and the moral impulse comes upon him to make good from his own fuller store of culture and civilization, what circumstances have been so chary in bestowing upon his fellow. His life though fuller is not the complete life unless it takes into account the stunted lives of the crowded sections of the city. There is a mutual need felt; and this mutual need finds objective expression in the establishment of Social Settlements.

The Social Settlement's marvelous growth bears witness to the needs which it fulfills. It satisfies the clearly defined longings of the patrons or founders and the ill-defined longings of those who are packed in the

tenement house sections of the cities. The Settlement is the cement that binds together the rich and the poor. It is the bridge by which communion between these classes is made possible.

The slum-dweller must surely possess an active moral conscience to resist the pressure that tends to burst the social fetters violently asunder, and to release from their prison longings that seek such worthy fulfillment as is implied in the desire for recreation and culture. Indeed, the State, largely through the influence of the Settlement, has come to let up in the severity of its punishment for violations of social restrictions. The young rowdy and the hooligan are first paroled, then placed into a reformatory or given an indeterminate sentence, mainly because the State assumes that the offender was so hampered by his social environment that it holds itself partially responsible and so prefers to mitigate the offender's punishment. The State virtually punishes itself by the risk which it thus incurs in letting the culprit go free.

The Settlement exists to set right, in part, the wrongs which social injustice brings about. It aims to give the pent-up spirit a chance to expand. Its social rooms and reading rooms, its musicals and dances, its clubs and societies, its art exhibits and lectures, its gymnasiums and baths, its libraries and classes, its industrial museums, its labor centers and its manual training shops are all so many artificial vents through which the pent-up energy might be set free and afterwards expand naturally.

The Settlement, in playing the part of a vent for the imprisoned human nature, serves, in fact, at the same time, as a prop and support of the State. Many a strike that would have caused violent disruption in the community has been settled through the agency of the

Settlement which was enabled to mitigate the threatened violence only because it had won the trust of the people through its services in behalf of their inner longing to expand and through its efforts in behalf of outer freedom.

The trust won by the Settlement was the fruit of years of patient waiting. The neighborhood does not soon flock to the Settlement; for a friend is not easily made. Mistrust must first be rooted out; for when years of suffering from social injustice have hardened sufferers who had been often betrayed by those who posed as their leaders, it is no easy matter to win their confidence. The first idea the Settlement evokes in the mind of an East Side mother is that the Settlement is a missionary movement aiming to win away her children from the religion of their parents. The East Side father again looks upon the Settlement as a capitalist's scheme for softening the righteous anger of the poor. He fears lest a secret impulse may be lurking behind the sacrifices which the Settlement workers make in his behalf. All these prejudices must be overcome, and it requires tact and patience to overcome them.

Originally the Settlement started with no definite program. It had no clear cut plan of satisfying the needs that it came into existence to satisfy. It relied on the personality of the Settlement workers to adopt any plan that circumstances approved. No beliefs, whether political or religious, were expressed. The life of the worker alone, not his opinion or his creed, was to be a guiding light. By examples of personal and domestic cleanliness, of gentlemanly politeness and inner sincerity the dweller in the neighborhood was to be attracted as to a shining light and be lifted up. Remarkably near are we in this to the naïve attitude of Jesus. Here again Jane Addams touches the soul of the

movement in the statement of its principles just as she personally surpasses in living them out. She says: "His [Jesus's] teaching had no dogma to mark it off from truth and action in general. He himself called it a revelation—a life."

The Settlements that exemplified this principle elicited the best that was in the neighborhood, and found that in a short time, the neighborhood itself furnished the workers and freed the Settlements from their dependence upon Universities for their leaders. Such, for instance, was the case with the University Settlement in New York shortly after its first decade of existence. This is proof of healthy vigor, a vigor which ceases as soon as the Settlement ceases to evince the adaptability which Jesus employed in dealing with individuals.

There is so much that is vivid and captivating in a movement at its incipency, and we so feel ourselves part of the living force that stirs it on, and so wholeheartedly do we imagine that we are contributing towards its furtherance, that our activity in its behalf knows no fatigue. At this stage of the movement, we find the coöperative principle most nobly exemplified, and genuine democracy the prevailing form of government. In the launching of something new, whether it be the formation of a religious order, or the organization of a benevolent society or of a labor union, or the erection of a new church or hospital or the establishment of a summer camp, we are sure to find a hearty coöperation and enthusiasm that surmounts all difficulties and carries the work to completion.¹ The numbers that

¹ Several clubs of an Educational Society on the Lower East Side of New York desired to open a summer home for its poor members, and finding a deserted house in the outskirts of Staten Island that was suitable but impracticable because of the use it had been put to (the previous occupant had housed his goats and chickens in it and the floors were inches thick with a deposit of years), nevertheless rented the place. The manner in which the obstacles were sur-

engage in it may be few or many, but each counts himself a vital factor, not a dead tool in the process. This self-esteem is highly important.

(c) *The Danger Involved in Institutionalization*

This spirit of coöperation characterizes the pre-institutional stage of a movement, before it has settled down to a fixed program and before it has set up precedent as an image of worship. When the institutional stage sets in, a new spirit also enters. At the present time we shower so much praise upon nicely organized movements; we so readily support the machine-like charity that works "scientifically" and the machine-like school that works to any prescribed "method" which its sponsors claim is related to some psychological principle, that it behooves us to call attention, by way of contrast, to the spirit operative in the pre-institutional stage of a movement.

The established institutional systems, with their organization and mechanism are fondly clung to, because they are scientific—and it is stylish nowadays to be scientific. We overlook the fact that the term scientific applies not to a mere status, not to a mere arrangement of parts in an organism. The mere arrangement is an æsthetic fact, which properly entitles an institution, or an organization to be called beautiful, but not necessarily scientific. The term scientific applies to the functioning spirit, and not to arrangement of parts.

We very often confuse function with arrangement of parts. This is mainly the case in institutions. A mounted, is an indication of the spirit that prevailed. On Saturdays and Sundays, all the young men went to Staten Island; some brought brooms, brushes and soap; others, shovels and pails and started to clean the Augean stables. Every one did something and that willingly. One lame young man of about twenty-five gave splendid proof of how the defect in his legs was rectified in his arms by scraping and scrubbing a floor to the cleanliness of a newly planed board.

gradation of officers of an institution whose functions are prescribed to an iota, may be a beautiful arrangement, but cannot by any means be considered a scientific operation of function. Our desire that the beautiful arrangement should work scientifically is certainly a commendable one, but we forget that what perhaps ought to be "idealiter" does not necessarily have to be "realiter." (See Kant on this point.) The prescribed duties of every worker in an institution, even if carried out correctly by every individual in a machine-like way, do not make the operations scientific, any more than a machine can be said to be scientific.

Its science lies in the individual who devised the machine, not in any parts of it. That institution is scientific whose individual functionaries, from highest to lowest, not only function their own parts properly, but comprehend the function of every other in the system, and can, when required, step into any place and perform its function. The spirit of the functioning method and not the mere mechanical functioning of parts constitutes the scientific attitude. To be scientific is thus to be organic as opposed to being mechanical. This attitude gives vitality to a movement; its workers are truly coöperative, and not mere wheels screwed into place and ever ready to get out of gear the moment the fastenings work loose.

Scientific is thus a term applied to the attitude we hold towards an object. It is not a term applied to an object. One must see a total view from each part of the object, before he can be said to have a scientific view of it. Likewise an Institution, if it is looked at as an object, may be beautiful in its arrangement or in the functioning of its parts, but as such, it cannot be said to be scientific. An Institution is scientific only when

the orderly arrangement of its parts functions according to the methods of the organic spirit. As an organism, it is scientific only if there is willing and not forced coöperation, and this is possible only when each views his operation from the total point of view.

Now it is precisely this attitude that characterizes the early stage of a movement, and gives life and hope to it. And it is precisely the absence of this spirit that characterizes the later stage of a movement and makes it formal and stiff and as stolidly routine in its functioning as are the daily prayers counted off the beads of a monk.

The Settlement idea is so fascinating, that it has spread to kindred movements, and it is impossible to treat of the Settlement without taking them into consideration. These kindred institutions are the charitable and the educational institutions. Strange to say, however, what the latter have caught of the Settlement idea is not its organic spirit but its mechanical arrangement of parts, and consequently we witness in these institutions a crystallization into a dead formalism which was far from the intent of the founders of the Settlement idea. This formalism has had a reflex influence upon the Settlement, and now we behold under our very eyes the three institutions which are closely allied to one another becoming mechanicalized. Let us observe the process going on at present in each of these allied institutions.

Our public schools have already reached the institutional stage, and are referred to as the "system," meaning the æsthetic characteristics which mark the orderly arrangements of parts. They are lauded highly for their "scientific" character. Their achievements, especially in their own reports, are often gloriously

"colored" and the color-blind laity marvel at the beauty, mistaking, in their ignorance, the æsthetic arrangement of parts for their vital organic functioning.

Of the many institutions whose purpose is the betterment of social conditions, the schools were the first to become institutionalized. Rousseau and Pestalozzi as pioneers tried to make them vital. Their efforts bore noble fruit, and therefore they were imitated and imitated until their very imitation came to be worshipped as "method."

It is "methods" by which our Universities proceed to institutionalize the schools. Strange evolution this! Because some methods, used by certain persons, were fruitful, therefore their methods, used by any person, must be fruitful. This is the logic by which schools are institutionalized and education made a "science."

Not that there is no value in method; but we forget that its value lies in the spirit in which it is employed, and not in the tactics of presentation; that not in the mere order and arrangements of the points of a lesson is found its scientific aspect, but rather in the personality that makes use of, and vitalizes this order and arrangement.

The harshness of institutionalism is painfully illustrated in the operation of the compulsory education act. No doubt, the highest ethical considerations prompt its promotion as well as that of all child-welfare movements. Yet legislative acts are very often mistaken in the particular mode in which they seek to gain that welfare. The compulsory education law is certainly in general a good act, but it often works untold hardships in its particular applications, and then brings no good to the child whom it was intended to benefit, simply because we take the law by itself without considering its relation to the school curriculum. Very frequently,

for the want of a few months to make up the legal age for obtaining a work certificate, a boy is prevented from coming to the assistance of his widowed mother and helpless younger brothers and sisters. Will three or four months' detention in school equip him with so much additional powers as to compensate him and his dependent family for the loss of his financial help? No one who knows the inner workings of our school system can honestly say "yes."

It is often argued that the mother by keeping him in school shows her motherliness and is thereby acting from the highest moral principles in so identifying her life with the life of her hopeful son as to suffer temporary want in his behalf. Splendid moral training. The theory is unchallengeable; but to make the practice worthy of the theory, the efficiency of the school must be taken into consideration. If the school were an organic and vital institution whose curriculum and spirit were not formal and stiff but life-breathing and life-giving, we should then say: "What a pity it is to tear a young boy away from it! It is the duty of the mother who needs his aid to make financial sacrifices in his behalf and keep him in school longer. It is the duty of the State to be rigoristic in the application of the compulsory education law, and to see that the schooling is not shortened; for by staying in school to the legal limit, the boy would thus be compensated in many ways for the financial loss which his mother would sustain." But we fail to take into consideration the efficiency of the school, and we make exertions to square a splendid ethical theory and an institutional practice—two things which are incommensurable.

The moment we do so, we institutionalize ethics and detract from its efficiency. We fail to see the relative value of things and become hard-hearted although we desire to be sympathetic. The compulsory education

act when rigidly applied as it is in New York State, where discretionary power is withheld from the school authorities, works great hardships, which are not warranted by the state of efficiency of our schools. In view of this lack of efficiency, what we need is discretionary power resting with the immediate superiors of the boy or girl, who know the conditions both of the pupil and of the school, to increase or to decrease the legal age limit for leaving school.

We trust a magistrate to give an indeterminate sentence and to parole, why not trust a school official with similar discretion in regard to work certificates? Is not this failure an open confession that our school officials are untrustworthy; that they will abuse their trust? If trustworthy personality is so little in the saddle here, what a commentary upon our schools!

Rigidity even of a good law is unethical. It ignores relative values, and thus puts a false stamp upon things. "A good custom may corrupt the world." Rigoristic ethics can be applied only to individualistic and personal conduct, to conduct self-imposed and not to that of a social group. Such an autonomic ethics, when applied by an individual to his daily life, guides him to act socially and to consider the relative value of his every act and to choose that one which is most in harmony with the demands of life's best interests. Rigoristic individualistic ethics is thus in harmony with the principles of Jesus.

Rigoristic social ethics often goes contrary to His teachings and to one's best judgment in particular cases. It makes one untrue to the requirements of the best impulses and thoughts that are in him in order that he may be true to the strictures of a social claim.

Take the illustration cited above. Social rigor requires the boy who lacks a few months of being

fourteen years old to stay in school although his help is needed immediately. It requires the mother to deny necessities to herself and to her other children on the ground that in so doing she is acting from a higher ethical principle. It requires the school official who is best qualified to decide the relative merits of the conflicting ethical principles to suppress his best judgment in order to conform to a social demand whose rigor goes counter to his conscience in the very act of his complying with its strictness. Here is the self-contradiction of social conduct that adopts a rigoristic stand which has place only in an individualistic ethics.

Charity likewise has become institutionalized and with like results. The art of giving has become the science of withholding. It has been given a beautiful form. A "case" is referred to a certain "department" and the reference blank, filled out according to formula, proceeds down the proper channels much as the cash-carriers in a department store are whisked along their proper paths until they reach their destination. The system is perfectly beautiful; but by thus mechanizing charity its vitality departs. The philanthropist who gives through an impersonal institution is one of the greatest losers by de-personalizing himself. The ethics of a charitable act consists in the reciprocal benefit derived from it both by the giver and the receiver. By becoming an impersonal party to the act of charity, the philanthropist weakens and perhaps totally loses the significance of the charitable relation to himself and to the beneficiary. In charitable institutions we have another example of the process of institutionalization. It is the process of removing personality as a factor in a social movement. And the machine that is thus created, eats up the greater half of the oil which it was intended to transport and to apply as a balm.

We are now witnessing the institutionalization of the Settlement. The spirit of the pioneer is fast giving way to the mere systematizer and codifier. With the exception of Miss Addams, the Barnetts, and of a number of others, the Settlement worker has become a professionalist whose vocation is figured out in cash value and in terms of mechanical results. The subjective impulse towards Settlement work no longer is the primary motive force.

The public is impressed by figures and figuring. Figuring classes and attendances therefore becomes an important part of the head-worker's efforts. It is absurd, this manner of showing the effectiveness of a Settlement Movement, to stand with tick-watch in hand and click every time a person enters through one door and goes out through another. In this, the Settlement is copying the school where we measure the effectiveness of classes and lectures by attendances and by audiences. It is show that we look for, and not genuine result which, in a way, is not measurable.

This way of appraising breeds hypocrisy and deteriorates our morals instead of enhancing them. Our schools and our Settlements are now measuring their success by figures just as our newspapers do by their circulation. Figures are easily manipulated. One of the worst evils of our evening schools was the "padding of the attendance reports"—an evil that sprang directly from our false way of judging the success of the teacher by the attendance he can roll up. One must be acquainted with the inside workings of an institution to feel the heinousness of the evil of employing a false measure of value to the efficiency of social energy. It is then only that the discrepancy between the reality and the statements of the annual report becomes exasperating.

Of course, all this does not detract from the value of the Settlement idea, as long as the principles that underlie it are sound; but the evil of institutionalism to which the Settlement is especially open, frustrates the purpose for which it stands.

The writer has been engaged for about ten years in the immediate neighborhood of New York's largest Settlement and has not been able to note one marked improvement during all these years, either in the external appearance of the gutters piled with paper, garbage and rubbish or in the personal cleanliness of thousands of boys under observation or in their reverence and respect for parents and elders.

The desire which the Settlement shows of drawing large crowds within its walls and of thus piling up figures in the annual report, prompts the workers to fraternize on a level with the immature minds of the young, and to hold them by catering to them on a lower plane—a familiarity which does not make for reverence.

The same difficulty now confronts the Public Schools which are crazed with artificially stimulated athletics. How in the midst of play between superiors and inferiors we may preserve the respect which is due from one to the other, is our great problem. The average teacher is not able to meet the situation, mainly because the schools are now steeped in institutionalism.

Can the Settlement be freed of institutionalism? The solution lies in the power there is in the supporters of Settlements, in those who finance them, to take active part in the work of the Settlements, and in not standing aloof, while a professional worker does the work and makes reports to satisfy the supporter upon whose goodwill he is dependent. If the Settlement is not to become a crystallized, dead form that bears witness,

merely through its physical features, of the life that once reigned in it, the supporters of Settlements must, in large measure, enlist themselves and not merely their money in the work. It is life, not money, that counts in a movement.

The life that dominates the Settlement is in the personalities that control it. This is so self-evident that it seems superfluous to mention it. But when one views the history of the Settlements not from annual reports that they issue, but from actual observation of their work and influence, and when he finds that there now goes on a process of slow crystallization into a mere Institution not possessed of that vitality which is rightly attributed to life alone, it is time to call attention to the vitalizing principle in the movement.

The sudden growth of Settlements all over the land has created a demand for Settlement workers and many respond who are not prompted to enter the field by the need for it which they find in themselves or in the neighborhood, but often only by the remuneration which it furnishes. Professional Settlement workers sprang up who call and compete for positions and care not much whether they are fitted to supply the need that is felt for the Settlement.

Under such guidance, Settlements are institutionalized. A routine program and prospectus is followed, that fails to mould character—a task which should be the chief object of a Settlement's aims.

In an ethical movement the object is character-making. The Settlement founder should realize that this is the aim for which the Settlement is founded and that he fails to live up to the situation if he loses sight of character-building. He becomes a mere worshiper of an idea. Such idea-worshiper is as little moral as the mumblor of prayers is religious. As

Professor Dewey says: "The question finally at stake in any genuinely moral situation is: What shall the agent be? What sort of character shall he assume?"¹

Unless one feels that he is serving a need—either his own subjective need or the objective need of the neighborhood, he is not justified in entering the movement. The philanthropist who gives money-service does not supply the need. He gives impersonal charity, but he falls far short of supplying the need for which a Settlement stands. Settlements need the services of their supporters just as much as they need their money, and are badly off unless they get such service. How majestically a character like Jane Addams or Canon and Mrs. Barnett looms up by comparison with the mere financial supporter of a Settlement or with the average paid worker!

The institutional stage betokens a decline in the Settlement as an effective moral agency. The Settlement is the personality of the worker, not the program of activity. The same is true of a school. Institutionalize a school, plan out and fix the program for every minute of the day, and bind the teacher to it, then the machinery which you thus create frustrates the very purpose of the school.

It is more than mere coincidence that the institutional school is at present assuming the function of the institutional Settlement and is taking over most, if not all, of its activities. Institutions are rivals and tend to swallow each other up; personalities are living souls that strengthen each other by eliciting the good that lies hidden in each other.

If the Settlement serves a genuine need, then it will resist absorption by the institutional school. Hull House, as long as Jane Addams lives to direct it, and

¹ Dewey—*Logic*, p. 210.

Toynbee Hall under the guidance of the Barnetts will not be absorbed even should all of their activities be assumed by the public institutions. There, personality lives and reigns. No program, but living spirit dominates. Most truly Mrs. Barnett says: "A Settlement's distinguishing feature is the absence of program, and the presence of men and women who recognize the obligations of citizenship."¹

The argument made for personal enlistment in reform movements rather than for the impersonal pecuniary enlistment which makes for institutionalization, calls for supplementation. Whatever be the institution which one supports—whether educational, charitable, or social—the ethics of such support lies in the reflex effect which the supported one has upon the supporter; it lies in the kind of man which the giving of the aid to the movement makes of the giver. In other words, an act is ethically valuable if it works both ways—on the agent as well as on the beneficiary. Perhaps the intrinsic value of the social deed lies in its reflex effect more than in its direct effect upon the recipient. If this truth be fully realized, the present-day impersonal attitude of the supporters of educational, charitable and social movements—an attitude that is largely responsible for their institutionalization,—dulls some of the luster which has hitherto shone round the word philanthropist.

A movement must be organized to become efficient; yet bare organization lacks vitality. It has momentum, but not living inspiration. It has the same kind of power which dead mass has, but which lacks the energy of some active principle. Many a worn-out institution possesses still some influence long after it has ceased to fulfill its purpose, simply because of the momentum

¹ *Nineteenth Century Magazine*, December, 1897.

which it has received at the start from the energy of some potent personality. A movement may have its value even after it has been institutionalized. This is the case with the school and with charity organizations. But the value it then possesses is but a fraction of the value it had when it was a living fountain of inspiration. Its present value comes from what it does for the recipient; its former value came from what it also did for the promoter of the movement. At present it has mere momentum affecting another, whereas, in its initial stage, the movement had also active energy and affected the agent as well.

(II) *Its Immanent Idea*

The Religious Ethical Movement endeavors to christianize our industrial and economic life. To do this means to apply to industrial pursuits the ethics of our private life. The Social Ethical Movement endeavors to universalize culture and comforts in the interests of human solidarity. The Religious Ethical Movement is an appeal to the captains of industry to stop the injustice which produces economic and industrial inequalities; the Social Ethical Movement is an appeal to the industrial toilers to take advantage of the opportunities for refinement afforded by the Settlements and to learn from them the beauties of culture as well as the home comforts which personality requires, and by these means to rise to the social level of the captains of industry.

This view is based on the assumption that, while wealth is an artificial means of creating class distinction, culture is a natural means of offsetting it. Culture is the balance scale of wealth. The social standing of the captains of industry rests on their wealth. The social standing of the masses must rest on culture.

This is the theory upon which the Social Ethical Movement purposes to bring about social solidarity. If human solidarity has been somewhat split upon the rocky mass of wealth which the industrial revolution of the 19th century has enabled the captains of industry to heap up, the rift so made is to be surmounted by the refining influences of culture.

The Settlement thus stands for the blessings of culture. Christian Socialism and the Settlement are at one in their object. Both seek peace between workers and employers. They differ, however, in the means they use. Christian Socialism pleads with the latter to be gracious towards the former; the Settlement pleads with the former to rise to the standard of life of the latter. This must not be taken as literally but generally true as an estimate of the functions of the two institutions.

Nor must the Settlement be thought of as altogether a meek dove of peace; for on occasions, when it has found the captains of industry unyielding to the pleas of justice, it boldly enlisted on the side of labor in its war against capital. But such alliance it entered into only when justice clearly was on the side of labor or of civic welfare. And so, when the strife was settled, the Settlement was held in greater esteem by both parties. In the words of Barnett, it "has tended to mitigate class suspicions, and helped to inspire local government with a higher spirit."

The relation between the two movements here considered may be thus summed up: The Religious Movement seeks through the application of Christian morals to business to spread among the workers the culture and comforts which the employers now have; the Social Movement seeks through universalizing culture and comforts to improve the moral life of the workers—a

life which at present is not moral. The argument of the former runs thus: "Religious living will throw open to all the possibility of obtaining culture and comforts; therefore live religiously." The argument of the latter runs: "The spread of culture and comforts will make men more moral; therefore establish Settlements which shall be centers of culture and patterns of necessary personal and home comforts."

Whatever be their agreement as to ends, they differ as to means. The means employed by the Religious Ethical Movement have already been stated and we have found how impossible these means were of attaining the end. We must now examine the Social Ethical Movement, and ascertain whether the principles upon which the Settlement rests are any more valuable as a means to the attainment of the end.

The primary principle upon which the Settlement rests is that there is something common to all men, as men. This common something is the bond of solidarity. It alone is sufficient to unite men. The Settlement maintains that no other bonds are necessary; in fact, if there exist any other bonds they are a hindrance to universal brotherhood. Religious bonds separate; racial bonds separate; national bonds separate. They separate the groups so bound from others that are not so bound.

The basis of solidarity is reached by eliminating from human society all accidental acquisitions. Wealth, rank, and birth, and even culture that takes pride in itself, fall by the wayside in the process of elimination; for all these make rents in the solidarity of the social rock. Ignore all differences between men and you will come to the element common to them. And you will find that this common element is the one thing that is noblest in all men.

Now what remains after these differences are sub-

tracted is simply the fact of human form. Human form is thus the basis of human solidarity. Upon this basis, the idiot boy, the negro mammy, the boorish man, the free-thinker are enfranchised into social fellowship.

The view here presented has at least this in its favor: The common is not an accidental element, but a natural possession of all men. It is this fact that the human form is the basis of human solidarity, which makes the Social Ethical Movement so universal, and gives it so wide a platform to stand on. The Settlement here has a tremendous advantage over the Church. In the words of Graham Taylor, "It appeals to the essential religious nature without insistence upon divisive tenet or ecclesiastic preference upon which it is the prerogative of the churches to insist." The Settlement draws to itself therefore people who possess differences; but it says that these differences are accidental, and non-essential. What is essential is the possession of that common something which every human being possesses by virtue of his being human.

The Settlement thus fraternizes on the basis of the human form which all men are endowed with. The idiot boy is as welcome as the genius; the ignorant, unmannered immigrant, as the cultured and gentlemanly native citizen. The Settlement is thoroughly democratic. Through it, democracy is spread far beyond the political sphere. "The social and educational activities of a Settlement," says Jane Addams, "are but differing manifestations of the attempt to socialize democracy, as is the existence of the Settlement itself." On this bare basis of social solidarity, namely, the common possession of a human form, the Settlement builds a social structure into which no material is allowed to enter that will in any way split this solidarity. It adds all that refines and uplifts—culture

and simple comforts; but such culture must not be self-conscious. Culture that takes pride in itself makes a rent in the social structure. Culture that is humble is noble and refining.

"The Settlement is an effort to add the social function to democracy," says Jane Addams. It endeavors to straighten out the inequality that still exists in the vocational, in the social, and in the religious worlds; and it purposes to do this by emphasizing what is common in men. "We must accentuate the likenesses," she says, "and ignore the differences which are found among the people whom the Settlement constantly brings into juxtaposition." This accentuation of likenesses is its great ethical pride. Yet it is hardly clear as to what is meant by accentuating likenesses.

We are told that "all that is noblest in life is common to men as men." Now if we lay emphasis on the common, we come to the empty human form; if we lay emphasis on the noblest we come to culture and art. For art and culture are presumably, in the intent of the Settlement, the noblest in life. Judging by the actual practice of Settlements, such is apparently the conclusion. Almost all Settlement activities are artistic and cultural. Its other activities, its gymnasium, baths, playroom, etc., are merely drawing cards, temporary sweets from which the youth is soon to be weaned and then trained to the permanent goods, culture and art.

Now culture and art, as the noblest in life, are by no means common; nor are they means of arriving at a common human element as a basis for solidarity. Culture and art, even more than wealth, make distinctions among human beings. They create differences of taste and differences of appreciation, which, though nobler, are as real differences as are those brought about

by wealth, race and religion. Culture and art thus fail as the bases of human solidarity; and the common element that the Settlement seeks as its ground of solidarity, is once again reduced to the mere possession of human form. It is hard to reconcile the process of eliminating differences and of simultaneously stimulating and instigating art and culture. The Settlement, in attempting to do this, virtually tries to suppress differences with one hand and with the other to emphasize what it chooses to call tendencies to likeness but which are nevertheless most profound sources of differences.

In this movement as in the Religious Ethical Movement we fall into the error of emphasizing likeness, and find that we have no clear conception of what we mean by likeness. The Settlement strips men and women of all differences; and when they are thus stripped, it says: "Lo and behold, they are alike."

We have here naked form, a pure Platonic concept; and in order to put substance and life into it, we immediately proceed to reclothe it but with garments that shall reveal no differences. These garments, art and culture are presumably to clothe all in such fashion as to make us unable to discern one being from another. In this way the solidarity of the race is to be established.

But art and culture are neither common garments of all souls; nor can they, if made general apparel, hide differences. They would, in fact, most loudly proclaim differences among beings; for culture evokes, rather than eliminates differences.

The theory that culture is a social force which may be employed to counteract the unsocial force of wealth, is a theory fraught with no unmixed danger. The

danger of this theory lies in the idea that differences are unsocial forces and must be eliminated. Culture is therefore called into the field as a mangle to smooth out the ruffles which differences beget. Now there are two fundamental errors here: first, the assumption that differences are unsocial forces is an erroneous assumption; second, the theory that culture eliminates differences is a false theory. As to the first of these, I must defer discussion to the last chapter; as to the second, it may truly be said that culture evokes differences of thought, of appreciation, and of action. It is certainly far from reducing all men to a dead level. The very interaction of experiences that comes from intercourse between peoples has a tendency to elicit differences much in the way that the same bow passing over strings of different tension produces different tones. The Settlement is the mart where different opinions are exchanged but not necessarily eliminated. The intercourse of human beings in the Settlement effects toleration, but not assimilation. This is a highly desirable effect; far more desirable than the elimination of the differences would be. Indeed the peculiar merit which culture possesses, is that it gives its possessor that tolerance of differences which may afterwards become the basis of an ethical life.

The culture that comes from the interaction of experiences is largely responsible for the spirit of toleration which we find in Settlements. Indeed, toleration is the great contribution to social ethics which the Settlement movement has made. As Jane Addams has it, "We are learning that a standard of social ethics is not attained by traveling a sequestered byway, but by mixing on the thronged and common road where all must turn out for one another, and at least see the size

of one another's burdens. . . . We realize, too, that social perspective and sanity of judgment come only from contact with social experience; that such contact is the surest corrective of opinions concerning the social order and concerning efforts, however humble, for its improvement."¹ But tolerance of differences is quite another matter from elimination of differences.

No better proof of the effect of Settlement culture as a divisive force can be adduced, than the schism it creates in families. There are critics of the Settlements who look upon the movement from a different perspective and so get a different view from that obtained by the Settlement worker. They are the large class of immigrants whom the Settlement has not been able to attract, whose children have, however, drunk fully of the culture offered by the Settlement. These immigrants accuse the Settlement of breaking up the home, of making a schism in the family through the very introduction of culture. The younger members of the family after having imbibed this culture, forthwith set themselves up as judges of right and wrong, in religious doctrines, and in social manners; and by foisting upon the less receptive minds of their elders ideas which the Settlement has implanted, the foster children of the Settlement family beget unhealing breaches in the natural family. Here is an instance of the separation which the Settlement causes in its very effort to unite, through the efficacy of culture.

This result, which the Settlement workers least looked for, is no doubt the effect of the mistaken notion that culture eliminates differences and is the basis of solidarity among mankind. The Settlement's claim that culture offsets the artificial differences which wealth and rank beget, may be fully allowed, without

¹ *Democracy and Social Ethics*, p. 7.

our allowing the other claim that it removes all differences whatever, or that it is a basis of solidarity.

The criticism here set forth, that the Settlement disrupts the family, is met with the claim that the Settlement is itself a family, a larger and more important family than any single family in its neighborhood. "By virtue of certain advantages—educational, financial or otherwise, the Settlement family is able to be neighborly in a wider and more effective way than any other families in Settlement neighborhoods."¹

Whatever we may think of the claim that the Settlement is a family, we cannot put this artificial family on a par with the natural family. In the natural family the Settlement does often cause breaks, and for these breaks it is poor amends to claim that it unites other families that are drawn to the Settlement into a larger family.

To sum up: An analysis of the primary principle upon which the Settlement seeks its basis of solidarity, leaves us with naught but human form—a pure Platonic image—as the basis of fellowship; and, moreover, the moment the Settlement tries to clothe that pure form, it brings forth garments that emphasize distinction.

There is a second principle for which the Settlement stands, which we come next to set forth. The Settlement viewed as a body of active residents giving the best that is in them to their less fortunate neighbors, hates paternalism as befitting only private morality, and endeavors to foster another principle—the principle of social morality. The prevailing note of the Settlement worker is, "Democratize Society," just as the prevailing note of the Christian Socialist was, "Christianize Society." Next after his efforts to meet in social fel-

¹ Mary K. Simkhovitch.

lowship all human beings, the Settlement worker stands out for social efforts to bring about social good. This is his second great doctrine.

With regard to the laboring man, the Settlement stands for his salvation by experience, even though in this way suffering and pain may be his portion, rather than for salvation by paternal guidance along a path strewn with happiness. As regards the philanthropist, it cares not for his paternalism but for his coöperation in making his paternalism unnecessary. Private morality without social morality is not the demand of the time. "To attain individual morality," says Jane Addams, "in an age demanding social morality, to pride one's self on the results of personal effort when the time demands social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation. To perform too many good deeds may be to lose the power of recognizing good in others; to be too absorbed in carrying out a personal plan of improvement may be to fail to catch the great moral lesson which our times offer."¹ Similarly Prof. Dewey says, "If the vice of the ordinary egoist, is to neglect the interests of others, the vice of the social leader, of the reformer, of the philanthropist and of the specialist in every worthy cause of science or art or politics, is to seek ends which promote the social welfare in ways which fail to engage the active interest and coöperation of others."²

The Social Ethical Movement with its underlying idea of the unity of life, propounds, as part and parcel of its ethical philosophy, a newer standard of morality—a social standard as over against the older individualistic standard. The distinction here aimed at is that the latter standard was satisfied with right conduct

¹ Jane Addams—*Democracy and Social Ethics*.

² John Dewey—*Ethics*, p. 303.

by the individual, with the taking care of the "person under your own hat," while the social standard is missionary in character, and is not satisfied with taking care of the "person under your own hat," but demands that each should see to it that every one shall be able to take care of the "person under his own hat." It is, in other words, democratic; whereas the individualistic ethics is monarchical.

Jane Addams in her book *Democracy and Social Ethics*, points out very clearly this difference in standard, by an illustration drawn from the great Pullman strike. She shows that the President of the company had the noblest of motives in constructing his model town and in managing it in a model but yet in an individualistic way, and so he thought himself wronged and was sorely vexed when rebellion broke out. She blames this philanthropic President for not having applied a social standard of morality and for not having seen to it that the inhabitants of the model town who were his employees were reared even by repeated failure to a democratic life—to a true democracy. The same view is expressed by Professor Hall, who says "Bad government that is training men for maturity is better than good government that leaves the large proportion contented Children."¹ The only heretic in the Social Ethical Movement, we are told by Mrs. Simkhovitch, the Head Worker of Greenwich House, New York, is he who does not believe in democracy. "The only cure for democracy is more democracy." This is a cry commonly heard nowadays, and is probably the first fruit of the Social Ethical Movement.

Democracy is to be established everywhere. In the clubs at Settlements we see a precocious twelve-year-old youngster, with gavel in hand, guide the destinies of

¹ Hall—*Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics*, p. 171.

his club, in accordance with the laws made by an electorate constituted of boys of his own age. He imposes fines and suspensions—a veritable future judge. Thus we are teaching him to be independent. The schools in this, as in other matters, ape the Settlements. The School City is being preached as a substitute for the methods of discipline in vogue in our schools. At the Child's Welfare Exhibit, in New York, one placard shown was a picture of a "Supreme Court in session in one of the school cities"; another, that of a Senate of boys; and still another, of a "House of girls," all in great solemnity debating some question.

When one looks at these pictures one feels as if the millennium has come. It seems as if the children are teaching their elders the democratic ideals. Assuredly, "And a Child shall lead them" has already come true.

Can it really be true that the cure for democracy is more democracy? How strangely the historic pendulum swings! Not so long ago the cry of the Manchester School of Economists was: The cure for individualism is more individualism—the cure for competition, more competition; the cure for selfish greed, more greed. Now the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme, and the slogan is more democracy.

We seem to be impatient until we reach the extreme of a movement, and then finding that Aristotle's statement in regard to extremes is verified, we turn back to correct the errors; but we keep on correcting until we wonder whether, like the much-darned stocking, the thing we are mending is the same thing we started out to mend. We started to mend individualism and we altered into democracy.

The Social Ethical Movement of which the Social Settlement is the physical expression, represents one extreme end of the cosmic pendulum's swing; and at

this end of the swing we preach democracy even for children; for are not children human and are not all human forms similar? Why then should democracy be limited at all? Away with the limits; more of democracy, and still more and fear not the consequences; for the very failures will ultimately neutralize one another.

Under this reign of universal democracy, how rapidly experiences succeed each other. And what are the consequences? The present day newsboy of thirteen has probably encountered all the experiences of a mature man of half a century ago. We are greedy of experiences, and we hasten on the kaleidoscope. Our schools which, according to our educators, are fitting our children for life, are here again at one with the Settlements and they are certainly hurrying the processes. In the purely mental processes as well as in the physical processes this haste goes on. The Courses of Study are overcrowded. For must we not clothe the naked human forms, and clothe them all alike with culture and art, lest there might arise differences in life? And does life according to this view mean anything else than the process of clothing the naked human forms with culture and art? By no means. And so we are urged to prepare for life, and to hurry to live. The more rapidly we can make the wheels of experience turn, the better.

See what effect this doctrine has in actual practice on the School, an institution allied to the Settlement, and note what important bearing this has in the construction of Courses of Study. Take, for instance, the subject of arithmetic. During the past fifteen years, the arithmetical processes have dropped the grades of difficulty which formerly were attributed to them, and the very youngest child is now taught them all at once. Fractions, decimals, percentage, all are given in mild doses

to the child in the fourth year. Hasten, hasten, lest the child (at fourteen) may leave school in his fifth year and not have had the experiences.

Consequently the boy, who graduates today from a public school, has had a whiff of everything that the college boy has had. He has even been a weather prophet, making charts and determining the course of winds; he makes airships; he sends wireless messages and telegrams; he follows the ball-games with the enthusiasm of the "fans." He has experienced at fourteen the excitements of the tournaments and the athletic meets. The only experience he needs to round out the gamut of life's store of experiences is the experience of marriage. "The school should give the graduate a wife," I once heard a principal of a school say, "and he will be fully equipped."

In this haste to prepare for "life" the Settlements take the lead. I know of a case where the head worker of a Settlement had a reading circle with boys of twelve years of age in which the book read was Darwin's *Origin of Species*.

In back of all these various activities lies the notion that the young boy or girl is capable of all the experiences that the grown up man or woman experiences, simply on the strength of his possessing the human form, which must be clothed with similar clothes lest differences might creep in, and with differences the inequalities which beget economic and industrial injustice.

It is not the variety and multiplicity of the Settlement's activity that is here criticised, but its underlying basis and its object of keeping men alike to insure human solidarity. In so far as its spread of culture and art has a purpose, it may be said to be the offsetting of the artificial differences produced by wealth, race and

religion, through the universalizing of culture and art. As for the activities of the Settlement apart from its purpose, there is no doubt of their great value, but for a different reason from that assigned by the Settlement. Blindly as it were, the Settlement through the unlimited scope of its work, through its setting aside of the limits within which fellowship is to be fostered, performs a mission and renders a service which the Religious Ethical Movement utterly failed to equal.

Another pivotal idea of the movement is that there is an "absolute unity of the race" embodied in the idea of a Settlement. Its philosophic foundation is equality of the human race—that all differences are artificial barriers. These the Settlement has come to pull down and to point out instead the unity of life. Its formula may be expressed as follows: "The common bond that joins mankind is the similarity of the experiences which life of itself involves."

In the literature dealing with Social Settlements, we find this notion approximately expressed. "Toynbee Hall stands for the way of Life."¹ A Settlement "is an attempt to express the meaning of life in terms of life itself."² "All its effort in securing labor legislation is valuable largely in proportion as it can make both the working man and the rest of the community conscious of solidarity, and it insists upon similarities rather than differences."³

To express this unity of life and to nurture it, and to present the total and not a partial view of life, the Settlement shuts out all differences that divide men. It therefore is non-sectarian, non-political and co-educational. Its attitude towards all comers is, "Hail, fellow, well met."

¹ C. H. Montgomery—*Bibliography of Settlements*, p. 55.

² Jane Addams, in *Amer. Acad. of Pol. Science*, Vol. 13, p. 326.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

The idea that all genuine life is alike, is the very doctrine that was uppermost in the latter half of the 18th century. The Social Ethical Movement has simply adapted this doctrine to social problems just as the revolutionary movements of that period adapted it to political problems. For a long time this doctrine was unchallenged. Not until political organizations based upon it failed to give satisfaction, was it even questioned. Today it is confidently denied as a political doctrine. However, social reform still rests upon it, and to social problems it is applied with a sureness that rivals its application to political problems in the 18th century.

The Social Settlement launches out to teach the similarity of life as enthusiastically as did the 18th century movement. But it emphasizes the notion of similarity not as the 18th century movement did by conceiving life as similarly constituted on its subjective side, but by conceiving life as it ought to be constituted on its objective side, as a similarity of opportunity for all lives. Its method harmonizes with its basic principle. It endeavors to point out the solidarity of life, by emphasizing the points of agreement. What is meant by this unity of life, by this way of life? Behind the Social Ethical Movement lies the idea that the common element running through life is the universal shrinking from suffering and the universal pursuit of enjoyment. Its main aim then is to minister to and support these tendencies which all men have in common. Suffering, it endeavors by all means to suppress; enjoyment, to encourage and to put on a higher level.

And so it organizes to fight for legislation against child labor with its accompanying horrors. It allies itself with trades unions against the employers of labor in order that a shortening of hours and an increase of

wages may be brought about. It ministers to the instinct for pleasure by providing cozy social rooms where the poor may be free from the discomfort of a crowded two-room home. It provides good entertainments and thus fights the inducements to low forms of pleasure so alluringly held out in crowded sections of the city. This is the program of the Social Ethical Movement—a program conceived in accordance with the view that life in its universal shrinking from suffering and in its universal pursuit of happiness is for the vast majority of human beings, one and the same.

The activity of the Settlement is therefore as broad as life. No one scheme suffices to define it. Graham Taylor tells us that "It is not a church, but it is a helper of all churches. It is not a charity, but aids in the glorification and mutual helpfulness of all charitable agencies. It is not a school, but it is in tributary sympathy with the public schools, to which it will give up any part of its work that they will take up. It is non-partisan, but has been a rallying point whence the balance of political power has been effectually wielded in aldermanic and legislative elections for nearly a decade. It is not an exclusive social circle, but aspires to be a center and a source of the best social life and the highest civic patriotism. It is not a class-conscious group, but refusing to be classified strives to interpret classes to each other, and to mediate for a just industrial peace."

A movement that refuses to be classified reminds us of the acts of Jesus, which also defied classification. Viewed from the sphere of its varied activities we are here in touch with life itself, with life not yet institutionalized and fettered, with life guided by conscience alone. No fixed program is instituted. Life guided by the scruples of conscience is the only program ad-

hered to. To quote Jane Addams once more: "The residents of a Settlement are actuated not by a vague desire to do good which may distinguish the philanthropist, not by the thirst for data and analysis of the situation which so often distinguishes the 'sociologist,' but by the more intimate and human desire, that the workingman, quite aside from the question of the unemployed or the minimum wage, shall have secured to him powers of life and enjoyment after he has painstakingly earned his subsistence; that he shall have an opportunity to develop those higher moral and intellectual qualities upon which depend the free aspects and values of living. Thus a settlement finds itself more and more working towards legal enactment not only on behalf of working people and not only in co-operation with them but with every member of the community who is susceptible to the moral appeal."

Thus the guiding threads of the Settlement's activities are the changing demands of life. At one time the Settlement may find itself establishing culture classes; the very next year it may find it better to give them up and establish classes for English to foreigners; it may next abandon these for clubs; and these again for western agricultural settlements. Such for instance has been the program of the Educational Alliance in New York which, though not strictly a Settlement because it has not resident workers, is yet classed as a Settlement because in every other respect it does Settlement work.

This shifting activity is characteristic of life and of living reform movements. There is no one principle that can catch and detain it. No one formula can express it. Far from being a sign of weakness, the unfixed program of the Settlement is its surest sign of life and strength. The Settlement that knows when to cease a certain activity and assume another, instead

of competing with the public educational institutions after these have assumed the work, is a wide awake Settlement.

A survey of the Social Ethical Movement has revealed the following points: The Settlement's main purpose is to establish the solidarity of the human race. It proposes to do this: 1. By universalizing culture and art; 2. By carrying this out not in a paternalistic, but in a democratic way; 3. By pursuing a democratic method, because there is a unity of life that runs through all human beings who, prompted by this unity of life, are best able to work out their own salvation. Splendid as this theory offhand seems, we must bear in mind that there is a weakness in the Settlement Movement, which militates against its permanence; not a weakness in its principle of universal fellowship, but in its basis of fellowship, and in the aim of its activity. This hidden weakness often comes to the surface in the manifestation of strange and unexpected results from the activities of the Settlement Movement.

For instance, in order to teach the solidarity of life through culture and art, the Settlement finds itself somehow constrained to teach it by pointing out contrasts. In fact, its whole method of procedure is to bring clearly to the attention of the neighborhood the difference between the Settlement building and the neighboring houses; the Settlement way of doing things and the way in which the homes in the neighborhood do them. The Settlement is established to be the common home of the neighborhood—a larger home, one of which families, as well as individuals, are constituents. The frequenters of the Settlement are expected to draw lessons from the contrast between the common home and the private home. To the youth who enters the Settlement building, the latter seems indeed an island

amidst a vast sea with apparently all the differences that obtain between two such natural bodies brought out in a striking contrast. The Settlement is clean and light and warm. The thousands of homes surrounding it are neither clean nor light nor warm. The faces at home are care-worn; those in the Settlement radiant with contentment. The similarity of life on which the ethics of the Social Movement rests, is conspicuously absent in this contrast. Certainly so far as the material side of life is concerned, the separateness of life and not its solidarity is brought out. Nor is the similarity on the spiritual side of life evident. When one reads the pamphlet of the Greenwich House Settlement describing the spiritual life of one of the Alleys in its neighborhood, he cannot but feel the vast differences that mark the forms of human life. If spiritual life consists in moral conduct, surely we have very little similarity between that of the Greenwich House and that of its neighbors. Efforts at finding similarity are futile unless perhaps the efforts at finding similarity in the mere constitution of the so-called mental faculties, *i. e.*, the power that expresses itself in thinking, in manifesting emotion and in exercising volition. Nor are these spiritual forces by any manner of means so similar in individuals as to warrant us in affirming the similarity of life. Men's intellectual capacities certainly differ. So do their emotional natures and likewise their ability to achieve things. When we disregard degrees of intellectual, volitional and emotional attainments, what is universal in the possession of these powers? How the mere possession of these powers, marked though their contrasts are, can be a principle of social union among men, is hard to see. At any rate the mere fact that the Settlement brings out striking contrasts between it and its neighborhood interferes

no little with its identification with the life of the neighborhood.

A second instance of a weakness which the Settlement derives from its basic principle of likeness is its over-emphasis of the value of democracy as a method. I say democracy as a method and not as a principle. The two are not identical. The Social Ethical Movement does not rest on the idea of democracy as a principle, but on democracy as a method, which is a very different thing. And the idea of carrying out its activities in a democratic way, the Settlement derives from the notion of human form as a principle of likeness upon which to base social solidarity through a culture achieved democratically. Democracy as a principle may give rise to methods that may not be democratic and may nevertheless carry out the social principle perfectly well, by taking cognizance of such notions as superior, equal and inferior. This is actually the case with the Pure Ethical Movement. But the idea of democracy as a method which the Social Ethical Movement so strongly emphasizes, an idea not resting on democracy as a principle, gives rise as we have seen, to such absurd practices as are found in the hastening processes of our school curricula and in the farcical self-government makeshifts in Settlements.

The principle of the unity or the similarity of life, which can mean only the universal shrinking from pain and the pursuit of happiness, requires that politically the opportunities to avoid suffering and to pursue the agreeable shall not be disturbed in the interests of one class to the detriment of another by the governmental agency. This is the only sense in which the 18th century doctrine of equality remains true today. As a social principle it has been interpreted to mean that the highest in life which a community is

capable of cannot be realized unless the conditions are made favorable for it. The Social Ethical Movement, therefore has labored for making these conditions as favorable as possible. Its labor along this line constitutes the Settlement's civic activities. Its ethical insight here is sound; and it works along with other ethical movements in this direction. For that very reason its civic activities do not distinguish it from other ethical movements. What is genuinely ethical is identical in all movements and refuses to be classified by itself just as the life of Jesus resists classification simply because his acts are above that of a single class and belong to all classes. Only what falls below the purely ethical plane assumes a distinctive character which can be classified; but at once it also develops some contradictory nature revealing a dialectical principle at work in its midst. We have found this true in the Religious Ethical Movement and in the Social Ethical Movement, where, for instance, to establish solidarity we employ as a method, culture democratically diffused. We have seen how inadequate this method is.

How strange a world this must be, wherein you must resort to pointing out differences, if you desire to bring about an appreciation of unity! Can anything be more indicative of the Hegelian dialectic of reality's flight to an opposite, than this attitude of the Social Ethical Movement?

To sum up: The idea immanent in the Settlement Movement is at variance with the actual work of the Settlement. The activities of the Settlement may be grouped under three heads; the cultural, the recreational and the civic. The immanent idea is that culture and art tend to solidarity and these are therefore made the main propaganda, with results surprisingly startling because of their opposite effects. The secondary activi-

ties of the Settlement, gymnasium, baths, game-room, are mere vents to allow pent up instincts their regulated discharges which are thereby made less violent and harmless. The remaining activities of the Settlement, the civic efforts towards public improvements are based upon the idea that since the best that is in life cannot be brought out under such unfavorable conditions, a change of conditions is imperative.

These three elements in the Settlement work, cultural recreational and civic, comprise in general all the activities of the Settlement. Of these the ground for the last is most truly a sound ethical principle; the ground for the second is non-ethical; the ground for the first cannot be made an ethical principle at all. It is in failing to see this that the Settlement may be said to fall short as an ethical movement.

CHAPTER III

THE PURE ETHICAL MOVEMENT¹

(I) *Its History*

BY The Pure Ethical Movement, I understand a movement which debars both religious dogma and material well-being as absolute essentials to ethical life. Such a movement has existed as an idea time and again in the world's history, and is therefore nothing new; but it has rarely crystallized into and found expression in a concrete physical form.

Whenever, in the world's history, the Will was given prominence over the Intellect, whenever the concept Action was esteemed higher than the concept Being, whenever man was emphasized rather than his world around him, we found this movement received articulate shape. Such occasions were found in the life of Socrates, in the lives of the Stoics and in the doctrines of Kant in regard to the practical life.

These emphases upon actual living are not without historic connection. Each of them can be interpreted in the light of the peculiarity of the time which forced to the front the emphasis upon man and his conduct. The Socratic movement is part of the sophistic movement reacting upon and rebelling against the rest of it; the Stoic movement finds its explanation in being

¹As was said in the Preface (see page viii, the word "pure" is here used in its technical signification and does not at all imply that the Ethical Culture Societies regard their members as "purer" people than others.

regarded as an offset to the blasted nationalistic idea of the Greek City States; the Kantian movement finds its rationale in the bankruptcy of the scientific explanation of the totality of the phenomena of life. Likewise the Pure Ethical Movement, with its emphasis upon learning to do the right, has its historic connection.

The Pure Ethical Movement which has found crystallization in the Ethical Culture Societies is, from the intellectual point of view in its general phase, the offsprung of the Kantian movement and closely connected with it. More particularly, and from the practical point of view, it is an attempt to rescue the religious life from the wreck which occurred when the church dogmas were shattered by the revolutionary movement started by Darwin.

From the negative point of view, we have in the words of Dr. Felix Adler, the founder of the Ethical Movement, its ground stated thus: "To understand the Ethical Movement it is indispensable to bear in mind the evils which it seeks to counteract. These evils are chiefly materialism and moral skepticism, a skepticism which, nourished by the crumbling of ancient creeds, has attacked the very springs of moral endeavor, has produced in the minds of many, a feeling as if there were nothing great any more worth living for, and as if life had been utterly emptied of all its nobler content."¹

The moral confusion which was engendered by the skepticism for which the evolutionary movement was in the main responsible, manifested itself in the complete abandonment of life to commercial and industrial materialism. Scientific inventions aggravated the abuse to which such an abandonment led, and religion was helpless. Christian Socialism made no impression and the Social Movement of the present day simply tends to

¹*Ethical Record*, Vol. 1, p. 2.

spread among the multitudes, the material comforts and the semi-materialistic refinements under which commercialism and industrialism hide when surfeited with self-indulgence.

Amidst such circumstances when heads were turned by money-making schemes, and when in the dizziness of the whirl they were unable to see clearly the paths of duty, a stern prophet-like call was required to awaken the confused moral sense. A pure ethical movement alone bore promise of success in dealing with these conditions. And the first function of such a movement was to sift that which was moral from that which was religious in the sense commonly accepted by the multitude. It was necessary to point out the sense in which the terms ethical and religious were identifiable, and in what sense they differed. This was absolutely essential in order to rescue the moral life from the disrepute into which religion had fallen through the shattering of old beliefs by the Darwinian doctrine. It was Felix Adler who undertook this task and became the founder of a pure ethical movement, for such the Society for Ethical Culture is.

Felix Adler had been brought up by his father with the intention of filling the post of Rabbi in the established order of things. It was expected that he would propound from the pulpit the customary beliefs which the established order required.

But the bread had been in the meantime leavened. The yeast which had been deposited in 1859 was gradually making itself felt. First the old notions about life suffered decomposition; then the astronomic and cosmic notions underwent a change; lastly through the stimulus of anthropologic investigations, through the comparative study of primitive races and their customs, and through the higher criticism of the Bible, religious ideas

also were upheaved. The whole world was thus affected by the evolutionary doctrine. The eternal and existing order was no longer eternal. Being was not. Becoming was. Heraclitus was triumphant. Never before had change, movement, activity, received such tremendous emphasis. The decade and a half after 1859, witnessed an extensive seething; and the existing religious organizations were confronted with the alternative of turning their backs upon this world-movement, and stolidly ignoring it in its entirety, or of going along with it and picking up in its paths the gems that it found by the wayside.

Thus the Pure Ethical Movement sprang from a sense of the insufficiency of the customary religious ideas to meet the ethical needs which the new conditions of the new times required. The new industrial conditions had given a tremendous incentive to the worship of wealth, and to this new Moloch were sacrificed young children and women with a recklessness which might well have inspired the ancient Moloch with envy. The followers of the new god were devotees of the existing religions who were little held back by their faith from offering a daily holocaust to their new deity.

We have already studied the Religious Ethical Movement of Maurice and Kingsley which had attempted to combat and stem this rising tide of wealth worshippers. In so far as it was successful it was by way of creating a better acquaintanceship between the spiritual shepherds and their lay sheep; it did not allay the ravenous appetite for wealth. The newly awakened interest of the clergy in the life of the laity was the one good result which it effected.

Now the ready ear which the laity thus offered to the instructions of the clergy was counseled to listen to the distant past, a past utterly unlike their own present.

And just about this time, when the finger of the clergy was pointing to the past, with the advice that it be made a guide to the future, the past itself became discredited. The scientific interpretations which it just at this time received gave a new meaning to that past, and stripped it of all the holiness which the clergy were then claiming for it.¹

Many people thus began to feel the insufficiency of the church and its dogmas to rehabilitate the moral life. Science had taken issue with the church in regard to the very dogmas whereon the church rested its authority, and had completely conquered. And now that the church authority was no longer binding, the problem of finding a substitute for it was keenly felt by thinking men and women. Morality which had formerly its foundation in religion either must be fixed upon a foundation of its own, or else it must disappear before the general onslaught of science upon the crude notions and dogmas of the past. "To-day," says the founder of the Ethical Movement, "a wave of skeptical opinion is passing over the masses of the people in all civilized countries, so that the number is exceedingly large of those who have neither the idealism of science and art to support them, nor are willing and able to accept the current creeds and who are therefore allowed simply to drift as best they may, wholly uncared for on the moral or spiritual side of their natures. The question therefore arises whether some effort should not be made to build up the moral life of those whom the church has ceased to influence, to develop the moral instincts of children, to fortify the character of the young against the temptations of intemperance and licentiousness, to cherish the love of justice and the capacity of self-sacrifice."² "The motive that prompted the forma-

¹ A counter-attack upon the theory of evolution led by W. J. Bryan, a layman in science, is at the present time being launched.

² *The Forum*, Vol. 16, p. 386.

tion of the Society, was the desire for an institution, which for its members should take the place of a church."¹

There were new times and new needs. The ethical needs of the times were twofold: first, a new ethics must be evoked to deal with the new industrial conditions; secondly, in view of the now scientifically disparaged past, the ethical guiding-finger must point to a religion of the future rather than to one of the past.

The whole of life needed a readjustment. The industrial as well as the spiritual life of man must be re-interpreted, and this the Ethical Culture Movement undertook to accomplish. The needs which gave rise to the Ethical Movement are thus specified by its founder: "In the first place, there is the need of founding religion upon a basis of intellectual truth. The second reason why an independent movement for ethical culture is necessary is, that we need to give men a clearer understanding of applied ethics, a better insight into the specific duties of life, a finer and more comprehensive scheme of moral practice . . . A third reason why an ethical movement and ethical societies are needed, is that they are needed to supply that stimulus and energy to the will which is so indispensable . . . Fourthly, ethical societies are needed for the sake of the children. It is time that men of advanced opinions should have the courage to teach their children what they themselves believe to be true. And lastly the purpose of an ethical movement is that out of it may spring an ethical belief with regard to the world, a moral optimism, a belief that the universe is making for righteousness, that there is a good tendency in things."²

The Society which set before itself this task was founded in 1876. The waning enthusiasm after a brief

¹ Felix Adler—*Twenty Years of the Ethical Movement*.

² Felix Adler—*The Need of a New Moral Movement in Religion*.

brilliant beginning of the Religious Ethical Movement whose main task was similar, taught the new Society a lesson of modesty and it set forth with humble ambitions. It had no ready-made code of ethics which was to be a talisman for all occasions. Rather, in the spirit of the new scientific impulse throbbing at the time, was it to search out the ethics of each occasion, studying what conduct the highest ideal required as new problems arose. "An Ethical Society," says Felix Adler, "is primarily a society of men and women associated together for a study of the problems of the higher life, for the discovery of those new points of duty by which the received code of ethics needs to be supplemented and enlarged."¹

The Ethical Culture Movement is not a popular movement, even though it claims to be a religious movement. Religious movements are, generally speaking, popular movements, i. e., they appeal to the heart of people through principles that are, at any rate in the incipency of these movements, intellectually very simple. The Ethical Movement is rather a movement for the more thoughtful type. It aims to gather into societies men and women who think on moral problems, and who are willing to live out in their daily life the phases of right living which their intellectual efforts have revealed unto them. "A Society for Ethical Culture will attempt to be a community within the community, illustrating a higher righteousness among themselves, adopting laws and modes of social living for which the community at large is not yet ripe. They will thus attempt to build a refuge for the ideal in the midst of surrounding realism. The members of such a society will never be slack in their efforts for the reform of others, but the princi-

¹ *Unitarian Review*, 1885.

ple of complete and radical self-reform in and by association will be their distinctive watchword."¹

Yet, at the outset, the Ethical Culture Movement had to answer this important question: Can morality be founded on a pedestal of its own? The formation of the Ethical Culture Society was in fact the material expression of such a belief. It was a bold move and was at first openly attacked by the churches as atheistic and irreligious. From these attacks it defended itself with dignity and clearness, establishing its religious character by pointing out that the appeals of religious movements in the past have been most effective when made to the ethical principles which they contained; that what is valuable and lasting in every religion is the ethical element in each; that all else in each is changeable and temporary. The Ethical Culture Movement simply lays hold of this ethical principle in religion and strongly emphasizes it to the neglect of all that is perishable, indifferent or hostile to ethical development.

Viewed in the light of the great evolutionary movement of the last quarter of the 19th century, the Ethical Culture Movement is thus first of all a religious movement going along with the current of things; secondly, it purposes as it goes along to pick up *all* the gems it finds strewn in the path by other movements; thirdly, acknowledging its religious character, it maintains that what is really vital in religion, are the ethical gems which each of the great religions in the onward course of events has polished and refined; fourthly, it firmly adheres to this alone: that of all the gems on the road, the purest and the best is the worth in the individual man and woman; fifthly, that no matter how soiled this gem might be from lying in the bypaths of the great

¹ Felix Adler—*The Need for a New Moral Movement in Religion*.

highway of life, the *gem* must always be seen amidst the dirt and mud, must be picked up and polished. This last is an injunction which is especially dear and peculiar to those who walk in the ranks of the Ethical Culture Movement. It is obedience to this injunction which at once distinguishes them from the others who are also pressing forward on the evolutionary highway.

The Ethical Culture Movement stoops to pick up the human gems, and thus asserts in this one respect, its independence of the evolutionary process. The Ethical Culturists differ from the scientists who form a part of the throng in as much as the latter simply jot down in their note books: "I have seen this, and that and the other thing," but do not stop to pick them up, to clean them and to take them along.

The Ethical Culture Movement may be defined as a religious evolutionary movement whose goal is altogether in the future. And here we may note the radical way in which it differs from the other ethical movements. The Religious Movement has a goal in the past, and its aim is to bring the present back to that past goal. The world according to it seems to be running away from its goal the further it travels on in time. To halt, as it were, the onward rush of time and to turn it to the past, is in the main its cherished hope. The Pure Ethical Movement, on the other hand, has no goal in the past. It looks solely to the future.

✓ It is a religious movement in that it attributes worth or holiness to humanity. This it has in common with other religions; but it is at the same time differentiated from them in as much as unlike them it attributes worth to humanity, not through grace, as Catholicism in the main does; not through merit as Protestantism in the main does; but rather in the spirit of the Hebrew fiat: Holy shalt thou be. And it differs even from the

Hebrew notion, in as much as it assigns worth or holiness unconditionally, without any whys and wherefores. The Hebrew notion does undertake the justification of such assignment. According to the latter man is holy because he is created in the image of God. But this reason for assigning holiness to man has also been the occasion for refusing the ascription of holiness to those whom, for one reason or another, it suited the rest of mankind to keep in subjection. The negro, it was often argued, was not a holy being. He was not of the human race; not made in the image of God. The Ethical Culture Movement drops entirely the cause of holiness, because any cause for assigning holiness may be, and in the past has been, a cause for refusing it to an unfavored group.

As an evolutionary movement it looks upon the past events as of no more intrinsic value than the events of the present or of the future. It jots the sights down in its note book much in the spirit of the scientist who writes down his data. As facts, it cherishes one set no more and no less than it cherishes another set of facts. It treats all alike.

On the other hand, it is unlike the evolutionary movement which conceives human objects as marching along with time each one indifferent to all the rest except as an object of curiosity to the others, or as a means to furthering its own existence at the cost of the others. The Ethical Movement looks upon them as an ideal order—an order in which each has a certain specific value which is necessary to the complete whole.

A practical reform movement which rests upon principles as abstract as are those of the Ethical Culture Movement cannot aim at mushroom growth. It cannot multiply as rapidly as can those movements that have their goal in the immediate present, as for instance is

the case with the Social Ethical Movement. And so we find that while Social Settlements though somewhat younger than Ethical Culture Societies, have increased with marvelous speed in city and town, Ethical Culture Societies increase but slowly and with much more deliberation than the Social Settlements.

The formation of Ethical Culture Societies depends largely upon the presence of men who are available as leaders of Ethical Societies; men who shall be able to interpret the present in terms of the future, in terms of an ideal that has not yet been. Naturally such men make their appearance at infrequent intervals of time and consequently Ethical Societies are expectantly few. Since the foundation of the New York Ethical Culture Society in 1876, there have been formed a few other Societies in the United States and in England. Chicago, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Grand Rapids, and Boston have one society each; New York has two; London has many. Germany, Switzerland, France, and Austria have at least one each. These various societies were organized as soon as leaders were available. The parent society in New York has been the school in which the leaders of most of the societies served their apprenticeship.

Besides being knit together by a bond of ethical fellowship, all the societies are united by a governing body composed of the Union of Ethical Leaders. The Societies form a sort of confederacy, in which each society, while independent in the management of its own affairs, is nevertheless subject to the decisions which the United Societies in their annual convention of delegates see fit to enact.

In this respect the Ethical Culture Societies differ from the Social Settlements: the former are, the latter are not, organically related to one another. The former

seem to build for the future and are therefore bound to build more deliberately and solidly; the latter build for the present and are therefore not so circumspect.

Though thus distinguished from the other practical movements, the Pure Ethical Movement does not exclude their activities. It is opposed only to their theoretical assumptions, but not to their practice. Indeed, it embodies all of that and goes beyond it, taking somewhat the part of a general and guiding practical art amidst the particular practices of the ethical movements and thus bears the same relation to all other practical movements, that metaphysics bears to the special sciences.

Professor Adler distinguishes the Ethical Culture Movement from the others as follows: "The movement for the elevation of the working classes is inspired and sustained by profound moral feelings. How can an Ethical Society remain an indifferent spectator of such a struggle? But at the same time the Ethical Society cannot merge itself with any of the special movements for social reform. First, because it directs its efforts to the cultivation of personal as well as of social ethics. And of such efforts there is special need at a time when social aims are in the foreground. The very splendor and vastness of these aims tend to withdraw attention from the narrower but no less sacred field of private duty. The efforts to regenerate society must spring out of the whole character. The new social ethics must rest on the foundations of private morality. Secondly, every movement which is conducted in the interest of a special reform is of necessity occupied with many practical measures, which of themselves have no ethical significance whatever, but are important as minor ends subsidiary to the main end. Experience shows that the prominence necessarily assumed by these practical meas-

ures, tends to obscure the high moral end itself. There is needed a distinct movement for the definition of ethical ends, for the clarification of ethical ideals. And such a movement, the ethical movement is designed to be. It remains in contact with the living questions of the day, but it does not suffer itself to be drawn into the whirlpool of agitation. It seeks to embrace every special movement for reform within its scope and yet to stand above them all. It tests and tries all personal and social aims whatsoever. It seeks to refresh in the minds of men the consciousness of the infinity of the moral ideal, an ideal which all the practical reform movements of our time, if their wildest hopes were realized, would still fail to satisfy."¹

(II) *Its Method of Reform*

There are three methods of reform that are generally propounded to-day. First, to reform by education; second, to reform by removing the causes that give rise to the ills requiring reform; third, to reform by legislative acts.

The last of these is the method generally favored by political statesmen who, thinking entirely in terms of national sovereignty, attribute national weaknesses to national policies, and lay the abuses to which the industrial order is subject, especially the highly artificial prices of necessities, to the system of protection or to the wanton way in which national resources were given away and squandered, or to governmental failure to regulate the charge for the transportation of commodities, or to its failure to properly supervise the cold-storage of food products.

These failures are great social wrongs, and the states-

¹ *The Ethical Record*, 1889, pp. 153-154.

man's method is to deal with them by legal enactments. A legislative fiat is the Aladdin's lamp that will do our wishes. "The popular remedy for bad morals, social sins, and all kinds of human dereliction is an act of the legislature."¹ And this view is held despite the evidence to the contrary, which such a measure as the Sherman Law so clearly adduces in the United States. This law, intended as a weapon to destroy the abuses to which vast corporate interests are prone, has been during the past twenty years the fostering mother of gigantic corporations. The anarchic tendencies we witness nowadays throughout the country, are due in large measure to the people's distrust of reforms by legislative fiat.

This method is a remnant of the eighteenth century doctrine that all ills are caused by governmental exactions and oppressions, and would not exist if the individual were simply left alone. This is the theory of the school of Rousseau. It is the governmental meddlesomeness that is to blame for ills from which mankind suffers. It is this meddlesomeness that has lifted the lid off that fateful box from which flew all mortal suffering. "Don't meddle, leave the individual alone," is thus the watchword of individualism.

Now if public woes are thus made by governmental fiat, why cannot public good also be created by governmental fiat? This is precisely the position of Socialism. For at the bottom of Socialism lies the implied principle that the Social Whole through its mouthpiece, the governmental agency, can dispel social and economic diseases by a statutory law. The government can resolve to buy or confiscate all industrial machinery and apply it to the economic uses of the Social Whole, and through such an application all ills will be gathered together

¹ Franklin Pierce, in *Political Morality*.

from the length and breadth of the land and again be shut up in Pandora's box, and mankind will suffer no more.

Thus the eighteenth century Individualism, and the nineteenth century Socialism draw their roots from the same sod, from the omnipotence of the governmental agency. The former laying social ills to government, at once leaps forward to the thought, that the creator of ill can also be the creator of good. Socialism as a political party rests entirely on this doctrine. The political statesman and the political socialist have thus the same method of reform, a method which has had years of trial and numerous failures.

The second method of reform, that of removing the causes responsible for the social ills, is the method mainly favored by the Social Ethical Movement. The theory underlying this method is that social ills are a social product for which society as a whole is responsible and not the individual criminal who commits them. The wayward girl, the depraved youth, the drunken husband, and even the hardened criminal, it is claimed, are merely the executive functionaries of the silent legislation which society is all the time unconsciously enacting by making no provisions to offset the natural bent or tendencies of human individuals.

Only racial characteristics, it is urged, are manifesting themselves in the individuals whom society pursues and punishes for crimes which not they, but inherited racial experiences are really responsible for. Were justice justly meted out, the race rather than the individual, would thus have been brought before the bar. The thief, whether he be the pick-pocket, or the youth who makes away with coal from the railroad yard or with lead-pipe from vacant houses is exercising not a vicious but a racial propensity which in times gone by

were perfectly legitimate and if carried out successfully were marks of commendable skill. The gangster's prowlings are merely the cropping out once again of the adventurous spirit of his ancestors. They are but foraging expeditions on a smaller scale, which the race in the past carried out on a large scale.

These youths are not to be condemned; on the contrary, they are the doers of deeds, the exponents of action, and the promising leaders of men, as compared with the goody-goodies who are inactive sheep waiting to be driven or led. All that these abortive heroes require is a redirection of their active propensity and not repression or punishment at the hands of society.

This theory has been directly responsible for several reforms—for the children's court, for the parole or probationary system, for the suspended sentence. Its method of redirecting the pent-up energies of youth, which now and then are wont to give way to explosive bursts harmful to the social order, has established the many gymnasiums, play-centers, recreation centers, game-rooms, dancing classes, etc., all of which are merely precautionary safety valves which society is advised to set up in increasing numbers throughout the land.

Other social ills such as the street-walker's profession are laid at the door of the lack of privacy which the overcrowded tenements beget; and the destructive diseases, tuberculosis and typhoid whose contagious nature warrants their being classed as social diseases, are attributed to the unsanitary housings of the poor. The tenement house law, which is the child of the Social Ethical Movement, is the remedy applied in these cases with great success.

That this method of dealing with social ills has accomplished much good cannot be gainsaid. But it has

these great shortcomings. First, it tries to reform the mass without reforming the individual, and second the causal theory upon which its explanation of social ills rests is entirely too mechanical, and results in beclouding responsibility. It is the materialistic theory of reality applied to social phenomena. The theory that it is inherited racial characteristics that are working in the individual who commits wrongs upon society, leaves society only with remedial and not with exemplary or punitive defences against criminality; for the individual is in no way responsible. He is according to this theory totally the product of a materialistic monism, for which Haeckel in modern times so strenuously fights. How can a materialistic theory of life step forth as the champion of a cause whose main welfare is directed against industrial and commercial materialism? How can materialism fight materialism? How can one call upon the devil to cast out devils?

The view here presented is one which results from following to its conclusion the partial truth which the Social Ethical Movement sees regarding the relation of social conditions to social crimes. It is not intended by the presentation here set forth, to charge the Social Ethical Movement with being materialistic. Nothing can be further from the truth. One has but to point to such exponents of the Settlement Movement as Toynbee, Woods, Taylor and Jane Addams to refute any such charge. Indeed the designation, ethical, as applied to the Social Settlement Movement in this Chapter, implies the very opposite of a materialistic conception of reality. The Settlement Movement takes, however, only a short-sighted view and proclaims but a partial truth when it makes social sins the product solely of social conditions. The need of a social metaphysics to check up and correct the partial truths which social

reform movements put forth from time to time, is apparent from the conclusions which follow a logical deduction of the premises set forth in their theories.

The social reformer fails to see this broader relation to things, because he is so completely engrossed in his particular reform that his field of vision becomes extremely narrow. Professor Adler puts the case splendidly when he says: "The narrow-minded reformer, who puts a moral idol in the place of a moral ideal, who erects into the object towards which all his enthusiasm goes, some particular reform, such as the single-tax or socialism, or public parks, or a model school, the man in short, who strives for a good instead of striving for goodness, possesses a virtue which, as Emerson has said so painfully resembles vice."¹

This is seen clearly when we follow up into details, the theory of any particular reform movement. The Settlement Movement is at bottom an indictment of the home. It deals with masses and not with individuals. It arrays itself against those institutions from which the masses sprang. It says in fact: "Your homes are poor social centers; your mothers and fathers are unfit for their parental duties; come therefore to us, ye boys and girls, youths and maidens, we will establish better social centers for you and in these new homes we will be your foster parents."

It may be that the existing homes are defective, and that parents are unable to fulfill the duties of parenthood; yet it is at least very doubtful whether in the large group-home of the Settlement with its numerous progeny, any better oversight and personal supervision can be devised for the individual, than in the average home with its comparatively few charges. Is it likely that where supervision and tender thought for

¹ F. Adler—*Essentials of Spirituality*.

a few children fail in the home, they will succeed when directed over many in the Settlement? Will work upon groups be successful where work upon individuals is not? When we cannot move the unit are we likely to move the mass?

The Social Ethical Movement is mistaken in its method because it undertakes what is not possible to achieve. It looks for quick results. It is a movement of the present and builds mainly for the present. This statement needs some amplification, if it is not to be misunderstood. It is true, no doubt, that all ethical movements start with a past and look forward toward that future to which the words of Robert Burns shall apply:

"It's coming yet, for a' that,
That man to man, the world o'er,
Shall brothers be for a' that."

It is furthermore true that all ethical movements strive to actualize that future in the immediate present. Yet there is such a difference of emphasis laid upon the time elements by the different ethical movements as to justify a characterization of these movements according to their emphasis of and outlook upon the temporal relation. Accordingly we may roughly distinguish the three practical ethical movements by pointing out that the Religious Ethical Movement has its eye, as well as its foundations, mainly on the past; the Social Ethical Movement has its eyes mainly on the present; the Pure Ethical Movement mainly on the future. This emphasis upon the future is not generally insisted on by the Social Ethical Movement with sufficient force.

Lastly there is the method of reform through education. It is the method which the Pure Ethical Movement pursues to the utmost detail. It aims to see life as

a whole, as well as the particular mosaics which compose it. "The method of propaganda," says Prof. Adler, "is for the teachers, the leaders, to see clearly the scheme of right living and to make others see it, to be aglow with moral passion and to kindle in others the same fire; to be in earnest and to infect others with the same earnestness."¹

Of course this method is long and tedious. But it is the method which follows from the conception of its ideal—the ideal whose abiding place is ever in the future. The method is slow because it has all eternity before it in which to operate. The only sin, therefore, lies in inactivity; not in the slowness of the process of the method. It must never cease to operate. Its application lasts as long as life lasts.

The scheme of the Pure Ethical Movement embraces this fully. It employs in part the methods of the previous movements. It does not exclude them. It incorporates them; but only incidentally. Its primary method is the method of education.

The Ethical Culture Movement has been the pioneer movement in the use of this method, and has constantly kept ahead of other educational movements. It has been a leader in this field; and the State educational institutions have followed in its wake.

The educational program of the Ethical Culture Society embraces the kindergarten, the elementary, the high school courses and the normal department. These are of the very highest efficiency. The pupils are selected from the well-to-do and from the poor in equal numbers. The classes are of a size which permits of the personal influence of the teacher. The courses embrace manual and physical training as well as the fine arts, in addition to the three R's. Furthermore,

¹ *The Reform*, Vol. 16, p. 386.

in this one respect is the educational course of the Ethical Culture Movement peculiar to the Ethical Culture Society: it provides for regular direct ethical instruction instead of the irregular and occasional ethical lessons that are given in other educational institutions as circumstances call for them. The Ethical Society thus provides educational courses for childhood and for youth. In its all-embracing scope, it provides also for infancy through its Child Nature Classes conducted by the Woman's Auxiliary of the Ethical Culture Society. Another important feature of the activities of the Society is its Sunday Meeting where, from its platform, it provides a series of lectures for the mature man. The subjects treated are either the problems of the day as they arise, or the great general problems of life. The activities of the society embrace also a Sunday School and Settlement work.

The scope of its method is thus as wide as are the educational requirements of infancy, childhood, youth and manhood. It pursues its task with thoroughness and zeal for the moral well-being of its members.

Surely, the movement that lays so much stress on education as a method of ethical reform must have some particular view in regard to the efficiency of education as a moral lever. The Ethical Movement maintains that "It is only necessary to hold the rule of right-doing before a man, and that if it is really right, he will accept it, whether he believes the theory of it or not. The appeal to conscience is direct and the response of conscience is immediate."¹ An ethical movement therefore holds up to clear view the paths of moral duty, in the hope that the vision of the right will lead to the performance of the right.

A doctrine such as this has been advocated by the

¹ Felix Adler, in *The Open Court*, Vol. 1, p. 600.

noblest ethical thinkers of all times. It was the view of Socrates and of Plato in ancient, and of Spinoza in more recent times. Spinoza placed the blame for moral delinquency on the confused idea of what was right. It is this confusion that enslaves us, and the only means of freeing ourselves from bondage is to work for the possession of what he calls adequate ideas. The Ethical Movement agrees with this view completely. It holds that "One of the greatest sources of disorder at the present time, is uncertainty as to the standard, lack of a clear perception of the line of duty, absence of moral light. We need light on the great social problems of the day; we need to see far more distinctly than we do, what are the duties of employers to employees, and conversely; we need to see far more distinctly than we do what ought of right to be the relation of the social classes, and also what ought of right to be the relations of men and women to one another, now that women claim—and properly claim equality of opportunity with men."¹

There is at least this difference between the Spinozistic cry for more light and the Ethical cry for more light. The former seeks a general light; the latter seeks particular brands that were fired by the general light of the ethical ideal. A general sunlight is useless precisely because the sunlight is not able to enter into and light up the twists and turns of life's passageways. Spinoza and Kant both offered a sunlight; but a general stationary light helps us little, be it ever so bright. A tallow candle carried along as you walk through the labyrinth of life's paths is of far more service. The Ethical Movement seeks to furnish such particular lights, first kindling them in the general flame of the ethical ideal.

¹ Felix Adler, in *The Religion of Duty*, pp. 197-198.

The Ethical Movement is thus an educational movement, a movement that endeavors to see in each particular occasion, the light shining from its great luminating ideal and in the light of this ideal to work out the path of duty the particular occasion requires. This it expects and justly expects from its reliance on the efficacy of clear knowledge in the field of conduct.

Its method of social reform is through individual reform, and through the co-operation of all individuals, non-members as well as members, whose standard of morals and manners of life are of the type similar to that of its members. It seeks proper means to proper ends. Not the ends alone, but the means as well must be right to satisfy its requirements. At every particular step the universal ideal must throw its light.

A method such this does not make a loud stir and noise in the world. It rather chooses to burrow its roots deep in the human breast, than to raise any branches not firmly fixed which the least gust of life's passions causes to be overthrown for want of solid support. It is slow but sure. It does not attempt, as do the Settlement and the Public School, to give their boys a taste of everything as quickly as possible and then to proclaim them fit for life.

Life is something not for which, but in which the child, the youth and the adult are to be educated, and the process of education goes on with life. Not a premature, quick witted youngster, ever-ready with repartee, aging quickly into a dull, half-spent manhood is the aim, but a slowly ripening youth whose virile sap does not dry up with maturity of years.

And this wise method is the device of wise leadership. Yes, in the care with which the Ethical Societies choose their leaders, is the method employed by the movement, realized to its full extent. The highest qualities are

essential for ethical leadership; for more depends upon the leader than upon the movement. Faith in personality rather than in institutions has been the principle upon which the growth of Ethical Societies depends. The propagation of the movement awaits the appearance of leaders. This is perhaps the main reason why the Ethical Culture Movement has not been institutionalized although younger ethical movements have passed into the institutional stage. Gradually some definite scheme of educating members for ethical leadership will be worked out by the Society. Whatever that may be, let it be hoped that it will be in the lines of the thoroughness so far signalizing the methods of the Society in all its other work.

(III) *Its Philosophical Implications*

(a) *Its Attitude toward Reality*

The distinctive feature of the Pure Ethical Movement lies in the locus of the ethical ideal. Deriving its inspiration from that ideal, it plants its basis on the knowledge, the love and the practice of the right. It disclaims all preconceived religious dogmas and philosophical theories. Alone the study and the practice of the right are its basis of union among its members.

This principle of right living without consulting the oracles of the past as to what the right consists in, receives more emphasis in the writings and lectures of the Ethical Culture Society than does any other. The Ethical Culture Movement has burnt the bridges behind it, and looks towards the future for its guiding thread. The Pure Ethical Movement thus rests upon an ideal that has never yet been; for its ideal is an ideal of the future.

This ideal of the future is to be clearly differentiated from, and not confused with the Christian's "Kingdom," and the Hebrew's "Future World." The latter are viewed as states of society in which perfection will finally be reached. A point of time will come when the ideal will be completely realized. Whatever activity may go on in that "Kingdom" and in that period of time, wherein the "Future World" is bounded, it will not be the activity which consists in the upward struggle to make mankind better than it is and nature less niggardly in bestowing her gifts. It is to these ends that, according to the Religious Ethical Movement, the present life is devoted; the future life is for the enjoyment of the products of the present struggle.

The future "Kingdom" will not be one of struggle, even though the struggle be one making for progress. All of this world's struggles is a propaedeutic for the ease and comfort of the "Kingdom" to come. The only activity conceivable, then, is that which is involved in basking in the divine radiance and in singing incessant Hosannas. For the religious notions of the future are capable of being fully realized and will at some future time be experienced as an immediate present experience.

There is not the slightest doubt to the religious mind that that future will be a present; nay, it already endures through the present; for was it not already truly realized in the past? Yes, the ideal had an existence in the past; it even now has an existence in the future, and simply waits for the present to come up to it and to enjoy it. The future life has as sure an existence now at this very moment, as has my immediate present. It is simply waiting for us. Those of us who shall reach it will enjoy its blessings with as much relish as the pious Hebrews will enjoy the Leviathan and the Shore

Habor, those patient monsters which are protracting their six thousand years' existence for the great day. The Christian's "Future Kingdom" has just as certain an existence to-day as have these traditional monsters that were, according to the Talmud, gotten ready for the final day during the first six days of creation. Such is the ideal of the future conceived by the Religious Ethical Movement.

The ideal of the Pure Ethical Movement, an ideal whose locus is in the future, is a radically different ideal. As an ideal whose locus is in the future, it has not now, nor can it ever have the immediacy of a present existence. It must always retain this locus, remain a mere future, a mere potentiality, ever drawing mankind on to further and further efforts towards its approximation. And only an approximation, a remote approximation to the ideal is at best ever possible; never its complete realization. There is ever an outlook to a beyond, to a better state than that already attained. This outlook, this vision constantly beckons to our energies, exhorting us to struggle on to a further realization and a still further realization without end. The more we attain of the ideal, the more we become aware of the remainder that is not yet attained.

In the line of conduct, we have from this consideration of the ethical ideal an analogue of Socrates's splendid interpretation of the Delphic Oracle. As wisdom consists in a comprehension of the limitations of our knowledge, so ethical insight into the nature of the ideal consists not in the taking of stock of what has already been realized of the Ethical Ideal, but in the awe-inspiring conviction that so much of it still remains unrealized.

Only at the peril of our souls do we say to any realized portion of our ideal, "Stay, thou art so fair."

For the nature of the Ethical Ideal is such that it can never find itself expressed in a present experience, for it is never of the present, but always of the future. We may progress towards it; but we cannot touch it, for it does not possess the immediacy of a present that would make any intimate union with it possible for one moment.

The Ethical Ideal cannot therefore give that satisfaction which the Beatific Vision gives to the saints, nor is it desirable that it should do this. The Beatific Vision surfeits the faculties of the soul just as gluttony surfeits the faculties of sense. Both cause us to grip the present moment, to beg it to remain, that we may feast upon it. In the end they both equally paralyze the spirit. Gluttony paralyzes the senses; the Beatific Vision palsies the soul so that it is good for nothing else except the singing of Hallelujahs.

Only by such strong contrasts can we fully learn the true value of an ideal that lies totally in the future, and of which we can realize but a very small fragment in each present moment.

Such a theory is a remarkable departure from the ideals that have been propounded in bygone days. The existing religions have their ideal in the past; the religion of the Ethical Culture Society has its ideal in the future. This is what is so strikingly new in the Pure Ethical Movement.

The thought that an ideal placed in the future should yet be endowed with the potency of operating in the present, neither the philosopher nor the theologian is willing to accept. Ideals whether religious or philosophical that were devised in the past, have been of two kinds: 1. The religious ideal whose embodiment and realization existed at one time in the temporal order

of the past. 2. The philosophic ideal which has an eternal existence but is completely outside of the temporal order. The ideal of the Ethical Culture Movement differs from these types in that it has not found its highest realization in the past, and in that it is not placed outside of the temporal order. It is therefore a complete innovation, and as such it has been subject to the attacks and criticisms from both the older types.

The Pure Ethical Movement takes, nevertheless, a cautious step in regard to theological and philosophical principles. It does not intend to antagonize them but it does intend to ignore them. And this is just what neither the theologian nor the philosopher will permit. Each wants to be reckoned with. To be ignored is to be slighted and prompts to an attack.

The theologian's attack is directed against the indifference with which the Ethical Culturist looks upon what to him is primary—that ideal which was realized in the past; the face-to-face communion between God and man, when once and for all there was revealed what reality is. How can such a momentous past be beheld with indifference? Where else can ethics draw inspiration from, if not from this past? To ignore this wondrous past is to the theologian to be irreligious; and to be irreligious is to be unethical.

The theologian attacks the Ethical Culture Movement on the ground that an ethics cannot be founded on an ideal that has never been embodied, and that rests on no foundation, but hangs, as it were, in the air by a thread tied to the future. Such an ideal cannot accomplish results. It has no compulsive power. It is, if anything, an attractive picture; but not a rigoristic driving force. Only religion furnishes such an ideal.

Ethics without religion cannot exist. This is the point of the theological argument and this is its criticism of the Ethical Culture Movement.

The philosopher likewise sees difficulties in the new movement which he presses for clarification. There are two kindred difficulties which the philosopher presses forward. One difficulty is mooted by the philosophical idealist; the other by the philosophical realist and the pragmatist. The idealist's criticism of the Pure Ethical Movement is aimed mainly against the stand which the Pure Ethical Movement takes in regard to what is ultimately real. To the question of ultimate reality the Pure Ethical Movement takes an indifferent attitude; but the philosophical idealist looks upon this question as of primary importance; and like the theologian, makes his ethical practice spring from his conception of ultimate reality. His reasoning runs thus: To emphasize right conduct is very well; but right conduct depends upon right knowledge of what is real. To neglect the investigation of what is real is to neglect the guide to the right. Hence you cannot have an ethics without a conception of what constitutes reality. The second philosophical objection to the attitude of the Pure Ethical Movement, comes from the realist and the pragmatist, and is directed against the claim of the Ethical Movement that no theory of right conduct, but the practice of right conduct is the essential thing in an ethical movement. It is directed against the position taken by Professor Adler when he says: "Our bond of union is not a common doctrine but a common practice."¹

But to the philosopher, the practice of the right without a theory of the right seems incomprehensible. To him the two cannot be so far separated as the Pure Ethical Movement separates them. The realist and the

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, V. 1.

pragmatist, who do not worry about the ultimate nature of reality deny the possibility of practicing the right without a theory of the right. Theory is but the act in idea, and practice is nothing more than the idea crystallized into act. Theory and practice go everywhere together. "Theory," says Professor Dewey, "is the cross section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained; it is theory in action."¹

The position of the theologian and of the philosopher is essentially the same in regard to the attitude of the Ethical Movement toward reality. Against this attitude they make common cause. Only there is this difference to be noted between the theologian and the philosopher: The former says that what constitutes reality must be found by the present exercise of reason or ascertained in and through daily experience; the latter says that what constitutes reality is found in faith, faith in the fact that there was an act of revelation of reality.

At the very launching of the Ethical Culture Movement, it thus became necessary to defend it against the theologian's charge that on the one hand the new movement is irreligious in taking no cognizance of the holy past, and that on the other hand it is fantastic and flighty in grounding its base in the future. It had to defend both its negative attitude towards the ideal of the past, and its positive teaching in regard to its ideal of the future.

It denied at once that its indifference to particular religious beliefs is an irreligious attitude. It is true that the Ethical Culture Movement does not concern itself with theories of Being in any shape; that it disre-

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 1, p. 203.

gards even the theory of the existence of a Supreme Being, and seeks to divorce conduct from theory completely. Yet these facts do not warrant the theologian in launching against the movement the charge that it is irreligious. They warrant merely the belief that there is a misconception as to the meaning of religion.

Indeed, the Ethical Movement forthwith proceeded to define its own conception of religion. "It distinguishes the concept religion from the concept morality. Morality consists in 'obedience to the principle of unity, which reveals itself as the primary principle of ethics.'"¹ Religion is grounded in this conception of morality and draws strength from it. "Religion is that sense of duty which comes after obedience to the principle of unity."² The Ethical Movement thus takes a higher view of religion than the theological view takes. The ethical view implies that we must first be moral and then we will have the genuine religious feeling which comes only after the moral experience. It looks upon religious experience as a feeling of genuine satisfaction which is obtained after one has gone through the purging which every moral achievement effects.

It is absurd to criticise such a conception as irreligious. In fact this is not only not a negative attitude towards religion, but a genuinely positive attitude towards it; it strictly enjoins us to go through the purging moral flame; and thereby it also directs towards the religious state of mind.

That this is a better method of finding religion helpful than is the theological method, history itself indicates. To how many has religion, understood in the old way, been a moral cleansing? Have not the staunchest believers in the holy past been the most ferocious exponents of brotherly hate? Has the conception of a re-

¹ Felix Adler, in *Unitarian Review*, 1885.

² *Ibid.*

vealed past been a sufficient restraining hand upon the exercise of wrong conduct, and an impelling force towards the exercise of right conduct? Look at history and you have a negative answer at every step of advancing time. Right conduct must be based on a principle other than the existence of a divine past. If the result of the old method has been unsatisfactory why not try a new method? First remove the hate, and then perhaps you may find yourself religious.

Its positive attitude towards an ideal of the future which the theologians thought chimerical, it defends on scientific grounds. Familiarity with the past, which scientific investigation has brought about, rendered that past less august, and less compelling as an ethical force. All past is of the same value for this compelling purpose, and equally fruitless. Evolutionary theories have brought low the cherished deities that sat on high. Ideals of the past have become past idols that are shattered by the very throngs that worshipped them. An ideal, to be an ideal must be out of reach of polluting hands, and such place is found only in the future. There alone does sacredness lie. It is to the star of the future that our wagon must be hitched. The moral ideal can rest nowhere else. In its past location it was not revered. A light that is behind does not serve as a proper guide. A light must be towards the front, forward, in the future; and this, the ethical ideal attempts to be.

More difficult is it to give an answer to the philosophical criticisms of the Pure Ethical Movement. An argument *ad hominem* does not apply so well here. The Platonic claim that right conduct derives its warrant from a knowledge of what is real, a claim which idealists ever since Plato's day have repeated, cannot according to Prof. Adler be a valid claim, for the

nature of reality has never been universally established and is no more universally accepted now than are the various religious dogmas. To await the discovery of the constitution of reality before we are to act morally is of course out of the question. The nature of reality may never be established. What are we to do meanwhile? The Ethical Culturist answers: We are to act regardless of what the real may be, and guide ourselves by an ideal that we ourselves create. He says to the philosopher: You demand a theory for right conduct. Very well. Such a theory will reveal itself in the course of conduct. First, act; and the action will show you what is right and wrong in theory. The theory will be forthcoming in the course of action. In the course of such action we shall find the ideal becoming more and more real. Reality is not something that is. It is something that becomes. The real is made real; not found such. Moral conduct is the anvil upon which the real is beaten out of the ideal. Every act of ours fashions a bit of reality. We know somewhat more as to what constitutes reality after every moral experience of our lives. The nature of reality cannot be preconceived. Its conception follows upon activity.

For verification of this doctrine the ethical view invites the idealist to search among his own experiences. No doubt you find "eye-openers" in every moral act. These "eye-openers" are the bits of reality which your moral conduct beats out of the situation in which you find yourself confronted with an obstacle. The real is that which satisfies the demands of a situation. This is exactly the position of the pragmatist in regard to truth. The Ethical Movement and the Pragmatic Movement are at one on this point: Reality is hammered out of a situation.

This is as far as they go together. The pragmatist

changes his reality with changes in situations; the ethicist sees danger in a reality that vacillates. The times require nothing so much as a rigoristic ethics. The ideal which we see loom up at every step of our conduct, the great ideal of the future which in each act we fashion into reality and which on all occasions we either promote or thwart—this is the iron law, the rigor of the moral law, from which we cannot escape. Every situation reveals the same truth. The pragmatist's truth is different. It is not universal. Truth shifts according to the shifts in the situation. No universal ideal looms up for the pragmatist on all occasions. One particular truth is all he sees and is satisfied with, in each situation.

The pragmatist's doctrine that theory belongs to a definite situation, and is true if it satisfies the requirements of that situation, must be clearly differentiated from the ethical doctrine that the ideal is to be wrought into the real in every situation, and that the value of an act is tested by the magnitude of the ideal that has been thus realized. The pragmatist's "situation" may be looked upon as an equation of one unknown term. The *X* of the "situation" is the theory which satisfies the terms of the equation, and its truth is determinable with regard to that "situation" and no other, just as the value of *X* in one equation may be different from its value in another equation. The ethical theory is something more permanent than that. It is an absolute *X*, an eternal non-changeable quantity ascertainable, to be sure, like the truth of the pragmatist in the heat of the conduct which a "situation" requires, but it is not only to be applicable to that particular "situation," it must immediately be applied to another "situation" and to still another without end. Where the pragmatist's "situation" may be considered as a simple equation, that of

the pure ethicist may be considered as a simultaneous or a quadratic equation; the X not only suits a particular equation but all the equations. For a rigoristic ethics the pragmatic movement will never do.

The Ethical Movement puts up a clear defense, first against the theologian's scorn of an ethics that is not grounded upon the will of God as manifested in the past; second, against the idealistic philosopher's contention that it is impossible to have an ethics without a theory of reality antedating it; third, it differentiates itself from the pragmatic philosopher's doctrine that the theory of the right manifests itself variously in particular situations. Its differences from the past are clear, and the movement is in every sense a new movement. It has introduced a new ideal—an ideal in line with evolutionary science and yet above it.

(b) *The Value of Such an Attitude to Reality*

It is then in the new location of the ideal that the Pure Ethical Movement differs from other practical movements. Now let us inquire after the value of such a location. We may estimate the value of this ideal that has its sanctuary in the future, by analyzing the effect it has upon the ordinary man, upon the sinner, upon the saint and upon the social whole. And the effects of such an ideal upon these we may compare with the effects of the older ideals upon them.

The ordinary mortal in the light of the older ideals was of the sheep type, possessed of no creativeness or spontaneity. There was no need of any; for is not God in his heaven? All's then well with the world. Such is the attitude which the old ideals stimulated. "The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want" is typical of the stand taken by the commonalty. It casts the bur-

den upon its ideal and then folds its arms. This type simply basks in the light of its ideal, and why not? To bask in the sunlight is the proper thing to do, when perfection already exists and has existed through all the past. Prayer and prescribed rites are thus the only substitutes for energetic labor in cases of distress.

All this is the logical outcome of the ideal of the past. It failed to evoke spontaneous energy in human hearts. A guiding hand had always to be stretched out before there could be active work from the vast mass of the people. The new ideal offers no such sinecures, nor such delusive hopes. The ordinary man is himself goaded on by it, to put forth efforts to realize that which is not yet. He cannot dare sit by the wayside and wait. The ideal is in the future; and to make it present is part of his eternal task. Prayers are here no substitute for effort. In the light of the new ideal, the ordinary man who rested on his oars under the old ideals and watched the few sturdy ones put forth their sturdy strokes, is enjoined to pull at his own oars; to consider himself in his own eyes a sovereign soul whose active coöperation is indispensable in the ever-present task of making the ideal, which is always in the future, partially fulfill itself in the present.

The logic of the new ideal demands a new adjustment from the complacent throngs who merely follow the paths beaten out for them by the few of the heroic type. The new ideal acts as a stimulant to the ordinary mortal, where the older one was satisfied with his mere complacency. In the light of the new ideal, he feels pressing upon him a task which he, as well as the greatest of mortals, can perform, if not quite adequately, yet to a measurable degree. He feels himself a commoner not in the midst of peers but amidst other commons. The old ideals were the aristocratic ones.

There were always a favored few, favored by grace or by a covenant, who had the advantage at the court of the ideal. The new ideal is democratic. In its presence all feel of equal rank. Thus there is a more encouraging outlook opened by the ideal that resides in the future.

Secondly the treatment which the penitent sinner has received in the light of the old ideals is one that evokes in us not unmixed feelings of approval. We indeed share the joy of the master to whom the stray sheep has returned; but at the same time we feel that the caressings which are bestowed by the master upon the strayed sheep are out of all proportion to the complacent indifference with which the sheep that had not strayed are treated. From them obedience is demanded as a matter of course; and so no extra favors need be showered upon them. Only the over-active ones, those that run amuck once in a while and cause some damage, only those who make a noise in the world and become the leaders perhaps of terrorizing bands, need to be caressed and patted and pandered and bribed to stay in the fold and not be inclined to run away again. The penitent sinner, the strayed sheep that has returned, has under the old ideal been treated better than the saints, the sheep that have ever followed the path that leads home.

No wonder then that a saint, goaded on by the injustice which partiality to the penitent sinner involves exclaimed, "I wish I had sinned as that penitent had, provided also, I could have done penance such as he has done." Why should it be so? Does not such discrimination smack of injustice to the ever faithful? When we read in the Bible the passages that deal with this problem, are not our feelings of approval of the divine compassion mingled with a sense of injustice

done to those who have never needed the divine compassion? Should the penitent fare better than the saint? There seems something insincere, something that savors of mere coaxing and even of moral bribery in the principle that the repentant sinner is to be more highly honored than the unfallen saint.

Still, in the light of the old ideals, the fact of sin remains nevertheless. It remains a hidden stain which might at any time be brought to light by the sovereign who for the present chooses to hide it. We can very well imagine the penitent not being quite at ease in the company of the never-fallen righteous and not quite feeling on a par with the other good people, who are standing before their God. Can the righteous feel that perfect justice is done in thus blotting out of sin, as if it had not been a fact recorded in time? May not the saints logically expect that the ideal of the past time should not blot out a deed committed in past time? No, the old ideal seems unjust and seems to contradict itself in its treatment of the penitent.

How does the penitent fare under the new ideal? He is treated as one who sees the light for the first time; not as one who having seen it turned his back on it; for there was no light except the one that he chose to kindle. He is a new recruit among the ranks of those who actively realize the ideal. His past failings are not recorded; they are not even potentially existent, and so cannot be over him as the sword of Damocles to smite him should he ever fail again. He does not need to feel uneasy in the presence of the ideal which he is now serving, for the ideal has no memory to make comparisons between him and the other saints, or to recall his former defections or to tax him with them in case of a second defection; he is not in the presence of some potentate who at any time might

recall to him his former sins. Nor is he pandered by profuse kindnesses; for the new ideal is not a storehouse whence he may receive more or less from the storekeeper. He is himself the source of power. The harvest must be gathered by each one himself and each gets what he earns; no more, nor less. Surely this is more equable than where the penitent receives more than the saint. Here, the ideal is the field of his operations and depends upon him for realization. To the repentant sinner, what an incentive it is to exert his energy in the face of an ideal which is in the future and beckons to him to employ his autonomous sovereignty in lending a hand to fulfill and realize the ideal at least partially. No such incentive is comprehensible in the face of an ideal that already has existence.

And thirdly, the saint, how does he fare? The saint and the penitent differ from the ordinary man in being rigorously active and not complacently passive in achieving something. Under the old ideals, their achievements, their prodigious efforts are like the child's exertion about a little task which the parent sets before it for the amusement and delight of its sire, who looks on the labor of the child and thinks what a trifling task it would be for himself to accomplish. Yet he does not do the task himself. He gets joy out of the puny efforts of the child. It is not the fact that these attempts of the child help to develop it, that prompts the parent to set the task. His own enjoyment, he desires to draw out of it. Something similar is the attitude of the old ideals towards the efforts of the saints who heave and toil before the eyes of their ideal. It is all useless toil; for if the accomplishment of the task were desired, their perfect ideal could by a fiat, in the twinkling of an eye, bring it about. The activity of the saint is unintelligible to the ordinary complacent

mortal who watches him laboriously toiling instead of leaving to the will of God to achieve, in an instant, what requires centuries of human labor.

There is a radical difference in the attitude with which, under the new ideal, the saint's efforts are viewed. The work must be done by him, or it is not done at all; for there is no one else to do it. The world depends on him for that task. He alone can do that particular work. How significant—how indispensable the saint thus becomes! No longer the child's play is his effort. It is serious tragic work he is performing. He is creating. Something that is not, is being wrought into something that is, and he is himself the smith that does it. How hollow is the cry: "Why did I not sin and then repent; for I would have shared a greater reward?" Mankind under the new ideal receives an importance which under the old ideals it never had.

And fourthly, how does mankind as a whole fare in the light of the new ideal? Under the old ideals, mankind is simply an aggregate of individuals. The Kingdom of God was for the glory of God. The Kingdom is that state wherein this aggregate of humanity will look up to the ideal and bow before it. It involved very little of the organic relationship which society is now, conceptually at least, intertwined in. The Kingdom of God was simply this aggregate of warring atoms beating their swords into plowshares and not into coöperative machinery. The idea of coöperation was not emphasized. In the light of the new ideal, mankind is the social whole and the social whole includes the mankind of to-morrow as well. This social whole, coöperating harmoniously together is the very ideal of the future. There is no other. The social whole is prompted to greater exertion because the ideal

is identified with the large social whole which embraces posterity in its scope.

The ideal is not something apart from the unity of the whole thus broadly conceived. It is nothing but that unity of the social body. To realize the ideal is, then, for the social community identical with realizing itself. Under the old order, where the identity is not established between the ideal and the social whole, the incentive to realize the social good was remote. "In the race after eternity," said an Italian monk, "each soul looks out for its own interest." There was no inducement to work for the social good; or perhaps the inducement to it came from the knowledge that it meets with the approval of the creator—an ideal not identified with the social good. The inducement to charity, to political and economic justice, came not from duty to the social whole, but from a divine command; and the divinity was something above and beyond that social whole whose good is sought for realization. Such is not the New Kingdom. In the New Kingdom, each is sovereign. There need be no bowing of the knees or singing of hallelujahs, for the ideal of the future cannot possibly require it.

The ideal of the future is a rational ideal, justifying itself at all points completely. There is nothing more unsatisfactory and distressing in the old ideals, than the palliatives which are applied to them to make them measure up to the demands of advanced ethics and progressive thought. Theologians have for centuries worried their heads so that they might find some way of patching up the flaws which the old structures constantly reveal. To the philosophic mind, there always creeps out a new flaw no matter how favorably the theologian has tried to patch up defects. The new

ideal needs no palliatives and this is one of the most encouraging signs of its rationality and strength.

To sum up: The ideal of the future opens up a hope to mankind which no other ideal has opened. Of that ideal all mankind are equally sharers, simply through the fact that it lies in the future. This is of tremendous importance. This simple fact takes from birth-right all claims for preferment; and from covenanters the distinction of being a chosen people, on whom the priesthood of all mankind has forever been bestowed as a heritage. Favoritism, cosmic favoritism was characteristic of the ideals whose hey-day was in days gone by. They lacked universality through their favoritism. They were responsible for the adjectives that divided the world into Jew and Gentile, into Greek and barbarian. They were responsible for the classes that divided a nation into aristocrat and plebeian. The old ideals lacked rejuvenating power. The fate of each human being was decided beforehand. It was useless to attempt to rise out of one's caste. There was no invigorating power in the ideal. There was no new birth possible after one's birth had once taken place.

The philosophic ideals have little to do with saints or penitents. They are primarily the ideals to guide the ordinary and to strengthen the sinner. How does the influence which the ideal of the philosophic idealist has over the sinner, compare with that which the ethical ideal has over him? But two types of idealists need be considered—the Platonic type and the Hegelian type. The ideal of the former is an individualization of a class. The ideal is, according to it, that individual which is obtained through a process of generalization of all the attributes that comprise a class of objects. It is

general in regard to the attributes of the objects of the class; but *per se* it is an individuated being. There are then as many Ideas or Ideals—for the two are identifiable to Platonists—as there are classes of objects. These ideals are perfect forms having an eternal existence and so are outside of time and space. Human endeavor cannot in any way affect them; nor can human strivings reproduce them. Such reproduction, were it possible, would bring into existence a second Ideal similar in every respect to the first, for which there would be no possible use. Fortunately, such perfect reproduction is not possible, for reproduction in itself implies creation and the created cannot be eternal. Neither the ordinary man nor the sinner is in any way moved by an ideal which he cannot effect and which cannot affect him. What incentive is there to realize imperfectly that which already exists in perfect form? True, we, as a matter of fact, strive to reproduce as nearly as possible the ideal; but the incentive to strive does not come from the ideal; for if it did, that incentive would affect all alike and all would strive to realize it. There could therefore be no sinners in the world. An ideal that already has an existence, is a contradictory concept and is given direct blunt denial by the very fact that there are sinners in the world. For it cannot be a perfect ideal, if it tolerates the existence of beings who fall short of the ordinary man's approach to the ideal. The perfect that fails to make others perfect is, in so far, not perfect. The Platonic ideal cannot be a practical ideal; for in practice it fails to make mankind approach it. It is a noetic ideal purely. The ethical ideal must be a practical ideal. What use is there for an ideal virtue existing as an individuated concept of a class of virtuous acts, if that ideal virtue cannot make others virtuous? The ethical ideal aims

to make men active creators of the ideal, and that the Platonic type cannot do.

The second idealistic type is the Hegelian and is best worked out by Bradley. According to this type, the ideal is Absolute. Every individuated form is a partial view of this Absolute, and so imperfect. Every act, as a particular act, thus falls short of the Absolute act and, as a partial act, is imperfect. But imperfect though it is, it is an act of the Absolute. Its imperfection is not an imperfection from the Absolute's point of view; for from the Absolute point of view the act is a necessary act, and cannot be imperfect. Only from the partial point of view can the act be called imperfect. From this point of view, the sinner is a necessary part of the Absolute and his sinful act is not sinful from the Absolute's point of view, but from the sinner's point of view alone. Thus also every error is a partial truth. The degree of readjustment required to make one act, as compared with another, measure up to the Absolute, alone determines its value as good or bad, as truth or error. While this is a highly plausible view, yet there is this drawback to it: as a practical ethics it fails in compelling the sinner to act in such other way as will not necessitate so great a degree of readjustment to bring his act up to the view-point of an Absolute act. The crux of the matter lies here: Is the Absolute an efficient force by means of which a human soul will act in such a way as to require the least amount of readjustment to make that act a perfect act? I answer: The Absolute as an idea may be efficient; but the Absolute, as existent, cannot be such; for to the Absolute as existent, every wrong act is its own act partially viewed. And no imperative can come forth from an ideal that itself performs in general, what it condemns in particular. The Absolute as total

view-point may serve as an imperative, ordering the realization in existential reality of what is expressed in idea only. But the Absolute as an existent cannot perform that function.

The ethical ideal makes the distinction between an Absolute idea and Absolute reality, and can therefore command the realization of this reality whose idea alone as yet exists.

(IV) *The Nature of the Ethical Ideal and Its Historic Sources*

The Pure Ethical Movement has thus far been discussed from the point of view of the locus of the ethical ideal, wherein we found one of the distinctive features of the Pure Ethical Movement. There is another distinctive feature of the Pure Ethical Movement which now requires our attention. This is the nature of the reality of the ethical ideal.

The reality of the ethical ideal is a hypothetical reality. This, the very locus of the ethical ideal requires; for what is in the future possesses merely hypothetical reality. There is, however, a difference between this hypothetical reality of the ethical ideal and the inferential reality of the Kantian postulates of the Summum Bonum. The latter is inferential and possesses thereby greater claim to reality. It is not hypothetical, despite the inferential origin, and does not issue forth the categorical imperative. The ethical ideal not only is hypothetical in character but despite this peculiar character it nevertheless is the source of the categorical imperative.

The ethical ideal differs, furthermore, from the Kantian ethical theory in that the latter makes no provision for an ethical end, whereas the ethical ideal is

both beginning and end, source and object of ethical conduct. In the language of Professor Adler, it is both *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* of ethical life.

This ideal which is so different from other ethical ideals is further characterized as being the organic ideal. In taking the organism as its type, the Pure Ethical Movement differs from all other ethical movements. In the words of Prof. Adler: "Not altruism with its so-called good of others for an aim, nor egoism with its *soi-disant* good of self, nor the Kantian formula with the mathematical notion of equality underlying it; not the evolutionary formula with its outlook on a general happiness which cannot even be defined, but just the idea of organism, in its spiritual sense, is, for me, the beginning of ethics—the beginning and end."¹

The ethical ideal as the organic ideal is one in which each individual is both means and end of every other individual. From such an ideal neither egoism to the exclusion of altruism nor altruism to the exclusion of egoism can derive absolute justification. Both at once reside in it, and it reconciles them both.

The term organic, as applied to the ethical ideal, is used not as a biologic term; it is a generic use of the term that is intended here. The biologic use of it is a derivative from that. The biologic organism is but an imperfect approximation to the organic ideal. The analogy of the ethical ideal to the biologic organism is thus but partly correct. For very few parts of the biologic organism are indispensable members of it. The parts that are not indispensable are, therefore, mere means and not ends of the system of parts. The ethical organism consists only of indispensable members. Every member thus becomes an end, as well as a means, of every other member. The ethical ideal is thus the per-

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 14, p. 279.

fect organism, of which the biologic organism is a very imperfect copy.

The organic ideal is a system whose parts are members of a democracy of spirits, each of which, because of its intrinsic worth that renders it indispensable to all the rest, is sovereign and subject at one and the same time.

Such a system rests not upon merely satisfying needs of others, but upon getting activity out of them—that activity which is unique and peculiar to each. To contribute to another's needs is indeed an injunction of the ethical ideal; but the contribution is not in the form of charity. Where each is sovereign, charity is no longer one of the supreme virtues, and does not count for much. The greatest virtue consists in performing a sovereign's function, in originating activity and not in passively submitting to the impelling activity of others. It is in this respect that the Ethical Culture Movement differs from every other movement. The former is essentially active; the latter is essentially passive; activity must first be imparted to it. This is splendidly seen in the practice of daily life. "This is the difference," says Prof. Adler, "between an ethical society and the peace societies, the social reform societies, the educational societies and the others—that they chiefly lay stress upon what the government ought to do, or upon what other people ought to do, or in general upon how the world is to be set aright, while the ethical society, mindful also of these demands, yet lays its chief stress upon the question, what am I to do? How shall I set the world right by setting myself right?"¹

From the implied sovereignty of each, which the ethical ideal rests on, is derived this essential difference between the Ethical Culture Movement and other move-

¹ *Twenty Years of the Ethical Movement.*

ments. A sovereign's function is to exercise good will towards his subjects; and as each is in turn sovereign the exercise of the good will by any agent is followed by an immediate reaction of good will from his fellow sovereigns towards the agent. Such relationship requires that each should clearly perceive that unique quality which is hypothetically credited to each of the rest and potentially residing in it.

Such vision of the whole, and such insight into the needs of each of the separate members of the whole, are possible only on the hypothesis that each part possesses an absolute knowledge not only of the needs of all the rest, but also of the unique possibilities of each of the other parts that constitute the organic whole. Each part thus actively supplements every other part. In order to supplement the rest, it must view clearly the totality of which it is a part. Such insight is the highest possible function of the human individual.

Thus it has been with the world's greatest benefactors. They were the spirits who saw clearly the world's need, and identified themselves with it. They are the Lincolns, the Mazzinis, the Galileos, the Savonarolas, the Brunos who feel their time's cry and attempt to fill it. They may lose their lives but what of that?

"Whoso takes upon himself the world's life and his own
lays down

He, dying so, lives.

Whoso bears the whole heaviness of the wronged world's
weight

And puts it by,

It is well with him suffering, though he face man's fate.

How should he die?"—*Swinburne.*

The feeling that one does act from and through a knowledge of the whole with which one identifies himself, is the genuine religious feeling. To act from such

insight, one must first identify himself with the whole; one must be the whole; and according to the ethical ideal each part must thus identify itself with the whole, must consider itself the whole.

What is this ethical or organic ideal? The organic ideal consists of an infinity of individuals, each possessed of such intrinsic worth as is absolutely indispensable to all the rest. This worth, partaking of the nature of the ethical ideal, must be, like it, hypothetical. It is an assumption, and may not at all be evident in any particular individual that comes into ethical relation with us; but it must be assumed to have a potential reality nevertheless. Since the worth of each individual is indispensable to all the rest, it becomes necessary for all the rest to elicit this worth or to make actual what is assumed as merely potential. Each member, as indispensable, as end, must therefore be comprehended by every other member and likewise in itself comprehend all others. Each must mirror all the rest.

When each member of society shall have thus possessed himself of the intrinsic need of every other member and shall have acted the sovereign function of a Lincoln, then the organic ideal will be much nearer realization than it is to-day. The organic ideal consists of a community of sovereign spirits whom those more remote from that ideal have hitherto invariably sent to martyrdom.

We have thus analyzed the organic ideal into a system of monads not much unlike that of Leibnitz. Each monad reflects all the rest and is reflected by them. Each has an image of the whole. It is this image of the whole constantly before the mind of each that constitutes the ethical ideal.

It is easy to see what the ethical imperative of such a system consists in. Act in such a way as to actualize

what is potentially inherent in each of the other parts of the totality. This is its formula. Both egoism and altruism are here involved and merged. It is the conduct that is based upon such an image of the whole that constitutes moral conduct. "The idea of an ultimate unity reveals itself as the primary principle of ethics and explains at once the absolute authority implied in the moral obligations and the relativity of the specific moral commandments. It is the principle of unity applied to human relations out of which all the specific moral commands have grown; and this principle variously understood according to such lights as men had, has given rise to diversity in the moral theory and practice of nations and races and will beget, let us hope, still greater and happier diversity as the course of evolution shall proceed."¹ Stating the case in another form Dr. Adler expresses the same truth thus: "An act is moral, not in proportion as it is standardized, but as it is individualized, in the degree to which it is unlike other moral acts though based on the same fundamental principle, not in the degree to which it resembles them."²

The ethical ideal consists of a system of parts each of which is different from every other and yet essential to it, and supplements the rest. This ideal in which the whole is not complete without the least of its parts and in which no part can be dispensed with is interpreted ethically to mean that no human being is insignificant. He is at the outset credited with an intrinsic worth, with a quality which is absolutely necessary to supplement that of all others. The least is as necessary to the greatest as the greatest is to the least.

This becomes possible only when differences between

¹ Felix Adler, in *Unitarian Review*, 1885.

² *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 20, p. 391.

individuals are emphasized, and likenesses overlooked. Only when differences are cherished, will differences in religion, in color, in nationality, in vocation produce no persecution, hatred or discrimination. "The organic idea lays the same stress on multiplicity as on unity, on diversity as on likeness."¹ The importance of this stress comes out more clearly, when we remember that the reform movements whose basis is brotherhood and likeness are limited in the scope of their fellowship. There comes a point beyond which they see differences; and immediately fellowship stops short and antipathy begins. The Ethical Culture Movement has no such shortcoming. It is one of the essential characteristics of the Ethical Culture Movement that it bases morality upon differences rather than on similarities. "Morality," says Adler, "is in essence a law for regulating the attractions and overcoming the repulsions between one human being and others."² These attractions and repulsions have been too commonly made dependent on the similarities that exist between men; and so moral conduct and straight dealings, in business, in social affairs, in political affairs extended no wider than did the degree of similarity between them.

The characteristics which designate men as similar are purely arbitrary. At one period in history, only those who belonged to a certain class and tribe were similar, and all those outside of it were considered enemies. The line of demarcation has indeed moved on, but it is nevertheless even to-day arbitrarily located. Whom we are to consider similar and whom dissimilar to us, is at the present time just as arbitrary as in primitive days, even though the line separates bigger masses

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 20, p. 391.
² Felix Adler—*The Religion of Duty*, p. 92.

to-day than it did then. This only means that the wars and the animosities are carried on between bigger masses than was the case yesterday. The shifting of the line of demarcation has not done away with wars, nor is it likely to do so. Peace movements, and arbitration movements are likely, after all, to be mere make-shifts, so long as there remains an arbitrary dividing line between people. On the basis of similarity between individuals there is certainly bound to be an arbitrary division. And as moral relations are assumed to be binding only within the line of demarcation and not beyond it, can we wonder at the wantonness and brutality which characterizes the clashes between two parties separated by that artificial line of demarcation?

The Ethical Culture Movement starts with the notion that there is a natural line of demarcation not alone between groups but between individuals. It draws that line distinctly. It isolates each from the rest by a bar and says: Coöperate despite these bars. The bars of separation are numerous; there are more than are ordinarily foreseen. Indeed there are infinite differences just because there are infinite spiritual beings. Now enjoins the Ethical Movement: Work together because and for the sake of these very differences.

This is a new notion, one that has not up to this time been tried out. The Ethical Movement, whose ideal is the perfect coöperation of an all-embracing system of monads each differing from the other, is for the first time in the history of the world working out the theory to its fullest conclusion. It aims at new types of men, types fused in the melting pot of human relations into which only differences enter as ingredients and out of which there is expected to emerge a higher type of manhood, a type resembling what Nietzsche calls super-man.

It is not, however, from Nietzsche that the Ethical Movement derives the elements of its ideal. But before we proceed to trace the sources of the ethical ideal let us sum up its component parts. There is first the concept of a perfect or a spiritual organism; second, the members or parts of this organism are possessed of essential sovereignty and complement each other; third, this sovereignty resides in each member by virtue of its being credited with an intrinsic inalienable worth, a worth peculiar to that member alone and differing from the quality peculiar to every other member; each member being thus marked by its own characteristic difference from every other member; fourth, the characteristic of each is but potentially inherent in it, and requires the eliciting activity of all the other members to convert this potentiality into an actuality; fifth, the eliciting and the evoking of this latent quality into actuality is the aim of each member and the realization of this aim is the end of the ethical ideal, which, when attained, consists of a spiritual kingdom of the greatest possible variety of members, thereby making the whole richer and more sublime; lastly this ideal operates with rigor in all particular cases.

The mosaic of which the ethical ideal is constructed, traces its several parts to various schools of philosophic thought. The roots of the ethical ideal tap two great philosophies, from which the ethical ideal derives no little nourishment—the Leibnitzian and the Kantian philosophies. One of the philosophical sources from which the ethical ideal draws its content, is the Leibnitzian doctrine of monads. To this source the ethical ideal owes one of its main concepts. Its group of beings, each sovereign in itself and yet needing the rest of the world both as fellow-sovereigns and fellow-

subjects, is an analogue of the monad which, though complete in itself, yet reflects the world about it.

There is much that is similar in the ethical ideal of the Pure Ethical Movement, and the monadology of Leibnitz: 1. The members of the ethical ideal are unique, and therefore indispensable beings; and so also are the monads. 2. The members of the ethical ideal and the monads are each parts of a system, *i. e.*, of a Universe. 3. Both the members of the ethical ideal and the monads visualize the unique individuality of the other members of the Universe, in varying degrees of clearness.

And yet the differences between the ethical ideal and the monadology are just as clearly marked: 1. The members of the ethical ideal, though they are each of them indispensable, are nevertheless not self-sufficient; whereas the monads of Leibnitz are in themselves microcosms, and as such are self-sufficient. 2. The members of the ethical ideal are members whose activity is inter-related with that of every other member, in an effort to actualize the unique quality which each visualizes in every other. The monads, however, possess no such functional activity; for they need it not, since it is not incumbent upon any one of them to act upon any other in this functional way. The activity which each monad possesses is a visualizing activity, which simply mirrors in itself every other monad. 3. The functional activity of the members of the ethical ideal makes the ethical ideal primarily regulative; whereas the sensory mirroring of the monads makes of the monadology primarily a constitutive system. 4. The latter cannot therefore be the ground of an ethics; the former cannot be anything but such a ground.

And so, though it has its roots in past systems, the ethical ideal is not tied down to them. It has branched off from them, and has made a real contribution to ethical and philosophical truth.

Whatever differences there are between the ethical member of the spiritual organism and the Leibnitzian monad, come from the different functions which they are intended to serve.

The Leibnitzian monad serves as a noetic concept, evoked by Leibnitz to satisfy an intellectual and not a practical problem. It partakes, therefore, of the placid quietude which has characterized all the noetic conceptions of the past, from Plato's Ideas functioning as mute patterns, to Aristotle's *Nous* doing nothing but thinking its dear self. To the noetic ideal, activity is something foreign, foisted upon it, merely tolerated and to be apologized for. Who, that reads Aristotle, does not feel that activity is tabooed to his God, and that the world's activity which derives its impetus from him, must be apologetically explained? What else than as an apology does the beautiful figure of the beloved moving the lover serve to Aristotle? It was the only way Aristotle could creep out of the dilemma which was involved in his task of harmonizing the Eleatic Being with the Heraclitean Becoming. Leibnitz's preëstablished harmony is but another instance of the straits to which the intellectual ideal is put, when it faces the practical problems. Complete and perfect though the monad is, you can't get motion out of it. It is omniscient; it mirrors the universe; but it can do nothing. The harmony of its acts with the acts of other monads was therefore something almost miraculous and was best explained on the theory of a preëstablished arrangement. The noetic ideal does nothing, for indeed there is nothing for it to do.

The ethical ideal, on the contrary, is a practical ideal. Activity is a basic and not an apologetic ingredient in its make-up. Nay, here it is inactivity that must be apologized for, and is invariably dearly paid for. Self-activity, the sovereign function, is the very essence of the organic ideal. It is not merely super-added to the static Being of the intellectual ideal. Each member of the organic ideal is thus credited with the two-fold function of visualizing the universe of kindred spirits, and of evoking the latent potencies they each enclose. The former function alone is possible to the Leibnitzian monad.

To the ethical ideal both functions are essential. The vision of each individual spirit must be seen from the view point of the Absolute, or as Professor Adler would prefer to call it, from the view point of the Universe which, according to him, is not a scientific but an ethical conception. This visualizing is one of the essential functions of the ethical monad. Its other function follows from the vision which it thus sees. This consists in eliciting that one quality which, as a result of its vision, each monad sees as a priceless possession in every other monad, a priceless thing laboring to come to birth and needing every other monad as a Socratic maieutic. The ethical ideal is a practical ideal in that it assumes this second function, which the noetic ideal of Leibnitz entirely neglects.

Herein lies the difference between the Leibnitzian and the ethical ideals. The former is a purely constitutive principle; the latter is also a regulative principle.

Though at first glance the difference seems great between the Leibnitzian monad that has no relationship to other monads and the ethical monad which is a spiritual self that needs all other spirits to supple-

ment it, yet this great difference quite disappears when we reflect upon them from their constitutive principle alone. The constitutive make-up of the ethical ideal is identical with the Leibnitzian doctrine.

It is only in their regulative principle that they differ; as constitutive ideals they are identical. Here the common element in both the Leibnitzian and ethical ideals comes to the front; nor must this be overlooked. The vision that sees in each component member of the society of spirits that constitute the Ideal Universe, those intrinsic needs that must be supplied to bring into realization what is unique therein—this vision is no other than that possessed by the monad.

The agreement of the two systems from the constitutive aspect, extends to further details. What in the ethical ideal appears as the unique intrinsic essence of each monad by which it is differentiated from and rendered indispensable to every other individual, appears in the Leibnitzian scheme as differences in the degrees of vision accredited to the different monads, whereby each images the rest of the universe more or less distinctly according to its power of vision. True, the view is always a total view; but the picture observed is blurred or clear according to the capacity of the monad that mirrors the universe. It is the differences in their points of view and the clarity of their vision that distinguish between different monads. And so, that peculiarity which is hypothetically accredited to each member of the organic ideal by virtue of which it is different from every other member and yet absolutely essential to all of them, this uniqueness is identifiable with the different degrees of clearness of vision which marked the characteristics of different monads.

Yet each must see that which is latent in all. The

totality must thus be divined in a single vision and thereby be intellectually swallowed up by the single spirit. This is exactly the essence of the monad and of the ethical ideal. The individual members of each ideal embody in themselves the totality, and act from the view-point of this totality. In their essentials, therefore, the Leibnitzian and the Ethical constitutive conceptions are one, and we may infer that the latter is derived from the former. At any rate the similarity of the two is evident.

Another source from which the ethical ideal draws freely is the Kantian ethical doctrine. The regulative or normative side of the ethical doctrine comes from Kant. From this doctrine, the ethical ideal derives the absolute rigor of the ethical imperative and the good-will as the content of the moral act. Kant has two tests of a moral act; one is the possibility of making the act universal without self-contradiction; the other is the manifestation of the good-will. The Ethical Movement likewise has two tests; one is the degree to which the act tends to realize the spiritual organism; the other is the manifestation of the good-will. The former is an objective, the latter a subjective test; the former is determinable by the intellectual faculty; the latter is so closely identified with the subjective conscience that an observer can never be positive that the good-will is present in and prompts the act which he observes. Society, therefore, in most cases applies the objective test to our acts, and leaves it to our intimate friends, who alone best know our subjective promptings and our habits, to apply the subjective test.

The Kantian and the Ethical Movement are thus at one in their view of the tests of what constitutes a moral act. Nevertheless the two systems, though united in regard to the absolute rigor and the content

of the moral law and in regard to the tests of a moral act, yet differ in the bases from which they derive their ethical formulæ. The Kantian imperative has its foundation in the universality and the necessity of the moral ought regardless of any end of action; the ethical imperative has its foundation in the ethical ideal, both as the source and end of action.

Now it is easy to see how the mere form of an act, simply through its universality and necessity gives rise to an imperative that is absolute. It is not so easy to see how an ideal that is not a pure form of action but contains also a content can issue a like imperative. The answer lies probably in the fact that the ethical ideal is an absolute end—an end which Kant sought, but did not find. Now an absolute and universal end of action can give rise to an absolute imperative just as well as the universality of the mere form of the act gives rise to the necessity of the act and hence to a categorical imperative. The Kantian imperative, based upon the mere form of the act, issues the command: Act so that thy act may be made the norm of a universal act. It has no reference to an end. The ethical imperative, with the added weight which comes from the content or end of action issues the command: Act in such a way as to elicit the universal end; *i. e.*, thy end as well as the ends of others at the same time. "So act," Prof. Adler says, "as to elicit what is autotelic (that is, mentally and morally unique) in the self of others, and thereby develop what is autotelic in thyself is the formula which I should choose."¹

The ethical ideal differs from the Kantian in that the former has an end of action that gives rise to an imperative; the latter has no such end, and derives its ethical formula from the pure form of the act. To the

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 14, p. 279.

question: "What sort of act fills the requirements of the ethical formulas of Kant and of the Ethical Movement?" we get the same answer from both: "It is the act which is characterized by the good-will." There is nothing good, but the good-will, say both systems alike. The connection holds not so much in regard to their views of the metaphysical nature of the ethical ideal as in regard to the form which they consider the ethical ideal to operate under. The Kantian ideal operates under the imperative of a purely formal law which is self-imposed and is absolute because it is universal in scope. The ethical ideal operates likewise under the stimulus of an imperative which an ideal, that is at the same time an absolute end, imposes upon us.

It is strange that the two movements, differing as they do in regard to the doctrine of ends of action, should yet harmonize in regard to the form and the content of the moral act, and should apply the same test to determine the morality of an act. This can be accounted for either on the ground that the doctrine of ends of action is, as Kant would have it, not a factor in the moral act, or on the ground that the spiritual organism as an end, is only a more picturesque expression of the universality of a moral act. Where the ends and means coincide, as is the case in a system where each is at the same time end and means, the mere form of the act becomes the significant factor, and we are reduced to the Kantian moral formula which is based on the mere form of the act. Thus the likeness between the two systems becomes yet still closer.

To Kant and to Leibnitz we thus trace the main philosophic sources of the Ethical Movement. The Pure Ethical Movement can thus be described as the Kantian rigoristic unconditional categorical imperative resting on the Leibnitzian theory of monads. The

Kantian influence is seen in the rigor of its injunctions, in the content and test of a moral act. The Leibnitzian influence is visible in the doctrine of the sovereignty of the members, each of which is both end and means of every other member. To be a member of the ethical ideal each member must know the whole in its severalty and mirror the whole in its entirety. From Leibnitz, then, the ethical ideal derives its constitutive principle; from Kant it derives its regulative or normative principle.

(V) *What Hope for Practical Moral Reform Can We Draw from the Ethical Ideal?*

Can the Ethical Movement, grounded as it is on the organic ideal, serve as a practical reform movement? This is, of course, the most vital of all questions and its most scientific answer depends upon a study of the moral status of a community after, as compared with before, an Ethical Society has been established in it. Only such a comparison can reveal the efficiency of the movement. It is, however, impossible to take such cross sections of society except at very long intervals of time; and then the cross sections so taken, are blurred and confusing and can therefore give little light upon our question.

We are then left to the other alternative, that of examining the scope of its ideal and of determining its efficiency in an *a priori* manner. Such an examination of the principle underlying the Ethical Movement, reveals at least no self-contradictory doctrine as is the case with the other practical movements. We find no demand for brotherhood based upon a principle of likeness—a principle, the consequence of which is to recognize no brotherhood where likeness is not established.

We find no mere fostering paternalism based upon an ideal that is devoted to the present enjoyment of the comforts and artistic luxuries of life—an aristocratic ideal that divided mankind into those that give and those that receive the present goods of life.

The ethical ideal calls for brotherhood and coöperation just as the religious ideal and the social ideal do, but it bases this call on the principle of the unique differences that separate mankind.

Moral reform is, after all, realizable only through educational methods; and relies solely on the soundness of the method employed. It depends for success upon the clearness with which we can uphold the light. And then the light will of itself effect the desired change in conduct, so that conduct will adjust itself to it. To see the light clearly, is therefore of prime importance.

To have a theory of truth thus becomes essential even for an Ethical Movement. In spite of its protestations against philosophical systems as sources of ethical knowledge, the Ethical Movement does, after all, take on a philosophical character. For it, like the philosophical systems which it condemns, aims at a total viewpoint; and is, in so far, philosophical. It can find light for ethical guidance, only by soaring up and bringing it from its ideal.

If the Ethical Movement errs at all in denying that it rests on a theory of truth, its error arises from the locus of the ethical ideal which is in the non-existent future. The ideals of the other movements are, as we have seen, in the past or in the present. The fact that the locus of the ethical ideal is thus different from that of any other ideals, is mistaken for an absence of a theory of truth. Because past theories have failed to solve the ethical problems, the Ethical Movement denies altogether the need of theories for the purpose of moral

reform. It insists upon proper action regardless of theories, simply because past theories have failed to produce proper actions. It fails to see that they failed not because of the existence, but because of the location of their ideal. Because the future is absent in the sense that it has never yet been, the Ethical Movement, whose ideal is in the future, is apt to lead to the error of confounding the absence with the total non-existence of the principle on which ethical conduct is based.

This is not, however, a vital error. It has no consequences that weaken its ethical doctrine. It is purely a logical error, which the Ethical Movement corrects in practice and so neutralizes. In practice the Ethical Movement has a theory of an ideal just as much as have any of the philosophical systems before it. The location of it in the future, it mistakes for its absence in toto.

The Ethical Movement gives more promise of successfully achieving moral reform, because it appeals to and works upon individuals and not upon masses or groups of individuals. The Religious Ethical Movement makes its appeal to the individual for a certain line of conduct simply on the ground that he belongs to a certain group. It calls upon him as a Christian to act so and so; and as a Jew to act so and so. Naturally, this line of conduct is limited by the adjective describing it, and is applicable only within these limits. This is genuine group morality, and has been the sanction of unethical conduct to all outside of that group.

There is present a strong tendency to emphasize group morality over individual morality, and to discount the latter in favor of the former. Jane Addams is the chief exponent of this tendency. The new doctrine of group morality advocated by Miss Addams differs from the old doctrine of group morality in this:

The latter did not even recognize any such thing as individual morality—all conduct that was moral has its origin in the group and its application was coextensive with the group. It did not extend beyond it. There was no such thing as immoral conduct towards one who was outside of your group. The new doctrine of group morality does make the distinction between individual and group morality and does not, of course, go to the extent of giving a free bill of ethical cleanliness to all acts affecting those outside of one's own group. The new view makes personal morality a mere zero point in the scale of ethical conduct. Yourself to live a moral life is not sufficient. You must go beyond, and spur on others to act ethically. This is positive morality as compared with the zero morality of the individual right-doing. Personal right-doing becomes immoral or, at any rate, unethical from the viewpoint of the group morality. Group morality is thus contrasted with individual morality. Jane Addams cites the conduct of the President of the Pullman Palace Car Company as an example of a high class of individual morality that fell so far short of being of the standard of group morality that his conduct is called immoral. The President of this Company devised various ways of benefiting his employees. He built a town for them amidst beautiful surroundings, and fitted it up with splendid, comfortable dwellings; he built houses, libraries, social rooms. He paid them fair wages and did all that in his power lay, to make them contented. Yet to his surprise they went on strike and stirred up much violence in return for all the philanthropy that was shown them. And they were right, contends Miss Addams, because all the philanthropy of the benevolent President was an exercise of mere individual morality, whereas the times demanded social or group morality.

What he should have done, was to have educated them up to the point where their welfare and salvation would have been a matter of their own and not of his creation. He failed to do this, and in failing to vest them with self-government and in maintaining instead a benevolent paternalism, his conduct was immoral.

In the light of the ethical ideal, the distinction here made between individual and group morality disappears. Morality, as a social concept, gives ethical value only to those acts that elicit what is potential in others. Only such acts are ethical; for morality consists in eliciting the good-will of others. From this point of view, there can be no distinction between individual and group morality. The Social Ethical Movement, of which Jane Addams is the chief standard-bearer, to-day evidently has two standards of moral conduct, one for the individual as individual, the other for the individual as a member of a social group. It is difficult to see what the ethical obligations of the individual as individual apart from the social group may be.

That morality implies a social obligation at all times and is not merely a goody-goody aloofness from society is becoming more evident daily, in the political, economic, and social spheres of life. In political life, this is evidenced by the establishment of Bureaus of Municipal Research, which attempt to force home the fact that public office is a public trust. In the economic sphere, we hear of the recognition by employers of the rights of employees to some form of recreation during the day, and the consequent introduction into some factories of a reading room, of a social room and of a lunch room. This is simply the recognition of the principle that human beings are not merely means but also ends in themselves.

With a view to ascertaining how far employees are

means and to what extent they must be treated as ethical ends, the Ethical Culture Society has recently given birth to a Business Men's Group¹ whose object is to study the proper relations between employers and employees. The need for a better understanding of this relation is becoming more and more general; and it is seen that to fail to heed it, is to run the risk of being condemned by the moral conscience. There is no line of demarcation between individual and group morality; for morality means the reciprocal relation between the individual and the group. The duties of a man as a personality do not stop when his duties as an employer begin. They are identical in both relationships. They require, however, to be worked out and applied under different circumstances; but this does not at all make group morality different from individual morality. The ethical ideal recognizes no such distinction.

Another need that ethical science feels to-day and which the Ethical Movement supplies is a clear, definite knowledge of what constitutes the Right in the particular problems that confront us almost daily. Great laxity in morals came about largely because the old notions of morality had been exploded and, under the influence of experimental science, an individualistic standard had been set up. The inductive sciences recently enthroned, were driving from the field all deductive methods. This went on more rapidly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century than ever before. Faculty psychology was overthrown, and experimental laboratory psychology was the fashion. In education, the old memory methods were broken up and royal-road methods were invented. All along the line, the

¹ See: "An Ethical Program for Business Men" in *The Standard*, 1921; also pp. 280-304 of Dr. Adler's book, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*.

same phenomena are visible. In ethics the new movement gave rise to the comparative study of races and set forth their moral notions. Anthropology produced a weakening in the rigidity of the moral law. If the moral law varied with the races of antiquity, why may it not vary with individuals of to-day? Science shows the existence of various moral standards without any compunctions of conscience. Indeed, to science, conscience is merely the overpowering of the individual by the racial experience. Where these racial experiences were different from our own, the morals were different and conscience was unhurt by acts which now cause it to hide itself with shame. All this, the inductive scientific investigations proved. And so the notion spreads that there is no other investigation than the inductive, that is worth anything. For by it we are guided on with help of one particular to another particular experience. There is no universal experience at all. Deduction starts with the universal experience and this is impossible. Therefore deduction is impossible. It is unscientific. This is the crucial position in the logic of the situation. To rehabilitate a stronger respect for morals, the individualistic stand which the inductive processes employed, must be modified and more rigoristic ethics must be substituted. Rigoristic ethics is in general not obtainable by the experimental procedure which comparative anthropology as a science falls back on.

Now it is here that the Pure Ethical Movement boldly grasps the bull by the horn, and says: Science depends on the validity of the law of causation. The law of causation must be absolutely accepted or you can have no science. Not a single exception from its operation is allowed. If the scientist accepts this, and he must or he has no science that predicts consequences

from the conditions, but mere probabilities, then, he gives up his claim to experience as a basis for his work, and starts instead with a universal which it is impossible to experience. He starts with the absolute necessity of the law of causation, and of such necessity there can be no experience. Instead therefore of the particular experiences forming the basis of a general law, the general law is the very basis of the science whereby particular experiences are organized. This universality of law is necessary in science. It is not a proof, but a postulate of all proofs.

Likewise in morals, there is a law which imposes itself upon all acts. It is the unifying principle in conduct just as the law of causation is the basis of science. This unifying principle is beyond experience just as the law of causation is beyond experience. It is a postulate of thought, and cannot be experienced. Its reality is not, however, thereby impaired. It is the reality that forever stands aloof from experience. Nay, this reality gives validity to the reality that is experienced, just as the law of causation which is not experienced gives validity to the particular sciences which deal with experience. This law is not crystallized into any content. It remains form forever. Herein the Pure Ethical Movement differs from the Religious Ethical Movement which assumes a unity endowed with certain attributes and with a content. This crystallized content then becomes the only content and conformity to this content is a test of morality and salvation.

The Pure Ethical Movement gives no content to its principle of unity and therefore admits an infinite variety of contents under it. It is thoroughly democratic. And herein lies the hope of moral reform. On the one hand, there must be a rigidity of the moral law

which shall dispel from conduct individual caprice and its sequel, anarchy; and on the other hand, there must be established a moral democracy under whose régime the meanest spirit shall feel himself a sovereign law-giver amidst fellow sovereigns. The Pure Ethical Movement furnishes both these conditions of moral life. In this movement, therefore, rests the hope of the moral reform of our social order, and from the establishment of Ethical Societies in increasing numbers may be expected the conquest of those institutions which are at present the greatest hindrance of moral reform, namely, the materialistic journalism and the materialistic educational systems of the present time—the two agencies which, if constituted on an ethical rather than on a materialistic basis would be the most potent protagonists of social reform.

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
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